“Marcus Aurelius, we are told, was in the habit of giving a large measure of water to the advocates, and even permitting them to speak as long as they pleased.
“By a constitution of Valentinian and Valens, A.D. 368, advocates were authorised to speak as long as they wished, upon condition that they should not abuse this liberty in order to swell the amount of their fees.”
The history of Roman practice, and, in particular, of the Cincian Law on the subject of advocates’ fees, is ably condensed; and the law of France and Scotland on the subject is thus stated:—
“In France, ancient laws and decisions, as well as the opinions of the doctors, allowed an action to advocates to recover their fees; but according to the later jurisprudence of the Parliament of Paris, and the actual discipline of the bar now in force, no advocate was or is permitted to institute such an action. In like manner barristers in England are held to exercise a profession of an honorary character, ‘and cannot, therefore, maintain an action for remuneration for what they have done, unless the employer has expressly agreed to pay them.’ Upon this point the authorities in the law of Scotland are not very precise. Lord Bankton says, ‘Though action be competent for such gratification, advocates who regard their character abhor such judicial claims, and keep in their mind the notable saying of Ulpian upon the like occasion, Quœdam enim tametsi honeste accipiantur, inhoneste tamen petuntur.’ But it is maintained by others, whose opinion is entitled to great weight, that no action lies for such fees—the presumption, in the absence of an express paction, being, that the advocate has ‘either been satisfied, or agreed to serve gratis.’”
What the law of England is on this most important question will probably be definitively settled in a cause célèbre now depending. We do not conceal our earnest hope that the principles laid down in the recent judgment of Chief-Justice Erle will never be departed from.
We close this notice by strongly recommending Lord Mackenzie’s book to the notice both of the student and the practising jurist, to each of whom we think it indispensable.
THE PERIPATETIC POLITICIAN—IN FLORENCE.
There is a mysterious power in this nineteenth century before which we all bow down and worship. Emperors have grown powerful by its support, and kings that know not how to please it become the laughing-stock of Europe. The highest are not beyond its reach, the lowest are not beneath its notice. The Secretary of State spreads lengthy despatches as peace-offerings at its shrine, and the parish beadle is careful not to put his hat on awry lest he fall beneath its censure. The idol has innumerable votaries; but its high priests, the exponents of its law, are the great authors and statesmen of the day. And they have a hard taskmaster to serve: they must do the pleasure of their lord before he has signified his wishes—they must anticipate his thoughts and be beforehand with his commands; obsequiousness and obedience alone will not suffice them; they may sacrifice every friend and every principle for his sake, and nevertheless disgrace and proscription await them, unless they can know their master’s mind before it is known to himself.
Public Opinion is the unknown master to whom all submit; listening anxiously but vainly for his commands, not knowing how or where to study his humour. There are Houses of Parliament, newspapers, clubs, mechanic’s institutes, pot-houses, prayer meetings—but which of all these speak public opinion? A weekly gathering of articles from daily papers is not public opinion. Opinion after dinner is not public. It is evidently necessary to apply some means specially adapted to the place and the time in order to discover the mood of public opinion. In Syracuse, Dionysius constructed an ear for the purpose; unfortunately this invention has been lost.
In London, it is popularly said that the only means to ascertain public opinion is to take a seat in the omnibus for the day and drive continually up and down.