In conclusion, we express our profound sense of the obligation under which the accomplished and persevering editor has laid every student of the New Testament. There is a fulness and richness of material placed here by him, at the disposal of those who are utterly precluded from this kind of investigation. The work is done so conscientiously and laboriously, that great confidence is inspired in the accuracy and reliableness of the information thus harvested for general use. The principles on which Dr. Tregelles has toiled, are so clearly put, and for the most part so patiently applied, that they command hearty respect, if not general assent. Such work as this is necessarily provisional, and cannot be regarded as final. The discovery of the Sinaitic codex and the recent collated edition of the Vatican MS. since the commencement of Tregelles' enterprise, is sufficient proof of this; and until the promised appendices appear we cannot tell to what extent this circumstance may have modified the text of our author. It is inexpressibly affecting that the labour of nearly forty years should be arrested when the patient, true-hearted scholar had just reached, as we understand, the last chapter of the Revelation, and that he should be suffering not only from prostration of strength, but be smitten in that very organ of vision which he had consecrated so lovingly to his Master's service. We can only deplore and sympathize with such disappointments as these. We are satisfied that we speak the universal desire of his collaborateurs, and of his rivals, in this lofty field of work, when we express the earnest hope that he may yet be spared to complete his labours, and to see the effect of them in the deeper reverence paid by his contemporaries to the Word of the living God.
Art. IX.—The War of 1870.
It is impossible as yet even to guess the consequences of the memorable war of 1870. It may verify the German exclamation that the hour of the Latin race has come, and that France has ceased to be a great power, or it may lead to the moral resurrection of that essentially noble people, and even to the recovery of its military supremacy. It may develope a French Republic which from its failure to turn the tide of fortune shall be followed by a Jacobin successor, and issue in a despotism of the sword not less fearful than that of Napoleon I. or it may be the forerunner of a better period when France, purified by adversity, shall win the esteem and admiration of Europe, by her constancy in affliction, her lofty patriotism, her renewed energy, her surviving genius. Looking at it, too, from the other side, it may accelerate the unity of Germany, cemented by blood poured out in the field, by a brotherhood in arms, and by common triumphs; or it may tend only to German divisions, and to the collapse of the policy of 1866, by aggrandising Prussia out of all proportions, and making her influence intolerable to the minor States. Who, indeed, shall speculate on the results of this mighty and awful conflict, when, though it seems for the time to be drawing to a close, France refuses to acknowledge defeat, and defies the invader behind the walls of the capital, and when, though apparently struck to the ground, she still raises the flag of resistance, appeals to the memories of 1793, and endeavours to rally for a final effort those national forces which, in her case, have so often proved impossible to subdue? Yet, if we shall not attempt to forecast the remote issues of this tremendous struggle, or to predict what it shall ultimately bring forth, the time has come when we can briefly describe its marvellous events and fortunes, and can truly indicate its immediate lessons of deep significance to these kingdoms. The momentous war of 1870 is not only one of the grandest illustrations of the art which founds and destroys Empires; it not only is an astonishing drama, every scene which the military student should examine carefully and lay to heart; it not only fascinates the ordinary observer by its gigantic action and immense events; it points conclusively to a solemn moral, not to be forgotten by any country which seeks to maintain its position in the world, and cherishes a sense of its independence. It shows how weak, in the hour of trial, may be even a great military power which neglects the real sources of its strength, and relies mainly on its martial traditions, on its past honour, on the memory of a name; it proves fearfully how imperial despotism may rear an edifice of imposing grandeur, which for a generation shall deceive mankind, and yet fall suddenly at the first breath of misfortune; it testifies to the old truth that material prosperity with moral corruption are the fruitful sources of national decline; and it teaches us what we should never forget, how terrible and decisive, in modern warfare, are the results of rapid and great success, and how absolutely necessary it is for England, in the present menacing condition of Europe, to surround herself with an invulnerable shield, to look after her national defences, and to take care that by sea and on land she shall possess the means of repelling aggression.
It would be an unnecessary and unprofitable task to examine at length the causes of the war. Impartial history, we believe, will pronounce that though Napoleon gave the challenge, it had been to some degree provoked by the policy of Bismark, by the attitude recently taken by Prussia, by the series of events which since 1866 have changed the centre of power in Germany. It was impossible but that the Emperor should feel bitterly how he had been outwitted by the unscrupulous statesman who had purchased his complicity in the spoliation of Denmark by promises of annexation on the Rhine, and had afterwards coolly violated his pledges; nor yet that he should not be really alarmed at the immense development of the military power of Prussia during the preceding five years. It would have been disregarding the traditions which, rightly or wrongly, for two centuries have guided the foreign policy of France, to have witnessed the absorption of the German States into one dominant and threatening power, without an effort to break the union; and if an attempt to obtain this, was contrary to modern ideas and aspirations, it was only carrying out what had always been the views of Henry IV. and Richelieu. Besides, ever since the battle of Sadowa, France and Prussia had been watching each other, and tending inevitably to collision; both Powers had been increasing their armaments, and events have proved which was the more ready; and we know from the Imperial correspondence that Napoleon had been repeatedly warned that Prussia was meditating an invasion of France, and would avail herself of the first opportunity. It is not, therefore, too much to say that it was not merely French folly and arrogance which precipitated this tremendous conflict; the conduct of Prussia and her aggressive acts contributed to it in no slight degree; and if France, as it has turned out, was unwise in not accepting accomplished facts, and in chafing at the military strength of her rival, we can perfectly comprehend this sentiment, without charging her, as a nation, with any peculiar turn for aggrandisement, or even any extraordinary ambition. It must be admitted that the Emperor was utterly in the wrong in the pretext on which he declared war, and that his whole policy in this respect showed ignorance of the real state of opinion. After the Hohenzollern candidature of Spain had been withdrawn at the instance of England, it was an act of extreme unwisdom to have proceeded to further demands; and the result was that, to outward seeming, France, at the beginning of hostilities, was alone to blame for the frightful contest, and that Prussia appeared the injured defender of the national independence of Germany. In truth, however, in this as in other matters, Bismark probably outgeneralled Napoleon; he seems to have been eager for war, and to have been too glad to find an opportunity to attack France with the support of public opinion; and now at least when he puts forward claims to wrest from her some of her present provinces, he can scarcely be considered by impartial men as the mere opponent of French aggression.
