THE PROGRESS AND POLICY OF RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA.[[36]]
It is one of the happiest peculiarities in the construction of the human mind, that it acquires knowledge so gradually, that it cannot realise the extent of that ignorance by which it was once clouded; and forms its opinions so imperceptibly, that no precise period can be attached to their origin. It is just a year since Prince Menschikoff visited Constantinople upon a mission which subsequent events have proved to have been fraught with the most portentous consequences to Europe. If it were possible now to convey to the public any adequate notion of the lamentable want of information which then prevailed upon all matters connected with the Eastern Question, people would be inclined indignantly to deny its accuracy, if they did not go so far as to maintain stoutly that they had always penetrated into the true character of the policy of Russia, and anticipated her schemes of aggression; and, certainly, considering the prominence which this topic has acquired, it is not to be wondered at if familiarity with it should lead us into so natural an error. Nobody now doubts that the occupation of the Principalities formed part of that system of territorial aggrandisement which is the very essence of Russian policy, and which has not the less been successfully at work, because its operations have hitherto been so silently conducted as not to excite the alarm of the great powers of Europe.
The results of that policy were always apparent, no less in the history than on the map of Europe; and if they have only been forced upon our attention by events which have recently occurred, it has not been because the facts themselves were wanting which should have taught us what to expect, and have prepared us to meet that contingency which was inevitable; but unfortunately, even now, our inquiries and our discoveries end here, we are content with recognising the leading principle of Muscovite diplomacy without looking more narrowly into its workings, and thus acquiring the very knowledge and experience best adapted to enable us to cope successfully with the wily and ambitious power which is now defying Europe. For it is a fair inference, that if success has uniformly attended the aggressive schemes of Russia, nothing else than a departure from her established policy could lead to a different result; and therefore it is interesting to investigate the system of frontier extension which she has hitherto pursued, so that, if it has been altered, we may not only be able to account for so important a change, but to show how it may be taken advantage of by the powers opposed to her in the present struggle.
Peter the Great devised a scheme of territorial annexation, which during his own splendid career he practised with the greatest success upon neighbouring countries, which he bequeathed to his successors, and which a very slight knowledge of Russian history will enable us to recognise as the formula since adhered to by the successive occupants of the Muscovite throne. In an able pamphlet recently published, upon the Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East, the process is thus described: “It invariably begins with disorganisation, by means of corruption and secret agency, pushed to the extent of disorder and civil contention. Next in order comes military occupation to restore tranquillity; and in every instance the result has been, Protection followed by Incorporation.” This process, however, we hope to illustrate in a more detailed account of some of the acquisitions of the last century; but first it will be interesting to observe why the system of Peter the Great was the only one calculated to attain the object for which it was designed. That object was to extend the frontier of the empire in every direction, and to continue to do so to an unlimited amount. There was no single especially-coveted province, which, once gained, was sufficient to satisfy the ambition of the Czars. It was a never-ending process, and one which depended for its successful working entirely upon a strict adherence to the formula; for it is evident, that in proportion as the frontier became extended did the difficulty of guarding it increase, and that caution upon which the whole policy was built became more necessary with every new outpost which was established, in order that the jealousy of neighbouring States might not be awakened, or the tranquillity of the newly-acquired provinces disturbed. Where an influence so destructive to independence, and so blighting to prosperity was at work, it could not steal over the doomed country too imperceptibly; and, therefore, not until this latter had become sufficiently enervated was the disguise under which it had been acquired thrown aside, and the protecting hand of the friend was now recognised to be the iron grasp of an insatiable giant.
