Hitherto we have only described the route to Khiva as far as the Jaxartes, because it is probable that a Russian army would embark there for Khiva. The Jaxartes divides into numerous channels near its mouth, forming an extensive delta, covered with reeds so tall that, although Meyendorff and Eversmann visited the embouchure for the purpose, they could not catch a glimpse of the waters of the lake. These reeds, matted together, form floating islands; and the natives construct rafts and canoes with them, upon which to cross the deep broad stream of the Syr. Forests of rushes fringe the southern and eastern coasts of the Sea of Aral, which is reported to be shallow throughout its whole extent. The banks of the Syr are considered the most favoured region in the globe by the Kirghiz, who there find trees occasionally six feet high, and rejoice in vegetation of a corresponding luxuriance. Upon some islands there are singular ruins of tombs and temples. It occupies a caravan five days of incessant marching through tall rushes to cross the delta. The principal arm of the river is said by Eversmann to be eight hundred yards broad. To the south of the Jaxartes, the route passes through a wood of saxaul, a species of tamarisk, and then crosses the worst desert in this part of Asia—the Kisil Koum, or Red Sand Desert. A loaded caravan is obliged to carry with it a five days’ supply of water, and is exposed to the attacks of the Kirghiz and Oozbegs who are subject to Khiva, and who inhabit the eastern shores of the Sea of Aral. It would be madness for a Russian army to attempt this route, and therefore the port has been wisely established at the mouth of the Syr. On the arrival of Meyendorff at Boukhara, after a journey of seventy-one days from Orenburgh, fifty of the horses which formed part of the escort died of fatigue.
The second route to which we have referred, passes along the western shores of the Sea of Aral. It was traversed in 1842 by a Russian mission to Khiva, and has been described by Basiner, a German, who accompanied the expedition. He left Orenburgh in August, the most trying time of the year, but found pasture abundant as far as the Ilek; it becomes scarcer between that river and the Emba. The route followed the line of Cossack posts at first; then crossing the Moughodjar hills, it enters upon the desert of the Oust Ourt, at a distance of about six hundred versts from Orenburgh. This plateau, elevated more than a thousand feet above the sea, is perfectly level, and is composed of deep sand. For days not a hill was visible, and our traveller records passing a mound three feet high as a curiosity. Cliffs overhang the Sea of Aral, and occasionally rivulets trickle into it, but water is sometimes not met with for two or three days at a time. For three weeks not even a wandering Kirghiz was seen; and then, at the south western corner of the Sea of Aral, only the most savage specimens were met with. Still this is the route which, if there be any truth in the rumour of a Russian army being at Oorjunge, it most probably must have taken; unless they had been conveyed across the Sea of Aral by steam, as, if they had followed its Eastern shores, they would have marched direct upon Khiva. Altogether the journey lasted seven weeks, and the description here given of the route does not lead us to suppose for a moment that it would be practicable for troops, more especially if their passage was disputed.
The third route, which has ever been regarded by Russia with a more favourable eye, crosses from Mung Ishlak, on the Caspian, to Khiva, over the southern portion of this same plateau, and has been accurately described by Captain Abbott. He estimates the highest point of the Oust Ourt steppe at two thousand feet above the sea-level, and gives a picture of the route, calculated to appal the most determined general that ever led an army. Although it is only four hundred and eighty miles, or about half as far from the Russian fort of Alexandrofski, on the eastern shores of the Caspian, to Khiva, as from Orenburgh to the same place, the difficulties of the traject would be far greater. Not even the tent of a Kirghiz was seen by Abbott during an interval of eight days: herbage was always scarce; and on one occasion the wells were one hundred and sixty miles apart. But the most serious objection to this route lay in the fact, that the greater part of it passes through the country inhabited by the tribes of Turcomans, which are subjects of Khiva, and a far more courageous and enterprising people than the Kirghiz. For a lengthened period the troops would be obliged to sustain the attacks of a most pertinacious foe, in addition to the frightful hardships incidental to the route. Caravans, no doubt, prefer coming from Russia by Astrakhan and Mung Ishlak, to going round by Orenburgh; but the requirements of a caravan are very different from those of an army, and not until every soldier is supplied with a camel can the same rules be made applicable to both.
