But notwithstanding the qualified terms of the Governor-general's reply, it appears to have been regarded by the Bombay government as equivalent to a full permission [44] for the prosecution of the object on which they had fixed their views: for by the despatch of Captain Haines from Aden, (dated Jan. 20, 1838,) we find that no sooner had he "completed the first duty on which he was sent," (the recovery of the cargo of the Derya-Dowlet,) than he addressed a letter (Jan. 11) to the Sultan, to the effect that "he was empowered by Government to form a treaty with the Sultan for the purchase of Aden, with the land and points surrounding it," &c. &c.—that he felt assured that the Sultan "would, in his wisdom, readily foresee the advantages which would accrue to his country from having such an intimate connecting link with the British"—and enclosing a rough draft of the terms on which it was proposed that the transfer should be effected. The Sultan appears to have been considerably taken aback at this unexpected proposition, which, it should be observed, was not put forward as part of the atonement required for the affair of the Derya-Dowlut—as for this, (in the words of Captain Haines,) "satisfaction has been given by you, and our friendship is as before." A lengthened correspondence ensued, at the rate of a letter or two daily, till the end of January—in which the Sultan, with all the tortuous tact of an Asiatic, endeavoured, without expressly pledging himself on the main point, to stipulate in the first instance for assistance, in the shape of artillery and ammunition, against the hostile tribes in the neighbourhood, and other advantages for himself and his family, particularly for the retention of their jurisdiction over the Arab residents in Aden: and he at last quitted Aden for Lahedj, without absolutely concluding any thing, but having authorized a merchant of the former place, named Reshid-Ebn-Abdallah, to act as his agent.
[Footnote 44: "The Government of India did not, indeed, in express words authorize us to negotiate with the Sultan for a cession to us of the post and harbour: but they desired us to obtain the occupation of the port as a coal depot, and that of the harbour as a place of shelter. These words far exceed the mere establishment of a coal depot under the auspices of the Sultan, and in fact, could not in any practical sense, or to any beneficial purpose, be fulfilled, except by our obtaining the occupation of that port and harbour as a matter not of sufferance but of right."—Minute by the Governor of Bombay, No. 49.]
Still every thing appeared in a fair way for adjustment; the principal difficulty remaining to be settled being the annual sum to be paid as an equivalent for the port-dues of Aden. The Sultan's commissioner at first rated this source of revenue at the exorbitant sum of 50,000 dollars!—but it was at last agreed that it should be commuted for a yearly stipend of 8708, a mode of payment preferred by the Sultan to the receipt of a gross sum, lest the rapacity of his neighbours should be excited against him by so sudden an accession of wealth: while the amount thus fixed was believed even to exceed the actual amount of the customs. The Sultan meanwhile, though evading the formal execution of the deed of transfer, constantly wrote from Lahedj that the English were at liberty to begin building in Aden as soon as they pleased—adding on more than one occasion—"if the Turks or any other people should come and take away the whole country by strength from me, the blame will not rest on my shoulders."
On the 27th, however, Sultan Hamed, the eldest son and heir-apparent of Sultan Mahassan, arrived at Aden from Lahedj, accompanied by a synd or descendant of the prophet, named Hussein, who was represented as having come as a witness to the transaction; and Captain Haines was invited on shore to meet them. While he was preparing, however, to repair to the place of meeting, he received a private intimation through the merchant already mentioned, Reshid-Ebn-Abdallih, to the effect that the Arab chiefs had determined on seizing his person at the interview, in order to possess themselves of the papers connected with the proposed transfer of Aden, (to which Sultan Hamed had from the first been strongly opposed,) and in particular of the bond for 4191 dollars which had been given in satisfaction for the balance of the goods in the Derya-Dowlut. How far this imputed treachery was really meditated, there can be, of course, no means of precisely ascertaining; and the minute of the governor of Bombay (Correspondence, No. 49,) seems to consider it doubtful; [45] but Captain Haines acted as if fully convinced of the correctness of the intelligence which he had received; and after reproaching Sultan Hamed with his intended perfidy, returned first to Mokha, and afterwards (in February) to Bombay, carrying with him the letter in which the old Sultan was alleged to have given his consent to the cession, but leaving the recovered goods at Aden in charge of a Banyan—a tolerably strong proof, by the way, that the Sultan, notwithstanding the bad faith laid to his charge, was not considered likely to appropriate them afresh.
