Blackwood's Edinburgh magazine, Vol. 75, No. 462, April 1854

by Various

We have already seen that, in Oct. 1852, the reviewer proposed to abstract thirty members from the smaller English boroughs. It became evident, however, that so paltry a massacre of the innocents would not suffice, more especially as it had become part of the scheme to swamp the English counties. Accordingly we are told, in an off-hand and easy manner: “To all that we said on a former occasion as to the theoretical propriety and justice of the small borough representation, we unreservedly adhere. But, unfortunately, it is too notorious that these boroughs are generally in a condition which, for the sake of electoral purity, imperatively demands their disfranchisement, partial or entire. Here again it is true that parliamentary statistics do not altogether bear out our conclusion. Of the seventy-two boroughs convicted of bribery between 1833 and 1853, only twenty-one can properly be called small—as having fewer than five hundred electors—while some of the more constantly and flagrantly impure places number their votes by thousands.” So, according to the admission of even this writer, there is no case established, on the ground of corruption, for the wholesale disfranchisement of the small boroughs. Nevertheless we are to assume them to be impure, because he says it is notorious that they are so; and by this short and summary process of assertion he gets rid of the trouble of investigation. The boroughs are not put upon their trial, for there is no specific charge against them; but they are condemned at once because the writer has a low opinion of their morality. This is worse than Jeddart justice, where the trial took place after the execution. In the case of the boroughs there is to be no trial at all. The following conclusion is therefore easily arrived at: “There can be no doubt in the mind of any reformer that, in some way or other, these small boroughs ought to be suppressed; that we must have, if possible, no more constituencies under one thousand electors.” So much for the disfranchisement; now for the redistribution.

Final scheme suggested to Lord John Russell for disfranchising the small boroughs and swamping the counties.—“The third method proposed is to merge all these small boroughs into the county constituencies, by depriving them of their members, and reducing the county franchise to a £10 occupancy. In this way the class would still be represented, and the individuals would still retain their votes, and the electoral lists of counties would be considerably modified and greatly enriched. This plan would, we think, be far the fairest and most desirable, inasmuch as it would give us constituencies large in number and varied in character, and, therefore, to a great extent secure against illicit and undue influences.”—Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1853, p. 602.

The next and last point which we shall notice is the representation of minorities. We do not know to whom the credit of having invented this notable scheme is really due. There are various claimants in the field. Mr G. L. Craik, of Queen’s College, Belfast, asserts that he was the original discoverer, having propounded a plan of this nature so early as 1836. Ingenious as the idea may be, it will hardly rank in importance with the discovery of the steam-engine, nor do we think that its originator is entitled to any exorbitant share of public gratitude or applause. We shall give it as we find it in the Review.

Source of Lord John Russell’s proposal to give members in certain cases to minorities.—“The mode by which we propose to insure the constituent minorities their fair share in the representation—i. e. to make the majorities and minorities in the House of Commons correspond as nearly as may be to majorities and minorities in the country, or in the electoral bodies—is, to give (as now) to each elector as many votes as there are members to be chosen, and to allow him to divide these votes as he pleases among the candidates, or to give them all to one. But as at present most places return two members, it is obvious that, under the proposed arrangement, wherever the minority exceeded one-third of the total number of the electors, they would be able to return one member, or to obtain one-half the representation, which would be more than their fair share, and would place them on an equality with the majority, which would never do; while, if they fell short of one-third, they would be, as now, virtually unrepresented and ignored. To obviate this, it will be necessary so to arrange our electoral divisions, that as many constituencies as possible should return three members: one of these a minority, if at all respectable, could always manage to secure.”—Edin. Review, Oct. 1853, p. 622.

Here, at all events, is the notion about the representation of majorities, and the establishment of as many constituencies as possible, returning three members. Lord John Russell’s method of working this, is to restrict each elector to two votes.