The fourth and last route is that which Mouraviev followed, in an expedition which he made to the country of the Turcomans, and afterwards to Khiva, at the desire of the Russian government, in 1819–20. The objects of this mission, undertaken a very short time before that of M. de Negri to Boukhara, throws considerable light upon the policy of Russia in these states. After the fatal termination of Prince Bekevitch’s expedition, it became evident that, without propitiating the Turcomans, it would be impossible to maintain friendly relations with the countries lying beyond them; and in 1813, M. Rtichichev, the general then commanding in Georgia, sent into Turcomania Jean Mouratov, an Armenian merchant of Derbend, who, carrying on commercial transactions at Astrabad, had preserved relations with that country. At this period the Turcomans were an independent race, at war with Persia, and their alliance with Russia would prove a most opportune assistance to this latter power, who would thus command the whole northern Persian frontier. The proposal made by the Russian envoy for such an alliance, was eagerly received by the Khan of the Turcomans, and deputies sent to treat with Rtichichev. They found him at Gulistan, in Karabagh, concluding peace with Aboul Hhussein Khan. The Persian plenipotentiary, perceiving at once the danger of the proposed alliance between the Russians and Turcomans, objected to treat unless it were abandoned. This was agreed to by Russia; and many of the unfortunate Turcomans, feeling they were no longer able to resist Persia, submitted to that power, giving hostages to insure their future good behaviour. The Khan, however, with many followers, retired to Khiva for shelter; while another portion of the tribe took refuge upon the shores of the Caspian, in the bay of Balkhan, where they were beyond the reach of a Persian army—and they have ever since not only maintained their independence, but have become the most successful slave-dealers in this part of the world. Five years after the treaty of Gulistan, and while still at peace with Persia, Russia, anxious to secure the alliance of a tribe whose hostility to that power would materially affect the existing state of their mutual political relations, deliberately, and in defiance of an express stipulation to the contrary, reopened communications with the independent portion of the Turcoman nation, and Major Ponomarev and Mouraviev were sent to negotiate the act of treachery. The following passage from Major Ponomarev’s instructions may serve to illustrate their general character:—“From address in your conduct, the most favourable results may be anticipated; and upon this point the knowledge which you have of the Tartar language will be most useful. In your character of European, do not consider that flattery is a means which you cannot employ. It is very common among Asiatic nations; and although it may cost you something, you will find it to your advantage not to fear being too lavish of it. Your residence among a people who are almost altogether unknown to us, will furnish you, better than my instructions can, with light sufficient to guide you. As I believe in your capacity and zeal, I flatter myself that this attempt to form amicable alliances with the Turcomans will not be without success, and that the knowledge you will acquire of the country will facilitate the ulterior designs of government.” The first Turcoman encampment visited was at the southeast corner of the Caspian, near Cape Serebrenoi. The Turcomans were delighted at the prospect of a Russian alliance, and of seeing a fort built on Cape Serebrenoi. “We will have revenge,” they said, “on the Persians for their robberies. We do not know how to construct a fort; but when we make a general call to arms, we can bring ten thousand men into the field, and beat the Persians. Only five years ago we cut their Sardars to pieces near here, and carried away their cattle.” It is clear that if Major Ponomarev was prone to be too sparing of flattery, he did not scruple to betray to the Turcomans the ultimate designs of his government upon its allies the Persians. The Turcomans are agriculturists; they also possess large flocks and herds, and, from their proximity to the Persian frontier, have attained some little degree of civilisation. They dress like Persians, and have adopted many of their manners and customs; but they are easily impressed by superior intelligence and civilisation, and Mouraviev anticipates no obstacles, so far as they are concerned, to the movements of troops. The route to Khiva is tolerably well supplied with pasture and water for the first few days after leaving Krasnavodsk; but then the same terrible desert must be crossed that in every direction divides Khiva from Russia, and for five or six days water is unprocurable. The nature of the country is similar to that already described; but this is the shortest of the four routes, Mouraviev having accomplished it in seventeen days. At Krasnavodsk, as at Alexandrofski, the Russians have built a fort; thus having a starting-point for each of the routes to Khiva. The ostensible motive for building the two forts on the Caspian, was to protect the Russian fishermen from their Turcoman allies, who occasionally sell them at Khiva as slaves.