Hence it is no longer a matter of surprise if we find that, from Norway to China, the Russian frontier is composed entirely of provinces which have been added to the empire since the accession of Peter the Great. But with the principles of annexation which he inculcated, there were also rules laid down for the guidance of his successors in the administration of new territory; and the success which has attended every scheme of aggression, only renders a strict adherence to these maxims the more indispensable, since the empire is now encircled with a belt of disaffected provinces five thousand miles in length, and varying in breadth from three hundred to one thousand miles—a barrier not to be depended upon, and formed of very combustible materials; indeed, in time of war, a source of weakness rather than of strength, and from which much is to be apprehended. It is easy, then, to see why war formed no part of the policy of the Great Peter. He did not recommend coming Czars to surround themselves with gunpowder and then to thrust in the match, but rather by a slow process to decompose and absorb the combustible particles—and this in many provinces has almost been effected. It is a work of time, which requires both external and internal tranquillity, and to engage in a general war is to undo all that has been going on during some of the quieter years of the last century. Energies which a long course of oppression have now almost crushed, will again develop themselves; and when the work of retribution once begins, there will be a heavy reckoning to be paid.
In all his diplomatic relations hitherto, the Emperor Nicholas has proved himself a worthy disciple of his great ancestor. He has never made a treaty without obtaining fresh territory, or acquiring the exercise of rights over new provinces which have ever proved the inevitable precursors of annexation. Recent attempts at negotiation, indeed, have not terminated in conformity with the uniform policy of the Czars; and we may venture to predict that the history of Russia affords no precedent for any such treaty as that which will probably be made at the termination of the hostilities now impending—and yet the Emperor has nothing to reproach himself with. Everything combined to lead him to suppose that the time had arrived to justify him in entering upon another step of the annexing process in the direction of Turkey. There had been comparatively little difficulty in appropriating Turkish provinces hitherto, and he is going through the customary formalities when his proceedings are most unexpectedly nipped in the bud, by what he had, no doubt, heretofore supposed to be an impossible combination of powers in the West. If the contingency of a war with Europe has never been anticipated by Russian autocrats as an impediment in the way of their aggressive designs, it is simply because the possibility of Europe combined against Russia has never been contemplated. If England and France were not now united to resist Russia, a treaty with Turkey might soon be expected upon conditions no less favourable than that of Adrianople. But, to the dismay and astonishment of the Emperor, the time for making the treaty has arrived, and he finds that it is literally hopeless to attempt to drive a profitable bargain. He has been called upon to choose between unconditional surrender of the countries he has occupied and unmitigated war. How, then, is he prepared to meet this contingency so suddenly forced upon him, how is his position affected by an emergency which has never been provided for, and how are the allied powers best able to profit by it? It is apparent, that if the power of Russia for defence or for attack depended only upon the extent of her resources, it would be enormous. Fortunately, however, the vital question is, not how vast, but how available those resources are—whether their development has been increased with the limits of the empire, or impeded by the acquisition of those extensive territories, the recent subjugation of which, to the rule of the Czar, must exercise an important influence upon the destinies of Russia in a crisis like the present?
In order thoroughly to appreciate these considerations, it would be necessary to dissect the whole extended frontier of the empire, and consider generally:—The political combinations which have in every case led to the annexation of each individual province—the advantage secured to Russia by such annexation—the present internal condition of the conquered province—the reasons which render any further extension of the frontier line in the same direction undesirable—and also to what country in Europe these reasons are more especially applicable—finally, with reference to the war now impending, the comparative strength or weakness of the advanced posts, and their general merits as points of attack. In making this survey the most eastern limit to which Russian influence extends forms the natural starting-point, and, as we explore the sands of Tartary, we shall soon discover that they possess at least far higher claims upon the notice of the