Faintly, and like a dream, the recollection of the beautiful old Whig moral sentiments steals upon our memory. We remember the touching pictures, limned some twenty years ago, of the industrious man working his way to the rank of the ten-pounders, in order to attain the glorious privilege of the franchise. We were told then that it was most desirable to have a distinct property qualification, in order that men might exert themselves to attain it, and by their exertions stimulate others in the like course of frugality and perseverance. Is that to be the case in future? Certainly not. Every common carrier who pays for his van £2, 6s. 8d. yearly, as the tax on an implement of trade, is to be as politically powerful as the acred squire, or the manufacturer who gives employment to thousands—every horse-dealer, dog-breaker, and tavern-keeper may vote in virtue of the assessed taxes—every clerk in a shop who has £100 a-year, and every warehouseman, who has either saved or succeeded to £50—are to be entitled to vote either in town or county. We said, long ago, when the Whigs were lauding their earlier measure as a grand incentive to industry, and as a splendidly devised scheme for stimulating deserving operatives, that before many years were over the same party would attempt to lower the qualification, so as to embrace all who were likely to forward and promote their designs. Our prophecy is now demonstrated to be true. We showed that, after the first successful attempt, there never can be an end of swamping, or, at all events, of proposals to swamp. The ten-pound householders, then in the full enjoyment of their monopoly, did not seem to believe us. Somehow or other they had been impressed with the idea that the Whigs were the devoted friends of the “middle classes”—that they had a firm faith in what was termed “shopocracy”—and that they never would attempt to supplant the power which they had created. And, certainly, the ten-pounders have done nothing to merit this treatment at the hands of the Whigs. They have clung to them, especially in the large towns, with a fidelity which we cannot but respect, and, in spite of occasional scurvy treatment, have shown themselves the most zealous of partisans. But the time has now arrived when their ascendancy is to give way. Respectability is no longer the fashion. If the ten-pounders, indeed, had been able to give the Whigs a large majority in Parliament, and to have insured their continuance in power, matters might have been different. There would then have been no occasion for lowering the franchise; because the Whigs, ever since they have been a party (which is now an old story), have never taken a single step except as means towards an end; and they would not, but for party necessity, have attempted to swamp their friends. But the old Reform Bill, though devised especially for the purpose of securing to the Whigs an unlimited range of power, did not succeed in its object. It was based essentially upon property, and, by degrees, property and Conservatism came to a common understanding. The Whigs lost ground every year: partly because their champions were either effete or insincere; partly because they were foolish enough to presume on their new ascendancy, and to insult the rooted Protestantism of the country; and partly, because they showed themselves in their arrangements grasping, greedy, and nepotical, to a degree never yet paralleled even in a corrupted state. They wanted to make, and did in fact make, with scarce an exception, the Cabinet a mere family Junta. They married and forwarded marriages on the strength of political connexion, and jobbed out public employment accordingly. Grey, Russell, and Elliot, were the three names preferred; and Heaven only knows what amount of perquisites was absorbed by the scions of these illustrious races. Such things cannot be done in a corner, so secretly as to escape observation. The popular ire was roused at such an exhibition of awful selfishness, and the Whigs declined in character. Had Sir Robert Peel not been the Minister and type of expediency, he might have gained an easy and lasting victory over them; but unfortunately, both for the party which he then led and for himself, he had a weak perception of principle. The two rivals sate, on opposite sides of the table, watching each other at the game of popularity, but never for a moment reflecting that, in any event, Great Britain had to pay the loss. The game, though it had continued a great deal too long, was somewhat abruptly terminated. Those who had supported the Baronet while he played fair, withdrew their confidence; and the noble lord was left in possession of the field. Did he maintain it? By no means. He juggled and traversed until every one was weary of him, and at last he was ejected. The election of 1852 showed that parties were very nearly balanced; so nearly indeed that, but for the union of the Peelites with the Whigs, Lord Derby would have had a majority in the House of Commons. This state of things may be embarrassing to politicians, but it does not justify a violent change in the Constitution. However desirable majorities may be to either party, an attempt to obtain ascendancy by means of legislative enactment and tampering with the franchise, is so very reprehensible that it amounts almost to a crime.