So long, indeed, as stray Russians continue to be kidnapped by the frontier tribes, will the Czar have a fair excuse for waging war, not only with those tribes themselves, but with the nations to whom his subjects are sold as slaves. He will continue desirous to extend the frontier of his empire, simply because he cannot set at liberty these unfortunates without doing so. Such was the object of Peroffsky’s expedition; the origin of which, as told to Abbott by the Khan of Khiva, is illustrative of what we have been saying. It was to the following effect: During the war between Khiva and Boukhara, about thirty years ago, a rich caravan, escorted by two hundred infantry and two guns, was sent by Russia to the latter state. To reach its destination, however, it was compelled to pass through part of Khiva, or Khaurism, as the whole country is called. The Khan, fearing that so desirable an acquisition might be used by his enemy against him, politely intimated to the Russian commander his objection to the further advance of the caravan. In spite of this prohibition, the latter attempted to force a passage. Khivan troops were sent to oppose him in the Kisil Koum, where they inflicted serious loss, compelling the troops to retreat to the Russian frontier, and plundered the caravan. Fifteen years afterwards the Russians built the fort of Alexandrofski, in what was really Khivan territory, and soon after seized some Khivan caravans trading in Russia, and retained five hundred and fifty merchants as prisoners. Upon her ambassador being sent to demand their release, the Khan was informed that he must first release all the Russian slaves. As an earnest of his intention to do so, he sent six to Russia, demanding an equal number of Khivans. The Russians were retained, and the ambassador’s brother imprisoned, but no Khivans were released. Upon this a third ambassador, with a hundred and twenty captives, were surrendered, but no answer was returned. “I therefore,” said the Khan, “perceived that Russia was only playing upon my credulity. It is six months since the return of my last ambassador.” At this very time there was an intrenched camp on the Emba, and an advanced post half-way between that river and the Sea of Aral. As we before remarked, the snows, and not the Khivans, rendered that expedition fruitless; and further attempts of a similar nature were put a stop to by the gallant exploit of Sir Richmond Shakespeare, who released nearly five hundred Russian slaves in Khiva, and conveyed them safely to St Petersburg.