[Footnote 45: "I am not, however, disposed to treat the matter as one of much importance. We have no knowledge of it but from report, and all concerned in it will solemnly deny the truth of the information.">[
The unsuccessful issue of this mission pretty clearly proved, that notwithstanding the dread of the British power entertained by the Abdalli chiefs, their reluctance to part with their town would not be easily overcome by peaceable means: while the Governor-general (then busily engaged at Simla in forwarding the preparations for the ill-fated invasion of Affghanistan) still declined, in despite of a renewed application from Bombay to give any special sanction to ulterior measures—"a question on which"—in the words of the despatch—"her Majesty's Government is rather called upon to pronounce judgment, than the supreme government of India." The authorities at Bombay, however, were not to be thus diverted from the attainment of their favourite object; and in a despatch of September 7, 1838, to the Secret Committee, (Corresp. No. 59,) they announce that, "on reconsideration, they have resolved to adopt immediate measures for attempting to obtain peaceable possession of Aden, without waiting for the previous instructions of the Governor-general of India:" but "as the steamer Berenice will leave Bombay on the 8th inst.," (the next day,) "we have not time to enter into a detail of the reasons which have induced us to come to the above resolution." A notification similar to the above had been forwarded two days previously to Lord Auckland at Simla; and a laconic reply was received (Oct. 4) from Sir William Macnaghten, simply to the effect that "his lordship was glad to find that, at the present crisis of our affairs, the governor (of Bombay) in council has resolved to resort to no other than peaceful means for the attainment of the object in view."
In the latter part of October, accordingly, Captain Haines once more reached Aden in the Coote, with a small party of Bombay sepoys on board as his escort; but the aspect of affairs was by no means favourable. The old Sultan Mahassan, worn out with age and infirmities, had resigned the management of affairs almost entirely to his fiery son Hamed, who, encouraged not only by his success in baffling the former attempt, but by the smallness of the force which had accompanied the British commissioner, [46] openly set him at defiance, declaring that he himself, and not his father, was now the Sultan of the Bedoweens: that his father was but an imbecile old man; and that any promise which might have been extorted from him could not be regarded as of any avail: and, in short, that the place should not be given up upon any terms. In pursuance of this denunciation, all supplies, even of wood and water, were refused to the ship; the Banyan in charge of the Derya-Dowlut's cargo was prohibited from giving up the goods to the English; and though the interchange of letters was kept up as briskly as before, the resolution of Sultan Hamed was not to be shaken by this torrent of diplomacy: and he constantly adhered to his first expressed position—"I wish much to be friends, and that amity was between us, but you must not speak or write about the land of Aden again." The English agent, however, persisted in speaking of the transfer as already legally concluded, and out of the power of Hamed to repudiate or annul: while, in order to give greater stringency to his remonstrances, he gave orders for the detention of the date-boats and other vessels which arrived off Aden, hoping to starve the Sultan into submission, by thus at once stopping his provisions, and cutting off his receipt of port dues. The blockade does not seem to have been very effectual: and an overture from the Futhali chief to aid with his tribe in an attack on the Abdallis, was of course declined by Captain Haines.
[Footnote 46: "Their first exclamation was, 'Are the English so poor that they can only afford to send one vessel? and is she only come to talk? Why did they not send her before? Had they sent their men and vessels, we would have given up; but until they do, they shall never have the place.'"—CAPTAIN HAINES'S Despatch, Nov. 6, (No. 61.)]
The apparently interminable cross fire of protocols [47] (in which both Captain Haines and his employers appear to have luxuriated to a degree which would have gladdened the heart of Lord Palmerston himself) was now, however, on the point of being brought to a close. On the 20th of November, one of the Coote's boats, while engaged in overhauling an Arab vessel near the shore, was fired at by the Bedoweens on the beach, and hostilities were carried on during several days, but with little damage on either side. In most cases, it would have been considered that blockading a port, and intercepting its supplies of provisions constituted a sufficiently legitimate ground of warfare to justify these reprisals: but Captain Haines, it appears, thought otherwise, as he stigmatizes it as "a shameful and cowardly attack," and becomes urgent with the Bombay government for a reinforcement which might enable him to assume offensive operations with effect. Her Majesty's ships Volage, 28, and Cruiser, 16 gun-brig, which had been employed in some operations about the mouth of the Indus, were accordingly ordered on this service, and sailed from Bombay December 29, accompanied by two transports conveying about 800 troops—Europeans, sepoys, and artillerymen—under the command-in-chief of Major Baillie, 24th Bombay native infantry. The Abdalli chiefs, on the other hand, made an effort to induce the Sultan of the Futhalis, (with whom they held a conference during the first days of 1839, at the tomb of Sheikh Othman near Aden, on the occasion of the payment of the annual tribute above referred to,) to make common cause with them against the intruders who were endeavouring to establish themselves in the country; but the negotiation wholly failed, and the two parties separated on not very amicable terms.
[Footnote 47: It is worthy of remark, that in a note of December 1st, (Corresp. No. 81,) from the Governor of Bombay to the Sultan, the ill treatment of the passengers of the Derya-Dowlut is again advanced as the ground of offence, as an atonement for which the cession of Aden is indispensable; though for this, ample satisfaction had been admitted long since to have been given.]