Thus we see that all the leading features and peculiarities of Lord John Russell’s new Reform Bill—the disfranchisement of the boroughs, the swamping of the counties, the ten-pound occupancy clause, the qualification by deposit in the savings’ bank, the voting of graduates, the retention of their seats by members accepting office, and the representation of minorities—are contained in the articles published in the Edinburgh Review, in 1852 and 1853. This is, to say the least of it, a very singular coincidence. Of course we do not mean to maintain that Lord John Russell was debarred from availing himself of any useful hints which might be offered him, or from adopting the notions of any political sage, or harum-scarum cobbler of constitutions; we entirely admit his right to gather wisdom, or its counterfeit, from any source whatever. What we wish to impress upon the public is this, that, down to 1852, not one of these notions had occurred to our grand constitutional reformer, who for twenty years had been sedulously watching the operation of his original measure! Nay, more than that: two years ago, his ideas on the subject of Parliamentary Reform were diametrically opposite to those which he has now promulgated; and that not only in detail, but in absolute essence and form! Had he come before us this year with a scheme based upon the principle of 1852, which was a lowering of the franchise, without any farther disturbance of the constitution of the electoral bodies, it would have been but a poor criticism to have taunted him with a minor change in the details. He might have used his discretion in elevating or lowering the point where the franchise was to begin, without subjecting himself to any sneer on account of change of principle. But, wonderful as are the changes which we have seen of late years in the views of public men, this is the most astounding of them all. Never before, perhaps, did a statesman pass such a decided censure on his own judgment, or make such an admission of former recklessness and error. If he is right now, he must have been utterly wrong before. The constitution of 1852, as he would have made it, must have been a bad one. One-tenth of the members of the House of Commons would still have been returned by constituencies which he now regards as unfit to be constituencies any more. If the maintenance of the small boroughs is a blot on the constitution, how was it that Lord John Russell did not discover that blot until 1853, after the articles we have referred to were published? Did he take his ideas from those articles? If so, was there ever a more humiliating confession of entire poverty of mind? If he did not take his ideas from those articles, what was it that produced so entire a change of opinion?—what eminent political oculist has removed the film which impeded his vision but two short years ago? This is, in reality, a very grave matter. We are accustomed in this country to associate measures with men, and sometimes to accept the former on account of our belief and confidence in the sagacity of those who propose them. But what faith can we repose in a man who thus plays fast and loose upon a question with which he has been occupied all his life? This is not a case of expediency arising out of unforeseen circumstances. That the question is of the deepest import no one in his senses can deny. We know how the constitution, as framed at present, works; but we do not know how it may work if very materially altered. And yet we find the same mechanist proposing, within two years, two separate kinds of alteration! The first was simple enough, and had at least this much in its favour, that it did not require any violent displacement of the machinery. The second is so complex that the whole machinery must be re-arranged. It was our sincere hope that the country had seen the last of sudden conversions of parties—at no time edifying events, and sometimes attended by disastrous consequences—but we must, it seems, prepare ourselves for another conversion on the part of the Whigs, if this bill is to be carried through. They must, supposing them inclined to support Lord John Russell, either unsay what they said, or were prepared to have said, in 1852, or be ready to maintain that they were then greatly in advance of their leader. The dilemma, we admit, is an unpleasant and an odious one; but there is no escape from it, if the Whigs are determined, at all hazards, to follow their erratic leader.

That there is room for certain changes in the national representation we are by no means disposed to deny. It is impossible to devise any system so perfect as to preclude the idea of amendment; indeed, we suppose that there never was a constitution, or phase of a constitution, in the world, which gave entire and perfect satisfaction to all who lived under its operation. We may be told that the present system is theoretically wrong, that its principle is to exalt property and to exclude intelligence, and that in some parts it is incongruous, inconsistent, and contradictory. Possibly there may be some truth in such allegations; but then we must never lose sight of this, that the real test of a constitution is its practical working. It is undeniable that under the present system the middle classes have gained, not only power, but preponderance in the state; and accordingly we find that they are not favourable to a change which would certainly operate to their disadvantage. The ulterior aims of the men of Manchester may prompt them to desire a still further infusion of the democratic element, but neither the members nor the doctrines of that school have found favour with the British public. If public opinion generally, and the great interests of the nation, are well and effectively represented in the House of Commons, it does seem to us a very perilous experiment to disturb that state of matters. We should like very much to hear from Lord John Russell a distinct exposition of the results which he anticipates, should this scheme of his be carried. Is there any real point of interest to the nation which he is at present debarred from bringing forward by the exclusive constitution of the House of Commons? What are the existing grievances which call for so radical an alteration?

“What is there now amiss

That Cæsar and his senate must redress?”

We apprehend that the noble lord would be greatly puzzled to frame an intelligible answer to such queries. Well then, we are, perforce, compelled to fall back upon theory, and to assume that he vindicates his proposal, not because future measures will be of a better kind, or better discussed than heretofore, but because it is desirable, for symmetry’s sake, that the representation should be readjusted.