The slave traffic, however, still continues; and in 1842 Danielevsky was sent to Khiva, upon the mission to which we have already alluded, charged with obtaining the release of the captives then in slavery, and securing the inviolability of caravans to Boukhara, together with certain privileges for merchants trading in Khiva. We have no information as to the secret objects of the expedition, or how far it may have been successful; but this is certain, that Russia does not need an excuse for invading Khiva, and has been paving the way for an occupation for many years. We have not space now to describe the condition of this country, the most savage of all the states of Central Asia; but, from the description of English as well as Russian travellers, it cannot be expected to offer any very serious resistance to Russian arms. The army is estimated by Abbott at one hundred and eight thousand men. It consists entirely of cavalry, and is furnished by the settled population at the rate of one horseman for fifty chains of land, and by nomades at the rate of one horseman for four families. The Oozbegs are the bravest of these, and compose nearly half the army; still, the encounters they have already had with the Russians prove that they are no match for disciplined troops; and if ten thousand men, in good condition, were landed upon the southern shores of the Sea of Aral, the independence of Khiva would be gone. It remains to be proved whether this is a possibility. The difficulties of marching an army across the Great Borzouk to the embouchure of the Syr have been already noticed, and do not seem altogether insurmountable. The Oxus is too shallow to allow of their being conveyed up its stream, and they would be compelled to disembark in the face of a whole population prepared to receive them. Mouraviev calculates upon a rising among the slaves in the event of any such invasion. But the mode which Russia would most probably employ to possess herself of Khiva, would be by exciting Persia or Boukhara to hostilities with that state, and then offering it her protection. Spring or autumn are the only seasons of the year at which the expedition could expect to make a successful traject of the steppes. Khiva, though a small state, is capable of being made a productive acquisition. Its annual revenue amounts to about £300,000. At present it furnishes scarcely any articles of export, and carries on a comparatively small trade with Russia. Boukhara is the great Eastern emporium; but the traffic is much intercepted by Turcoman banditti, who are subjects of Khiva. The aspect of Khiva, after a journey over the steppe, which in every direction surrounds it, is most inviting. Canals intersect the country, forming little islands, upon which castellated houses are situated; tropical produce is abundant and luxuriant; vegetation affords a grateful relief to the eye of the weary traveller. The most fertile portion is about two hundred miles long by sixty broad. The entire population amounts to 2,500,000. In winter the cold is severe; and though in the latitude of Rome, the Oxus is frozen over.
Having thus attempted to relate the mode by which Russia has extended her influence over those tribes whose furthest wanderings form the uncertain boundary which separates her subjects from the nomades of Khiva, and having described the nature of the country, and of the inhabitants through which a Russian army invading that state would be compelled to march, it is time to consider shortly what the object of such a campaign would be, and what its probable results. It is evident that, of all European nations we alone could be directly interested in such a movement on the part of Russia; but it is equally plain that, even should a Muscovite army succeed in occupying Khiva, its farther advance through Caubul and the Hindoo Khoosh is an utter impossibility. Bjornstjerna, the Swedish general, in his work on the East Indies, says it will require four campaigns before a Russian army could possibly arrive at the Indies by this route; and, indeed, the slightest acquaintance with the nature of the country to be traversed, will be sufficient to justify our discarding as absurd the notion of a Russian army invading India from Orenburgh and Khiva. But this consideration does not divest of their importance the designs of Russia upon Khiva, but should rather lead us to discover what those motives really are which induce her to entertain them at all; and a due appreciation of the present position of Russia in the East will quickly enable us to perceive why, while repelling her aggressions in the West, we should not neglect to watch her movements in that part of the world in which our own interests are more nearly affected. The tendency of those movements has not been altogether concealed. Mouraviev says, unreservedly—“Masters of Khiva, many other states would be under our rule. The possession of it would shake to the foundation the enormous commercial superiority of those who now rule the sea.” It is, therefore, not the invasion of India which is anticipated, but the acquirement of that influence over the neighbouring states which would have the effect of undermining the power of Great Britain in the East. The states here alluded to as bordering upon Khiva, are Boukhara, Caubul, and Persia. Supposing Russia to be at Khiva, so long at least as she was confined to that remote and inaccessible country, the possibility of her alliance with Boukhara and Caubul against England can scarcely be entertained. The barbarian rulers of these distant people are far too suspicious of so powerful a neighbour, and too ignorant of the relative power