But we must not lose sight of the bill by indulging in remarks upon the past. Its object is to swamp the present class of voters by a wholesale admission of others who have not been able to raise themselves to the enviable level which is the limit of the existing qualification. The bill is ingeniously devised. Let it pass, and every tradesman will consider himself sure of three or four votes which he can direct. Because, of course, the clerk, with £100 a-year, dares not vote against his master; and, even if he is entitled, after dismissal, to remain on the register, the mere privilege of voting, perhaps once in seven years, will be a poor compensation for the immediate loss of employment. Can you call a clerk or book-keeper, with a bare £100 a-year, independent? To do so is a mere perversion of terms. He is more liable even than the operative to the influence of his employer, inasmuch as the nature of his employment is more precarious. We heard a great deal last year about Government influence being used among the persons employed in the dockyards, and it was gravely proposed by some of the leading Whig journals, that all such should be disfranchised, as they could not be expected to vote independently. But a Government official, however zealous and unscrupulous he may be, is amenable to public opinion and public censure, and cannot exercise the same stringent means of compulsion which are open to the tradesman or the attorney.
Then as to bribery: the tendency of lowering the franchise must be to increase that to a very great extent. In many places, even under the present system, votes are bought and sold; but if this bill is carried into effect, the corruption will become enormous. Experience has shown us, very clearly, that there is a large class in this country by whom votes are considered in the light of marketable commodities, and this bill seems specially framed for the purpose of adding to their numbers. The possession of £50 in a savings-bank is by no means a guarantee that the depositor will be inaccessible to the influences of a bribe. But besides the other changes which we have discussed, it is proposed that residence of two years and a-half in a house rated at £6 in a municipal borough shall confer the right of voting, and that previous payment of rates and taxes is to be no longer required! Can any one for a moment doubt that the consequence of this will be to render constituencies venal to an extent never yet known in this country? If even under the present system it is found that bribery prevails, will not the offence become much more rank and general when you enfranchise a class peculiarly liable from their position to such influences? And remember this, that candidates or their agents are not always, nor indeed in the majority of cases, the tempters. Enough has been revealed to show us that, in a very large number of the English towns, there exist regularly organised clubs or societies of voters, who force their terms upon candidates. These fine patriots do not concern themselves much with party politics. They do not object to one man because he is a Tory, or to another because he is a Whig. Pledges as to future conduct are not at all in their line: they much prefer the immediate tender of a crisp bank-note or of a few shining sovereigns. They have their agents and their office-bearers, and must be bought in the lump. Let this bill pass, and there will hardly be an urban constituency in this kingdom without such a club. Is that a state of things to be envied? Is it fair to the honest and upright voter that he should be swamped by organised rascality, and that his privilege should be rendered of no avail? We can hardly express ourselves too strongly on this subject, for the provocation is very great. The Whig party, for years past, have affected to mourn over the corruption of the constituencies, and yet here is their accredited leader bringing in a bill which must necessarily have the effect of increasing that corruption tenfold!
But we have not yet quite done. Lord John Russell proposes to give 46 new members to the English counties; but then the county constituency is not to remain as before. Occupiers, not proprietors, of £10 a-year are to have votes in counties; and it is by no means contemplated that the house occupied by the voter should be of that value. “We propose,” said Lord John Russell, “with respect to the county right of voting, that—with the exception of a dwelling-house, which may be of any value, provided the voter lives in it—in all other cases the building must be of the value of £5 a-year. Supposing there is a house and land, the house may be rated at £1 or £2 a-year, provided the voter resides in it; but if the qualification is made out by any other building—a cattle-shed or any other building of that kind—then we propose this check, that such building shall be of the value of £5 a-year. This, then, is the franchise we propose to give in counties for the future; and the House will see that it has a very considerable bearing upon the question of the increase of number of members which I have stated we propose. Out of the whole number I have mentioned I shall propose that 46 members shall be given to counties; but as these counties will hereafter include the £10 householders, it is obvious that the constituency will be less of a special character. It does seem to me that all the endeavours made to run down the agricultural interest, or to run down the manufacturing interest, are totally foolish and absurd, and that there can be no better system of representation than that which takes into consideration the whole of the great interests of the country, which contribute to its glory and prosperity.” We have thought it right to insert these paragraphs, because they contain a doctrine quite new to statesmen, and one which has hitherto been unbroached. There is certainly a little obscurity in the language, but not enough to conceal the true nature of the sentiment. What Lord John Russell means to