British public than the snows of Lapland. At the same time, the information which we possess upon this remote quarter of the globe is so meagre as to render any very full account of the Kirghiz Steppes and their inhabitants impossible—and the historical records are so uncertain as to make it somewhat difficult to follow every step of the process by which Russia gradually exerted her influence over those nomadic hordes who wander between China and the Caspian, between Siberia and Khiva. Nor would there be much use in pursuing the inquiry, did it not derive its interest from the extreme anxiety Russia has manifested for a century past to advance and consolidate her power in this direction—incurring vast expense and sparing no efforts to carry out the apparently insane project of subduing two millions of the most impracticable savages that ever defied civilisation, and annexing a more uninhabitable series of deserts than are to be found in the whole continent of Asia. It is not to be wondered at, if an attempt so long and earnestly persisted in, and apparently so little in accordance with the sagacity which usually characterises Muscovite diplomacy, should attract attention, more especially since the motives ostensibly assigned by Russia are by no means sufficient to account for her course of procedure. The necessity of protecting and encouraging her Eastern trade has been put very prominently forward as the principal ground of interference with independent barbarians; and, in so far as her commercial intercourse with Khiva and Boukhara are likely to promote her ulterior designs, this is doubtless the case. The trade of the East once passed through the Caucasian provinces; but when those provinces fell into the hands of Russia, it was diverted into another channel by the establishment of a restrictive system which proved that the encouragement of commerce was merely the pretext used to acquire a territory, the prosperity of which was a matter of indifference to the government. Had the same energies been expended in the formation of roads, or the construction of canals throughout the empire, which have been devoted to the protection of trade on the Kirghiz Steppes, the best interests of commerce would have been immeasurably further advanced; and therefore, so far as they are concerned, we are fairly entitled to assume that they did not furnish the real motives for any such expenditure. Perhaps a more plausible excuse is to be found in the annual captures by the Kirghiz of Russians who were sold to the Khivans as slaves. But the number of these was very trifling, and the sums spent in a year, for political purposes, would have sufficed to repurchase ten times over those who were thus unfortunately kidnapped.
We have had, indeed, sufficient experience of the intrigues of Russia in the East, to enable us to perceive at once, that the object which she has in view in subjugating Tartary is none other than that which she betrayed in her secret intercourse with Persia; and, in the present state of our political relations with the Russian empire, it is important to inquire how far her designs in the East have been attended with success, in order that we may be able to appreciate at their proper value those rumours respecting the advance of her armies in this direction, which find a ready circulation among those whom ignorance disposes to credulity, and an exaggerated estimate of the power and resources of our enemy excites to alarm. Thus we have had it regularly communicated to us as a fact for the last six months from India, that a Russian army is at Oorjunge, two marches distant from Khiva, with an occasional intimation received from good authority, that it is prepared to invade India, reinforced by levies of indomitable cavalry, supposed to have been raised upon the Steppes of Tartary. Alluding to such reports as these, the Journal de St Petersburg inquires naturally enough whether the Times and its contemporaries have correspondents in the little states of Upper Asia, and records with much amusement some of the most glaring inconsistencies which have been gravely listened to, and credited by the British public. Thus, although Russia was said to have formed a quadruple alliance with the Khans of Khiva and Boukhara, and Dost Mahomed, it was nevertheless necessary to seize the town of Khiva, which succumbed after an energetic resistance of thirty-two days—certainly a most improbable mode this of cementing the alliance. At the same time, it is due to another portion of the home community to give them the benefit of holding views of a very different character. They utterly ignore the influence of Russia in the East—treat her possible advance in that direction as a chimera—and the power which she has already acquired as a bugbear from which nothing is to be apprehended. The fact that views so diametrically opposed to one another are very generally entertained in this country, induces us to hope that any information we may be able to afford upon a subject which has hitherto been scarcely investigated, may prove both useful and interesting.