of European states, to join in a war between two great Christian empires, the objects of which they would not understand, and which they would conceive might probably lead to the extinction of Mahomedanism. While allowing that the conquest of Boukhara is possible, its acquisition would not facilitate the designs of Russia against India, for the intercourse between the two countries is unimportant, and the mountain ranges by which they are separated are almost impassable. The deserts which intervene between Khiva and Caubul, the mountainous nature of this latter state, and the bravery of its inhabitants, would render its conquest by a Russian army out of the question, as our own experience may testify. Persia, then, is the only state which would really be placed in imminent peril by the occupation of Khiva by the Russians, and it is the only state whose independence is of vital importance to our Eastern interests. “The independence of Persia,” writes the author of the pamphlet we have already quoted, “is the only apparent obstacle to a position by Russia which would enable her to destroy in Asia the power of the Sultan, already shaken in Europe; to annihilate our commerce in Central Asia; to force us to diminish our revenues, and largely to augment our expenditure in India, where our finances are even now embarrassed; to disturb the whole system of government in that country during peace; to threaten it with invasion in war; and to oppose to our maritime and commercial superiority her power to shake our empire in the East.” If, then, we admit the view, here so ably expressed, to be correct, it only remains for us to consider how the taking of Khiva would be instrumental towards the subversion of Persian independence, and how we may best take advantage of the existing state of our relations with Russia, so as to relieve ourselves for ever from the anxiety arising from this source. The frontier of Khiva is conterminous with that of Persia from Herat to Astrabad, for a distance of four hundred miles. If Khiva became a Russian province, the whole northern frontier of Persia, from its most easterly to its most westerly point, from Boukhara to Turkey, would form the southern boundary of the Russian empire. Already has the Czar despoiled Persia of territory equal in extent to the British Islands, but hitherto he has been able to threaten her upon the western shores of the Caspian alone. It was the object of Mouraviev’s mission to Turcomania to induce the Turcomans to create a diversion upon the opposite coast, and, crossing the Attruck, to invade the province of Astrabad. That project would be rendered still more feasible by the possession of Khiva, whose influence extends more or less over the whole of Turcomania. The most bitter enmity has ever existed between these tribes and the Persians, fostered by the fanaticism consequent upon their profession of opposite Mahomedan creeds, and they would gladly seize this opportunity of avenging themselves on a power which has incessantly persecuted them, while even Caubul might be incited to join in a crusade against the heretical Sheas. The long-coveted provinces of Ghilan, Mazenderan, and Astrabad alone separate the Transcaucasian provinces of Russia from Turcomania and Khiva. Their ports are at the mercy of the Russian fleet on the Caspian; and if, while the Turks are being conquered at the one end of the frontier, the Khivans are being subjugated at the other, Persia must, in her turn, submit to the omnipotent power from the north, and her most fertile provinces will be added to the catalogue of “All the Russias.”
But if, on the other hand, by a prompt conveyance of troops to the seat of war in Georgia, and a strict blockade of the eastern shores of the Black Sea, we are able, in conjunction with the Ottoman and Circassian armies, to drive out the Russian forces at present occupying them, we shall hear no more rumours of a Russian army being at Khiva. A Russian army in Khiva, unsupported by an army in Armenia, would find itself in a particularly useless position; and, even in connection with the Affghans and Turcomans, could hope to gain no advantage over a power who, now that the tide of Russian aggression had been stayed, no longer believed in Russian omnipotence, as it saw with amazement that the allied powers of Europe had been able to maintain the tottering independence of plundered and enfeebled Turkey.
The conclusion, then, to which our consideration of the present state of the acquired provinces in Asia has brought us, seems to be, that they have been acquired only as a necessary prelude to the annexation of another and more important country;—that, notwithstanding the judicious treatment of the Kirghiz, their internal condition is by no means satisfactory, while the natural obstacles which their country presents to the transport of troops are almost insurmountable;—that even if the conquest of Khiva were achieved, it would be dangerous only to the British possessions in the East indirectly, or through the influence thus exercised upon Persia;—that this influence can only exist so long as the Russian arms in Armenia are successful;—that, in fact, the extension of the frontier line of Russia to the east of the Caspian must be regulated entirely by its progress to the west of that sea;—and that it is in the power of this country to check that progress at once, and thus nip in the bud her long-cherished designs upon Persia, and her deeply-laid schemes for the appropriation of those sources of wealth and power in the East, which have so materially contributed to raise this country to her present high position among European nations.