say is this:—It is absurd any longer to maintain the special character of constituencies—absurd to make distinctions between agriculture, manufactures, or any branch of industry—absurd to frame your system so that one member shall represent agriculture, another commerce, and another manufactures, because you should in every case combine the whole of the great interests of the country. Carry that doctrine into effect, and the distinction between counties and towns ceases altogether. But how can you bring it fairly into effect? In the towns which have the privilege of returning members, agriculture is not, and cannot be, represented at all. The urban voters are all engaged in other pursuits, and they send to the House of Commons members to represent that branch of industry which is their staple. From the towns, therefore, the territorial interest, which is in reality the greatest and most enduring in England, never can be adequately represented. You may, however, easily enough, swamp the agricultural interest in the counties, and that by the method which Lord John Russell proposes, namely, of admitting to the county-roll ten-pound occupiers from the towns, which do not send a representative to Parliament. It has often been remarked, as a special defect in the Act of 1832, that it allowed in many cases the votes of small proprietors in villages and towns to swamp the votes of the agriculturists; and in several counties in Scotland this is notoriously the case. The manufacturing towns in Forfarshire, in Roxburghshire, and in Fife, furnish so many votes, that the landed interest is entirely unrepresented; and as new seats of manufacture are laid down, the evil is always progressive. There can be no doubt that in the instances which we have referred to, the landed interest is incomparably greater than all the others; and yet, in so far as representation goes, it has virtually no voice at all. It has been proposed, more than once—and the scheme carries reason with it—that these anomalies should be removed by the attachment of the unrepresented boroughs to the nearest ones which have representation; thus increasing and consolidating a class of voters who have a distinct common interest. If this were done, and the counties freed from an incubus, there might be no objection to the lowering of the agricultural tenant’s qualification, so that the man who paid £20 of yearly rent might be entitled to admission to the roll. But Lord John Russell takes exactly the opposite view. He wants to swamp the country constituencies altogether, and he proposes to effect that by letting in every man from the villages who pays £10 of rent! He himself admits that by this arrangement, persons occupying houses not rated at more than £1 or £2 a-year—in fact, mere hovels—may become county voters, and this he considers a fitting method of combining “the whole of the great interests of the country!” And yet, mark his inconsistency. By the same bill which proposes this amalgamation of interests in the counties, it is provided that University representation shall be extended, and that special members shall be allotted to the English Inns of Court. Surely there cannot be a more direct recognition of separate and exclusive interests than this; and yet, in counties, the agricultural interest is to be put down.
We have not the least fear that the law will be so altered; but that such proposals should emanate from a Ministry, is, we think, a disgraceful and a lamentable fact. They are no doubt entitled to have their opinion. They may think, though on what grounds we cannot divine, that it is good policy not to maintain any balance in the constitution, and that the franchise in town and country should be made the same. They may consider it advisable that small manufacturing towns, too unimportant to return members of themselves, should be allowed to furnish the majority of county voters, and that, virtually, the land should cease to have any representatives. If they think so, it is much to be regretted that they do not say so openly, so that we might have the opportunity of doing battle in a fair field. But this measure of theirs is intended to be deceptive, and convey a false impression that they are dealing impartially with all classes. In the first place, they take from the smaller boroughs no fewer than 66 members. Their principle is, that no borough having less than 300 electors, or less than 5000 inhabitants, ought to return a member; and that no borough having less than 500 electors, or less than 10,000 inhabitants, should return two members. Let us, for the sake of argument, admit the justice of this proposition. Does it therefore follow that it was wise to disfranchise such boroughs? That is by no means a necessary consequence. If the constituency is at present too small, extend it by all means. Wherever practicable, join these boroughs together; where that cannot be done, take an increased constituency from the nearest unrepresented town, until you reach the magic number which is to be the minimum of representation. Bring in fresh blood, which it is quite easy to do, without exciting the clamour and dissatisfaction which the abolition or curtailment of a privilege long enjoyed is sure to create. It cannot be denied that there is plenty of material at hand. There is also Parliamentary precedent and usage; for in Scotland, at the present moment, groups of small burghs return a single member, and some of these burghs are infinitesimally small. We have them so low, in point of voters, as 12, 14, and 22. Yet they are not disfranchised. They share their peculiar privilege along with others, making in the aggregate very respectable constituencies. Surely such an arrangement as that would be preferable to the Government proposition, which does wanton violence to constituencies against which no accusation has been made. We fear, however, that the disfranchisement of the smaller boroughs was considered an indispensable preliminary to the grand attack upon the counties.