Among the vast and varied schemes formed by Peter the Great, for increasing his dominions and his influence in the East, he early conceived the design of opening up a trade with those nations to which, of all European powers, Russia was the most contiguous, and whose riches at that period found their outlet by different overland routes to the great markets of the West. In 1717, he sent a mission to the Khan of Khiva, under Prince Bekevitch, to negotiate a commercial treaty. The attempt, however, proved abortive, and Prince Bekevitch and his whole troop were assassinated. This catastrophe served its purpose, in so far as it proved that the really effective way of attaining the desired end would ultimately be by coercion, rather than by alliance. But as the vast tract of intervening country was inhabited by wandering tribes of savages, their subjugation was involved in any scheme of extended conquest. The motives which stimulated and encouraged Russia in the accomplishment of this primary object, have increased in proportion as the possessions and influence of Great Britain in India have been extended, and that trade monopolised by the enterprise and capital of this country, which Peter the Great had destined to flow in a very different direction. The task, however, has proved one which for a century has demanded the exercise of a more than usual share of Muscovite cunning and perseverance; nor has it yet been so perfectly completed as to render the conquest of Khiva a matter of certain practicability. It fortunately does not fall within our limits to enter into any dissertation upon the origin of the Kirghiz Cuzzacks, or to attempt to chronicle the early history of these tribes, which is as vague and uncertain as records of barbarism usually are. It appears that the country now inhabited by the Kirghiz Cuzzacks, was formerly occupied by the Black Kirghiz or Bouroutes, nomades who attained to some degree of civilisation by reason of the commercial relations which they maintained with the Arabs, Boukharians, and above all, with the Khazars, who, inhabiting the Steppes of Southern Russia, kept up a constant intercourse with Constantinople. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, the Bouroutes were compelled finally to emigrate to the neighbourhood of Kashgar, thus relieving the southern provinces of Siberia from the presence of a tribe whose warlike and predatory habits had proved a constant source of annoyance and irritation. The tranquillity of these provinces, however, was of short duration. The Kirghiz Cuzzacks, who now extended their wanderings to the borders of Siberia, claimed to be of Turkish origin, and had formed a portion of the subjects of the celebrated Gengis Khan. They were originally called Cuzzacks, and the prenomen of Kirghiz was merely used as a distinctive appellation. Spreading over the Steppes of Tartary, they made frequent inroads upon the Russian territory, and in 1717 penetrated as far as Kazan. Surrounded, however, by tribes of Bashkirs, Calmucks, Zungars, and Nogais, the Kirghiz were continually attacking or being attacked, while their division into three hordes, the reason of which has never been fully accounted for, did not increase their warlike capabilities. Thus it happened that the great horde was completely subjugated by the powerful tribe of the Zungars, whose territory extended to the Chinese frontier; and it soon after became apparent that the middle and little hordes could not much longer continue to make a successful stand against the western tribes. In this emergency, Aboulkhair, the most celebrated of Kirghiz Khans, perceived the advantage of obtaining the protection of Russia. As, however, both hordes were excessively averse to any such proposal, the negotiations were carried on with great tact and secresy by Tevkelef, a Russian agent, who guaranteed to Aboulkhair the assistance of Russia, in order to enable him to carry his designs into execution. This, however, did not become necessary; the consent of the Kirghiz was ultimately obtained, partly through the persuasive eloquence of Tevkelef, and partly by the influence of Aboulkhair; and in 1734, the middle and little hordes were formally enrolled as subjects of the Empress Ann.
The submission thus obtained was not of any very permanent character, and Kirilof was sent with a small body of troops into the Kirghiz Steppes to take measures, which should insure the permanent subjection of these tribes. His instructions afford us the first glimpse of the ulterior designs of Russia, and the means proposed for their execution. Kirilof was commanded at once to build a town and fort at the embouchure of the Ori; to assemble the Khans and ancients of the two hordes, and obtain from them, in the presence of their subjects, the oath of allegiance, and having succeeded in this, he was to preserve the obedience of the Kirghiz by gentleness or by force, by presents or by menaces, according to circumstances. The Ural was to be considered the boundary of the empire, and the newly-acquired subjects were strictly prohibited from crossing it. A caravan was to be despatched across the Steppes to Boukhara, with the least possible delay, and every effort was to be used in order to attract merchandise from every part of Asia. Kirilof was himself to examine the annexed country, in the hope of discovering mines. A port was to be established upon the Sea of Aral, and ships built upon the Ural, and kept ready to be transported thither as soon as the town should be built, and such terms made with the Kirghiz as would facilitate their conveyance, and that of the artillery with which they were to be provided.