Having thus secured the disposal of sixty-six seats, the Government come forward with an immense show of liberality, and offer forty-six of these to the counties. But then it is only on condition that the counties will allow themselves to be swamped. Nine large towns are each to have an additional member; there are to be five new borough seats; the Inns of Court are to have two, and the London University one member; the remaining three seats are to be given to Scotland.
This brings us to a point which we are absolutely bound to notice, because it serves as a further illustration of the impropriety and folly of bringing forward such a bill at such a time. If the Emperor Nicholas had the direction of our internal affairs, he could not have devised a more notable plan for fomenting dissension among us; and it is but right to show that this measure, if pushed on, must excite an angry feeling in the country. We, who are opposing any change in the electoral franchise at the present time, mainly because we think it an unhappy and dangerous juncture for making experiments, cannot be blamed if we state our own views of what is really required when the proper time shall arrive for making a readjustment of the representation. We do not wish, by any means, to argue the question at present: we state it simply to show the extent of the disagreement which may arise, if this measure is to be prosecuted just now.
Independent of the wholesale disfranchisement of English boroughs, which must necessarily excite great disgust and dissatisfaction, we take leave to tell Lord John Russell, and the other members of the Cabinet, that this bill of theirs is not likely to meet with any favour in the eyes of the Scottish people. The question of adequate representation has been mooted, discussed, and is now thoroughly understood by us; and we are determined, in the event of a change, to insist that our rights shall be recognised and allowed. This new bill, proposing to give us three additional members, whereas in respect either of population or of taxation we are entitled to twenty, cannot be satisfactory. It is not only right, but necessary, that our English friends should know the feeling in Scotland. We are not represented on the same scale or in the same manner as England is, and we complain of the inequality. We ask a common standard and a just proportion. Now, it does not appear that, by the present bill, the existing anomalies are to be removed, although, by the disfranchisement of so many boroughs, it would have been easy to have given Scotland her just share of members. If there be any reason why Scotland should have fewer proportional representatives than England, let it be boldly stated. If there is no reason at all, then let justice be done to us. We do not wish at present to go into details—indeed, that would be premature, until the new Scottish Reform Bill is before us; but as it is quite plain that the aggregate number of the House of Commons is not to be augmented, and as Lord John Russell proposes to give only three additional members to Scotland, we are perfectly entitled to enter our emphatic protest against a measure which has no solid principle for its foundation. The first point for consideration, in a redistribution of the representation such as is now contemplated, was undoubtedly the number of members which England, Scotland, and Ireland are entitled respectively to return. Lord John Russell either does not see the principle, or he refuses to acknowledge it. Now, this is a matter which will cause much excitement, and create not a little angry feeling in Scotland; and it is as well that our English friends should be made aware of it. We are, of course, anxious for a proper increase of national representatives, and we are perfectly aware that we cannot attain that object without a general measure for altering and abolishing constituencies. But this measure, while it is sure to create a turmoil in England, hardly professes to benefit us at all, and avoids the principle for which the Scottish people are contending. Any arrangements which may be made as to the future distribution of the representation, ought to be well weighed, considered, and matured; for this country will not submit to the confusion of a new reform bill once in every three or four years. This measure seems to us to be utterly deficient in these respects, and to be so loosely conceived as to give some colour to the prevalent opinion that it furnished an agreeable relaxation to the noble Lord between the intervals of his more serious editorial labours.
In Scotland, therefore, the bill will be considered highly objectionable, as evading the only popular demand from that portion of Great Britain. Beyond an increase of numbers, we have no desire for any change—Whigs, Tories, and Radicals, being for once agreed.
But we are not so unreasonable as to wish to fight that battle now. We earnestly deprecate anything like internal discord, for we have other battles to fight, and the people of Great Britain ought now, if ever, to be cordially united in sentiment. Therefore, although we think that we are not altogether fairly treated, and that we have not only a strong case, but an absolute right to claim redress, we shall not be guilty of the lamentable folly of urging our claims for increased representation at such a time. We believe that to be the general feeling of the people of Scotland; but then their forbearance is entirely contingent upon the course which the Government may pursue in respect to this measure. There may be, and probably will be, agitation hereafter; but there need be none now, at least on the score of representation, if the Ministry will but tacitly acknowledge their error, and remove this source of dissension.