Hostilities were proclaimed on the 15th of July, after efforts at negotiation on the part of England. There can be little doubt that the war was welcomed by the classes who form public opinion in Germany, quite as much as in France. The passionate and foolish cry, 'to Berlin,' was answered by shouts of defiance, 'to Paris;' and if French chauvins and journalists talked of the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine, and of the breaking up of the German Confederation, claims for 'the lost patrimony of Elsass and Lothringen' were put forward prominently by the press of Germany. In fact, amiable German professors who back the arrogant demands of Bismark, and pleasantly insist on 'the line of the Vosges,' as a necessary bulwark for 'peace-loving Germany,' against the 'intolerable ambition of Frenchmen,' must have a strange notion of the facts of the case; the war fever was at least as strong in the capital of Prussia, as in that of France; and it is about as correct to represent the two nations as differing in this, as it is to repeat the veracious legend—of which of course the League of Pilnitz and the barbarous invasion of 1792 are confirmations that cannot be gainsaid—that France has always been the assailant of her meek and long-suffering Teutonic rival. Within a few days after the declaration of war, the army of the Rhine was set in motion, and the heads of the columns of eight French corps were approaching the verge of the German frontier; the main bodies, however, being still distant. The first corps, under the renowned MacMahon, had advanced from Algeria and the south, and occupied Upper and Lower Alsace, its headquarters being at Strasburg. The second and fifth corps of Frossard and De Failly were sent forward, and at St. Avold and Bitsche held the approaches to the Rhenish Palatinate, from MacMahon's left to near the line of the Saar. To the left of these again, was the fourth corps, marched from the north under L'Admirault, and stationed at and around Thionville; while, in the rear, Bazaine with the third corps, was moving to the great fortress of Metz; the sixth, under the orders of Canrobert, was on its way from Chalons to Lorraine; and far behind, the Imperial Guard—the flower of the French army—was pushing forward from the French capital. In the meantime, the seventh corps of Douay formed the extreme right of the great French line; far to the north it guarded Belfort, the 'gate of France,' between the Vosges and the Jura; and it connected itself with MacMahon's rear-guard along the Rhine and Lower Alsace. The whole French army, in its first line, extended in a huge semicircle from Northern Lorraine to the Southern Vosges; but its second line, massed between Metz and Chalons, was at a considerable distance from the first; and though it was well connected by railways, and placed as it was, it threatened equally the Rhenish provinces and Southern Germany, it was not yet even nearly concentrated.
Such was the disposition of the army of the Rhine about the 21st or 22nd of July. It will be seen at once that it was well adapted for an offensive movement against Germany, if made rapidly and in full force, for Baden and the Palatinate were threatened, and the exact point of attack was concealed. Placed as they were, the forces of France could either pour into the Rhineland, drawing after them their reserves on all sides, or they could cross the Rhine, and, advancing from Strasburg, interpose between Northern and Southern Germany and endeavour to break up their uniting armies. On the other hand, the position of the French was badly chosen as a line of defence; for their foremost corps were widely disseminated, and in case of a sudden attack, were thrown too far beyond their supports; and if they were assailed by a resolute foe, converging against them in full strength, they would be exposed to serious disaster. For these reasons we may certainly infer that the strategic plan of the French Emperor was to march upon the Germans with much rapidity, and whether the recently published pamphlet does or does not disclose his purpose, it is evident that he intended to advance either by the Rhineland on Landau and Mayence, or by Strasburg into the territory of Baden. Besides, he must have known perfectly well that a brilliant initiative was his best chance; for not only was it in accordance with the traditions and genius of the French soldier; not only was it calculated to sow dissensions and alarm among his foes and perhaps prevent them from combining; it was the sole means to give full effect to the one great advantage which France would possess over Prussia at the beginning of a campaign, the imposing strength of a standing army, supposed to be ready at all points and formidable in its numerical proportions, compared with levies, immense indeed when brought together and set in motion, but believed to be inferior in military power, and requiring time to be fully arrayed. It may therefore be said with confidence, that a sudden and vigorous spring on Germany was the real scheme of Napoleon III.; and, notwithstanding all that has occurred, it is impossible to say what the result would have been had this design been carried out boldly, with the promptness and skill of a great commander who would have led his troops to immediate victory. Unhappily, however, for the interests of France, vacillation at the decisive moment took the place of resolution and genius; and her armed arrays, however imposing to outward seeming, were not in a state to undertake great and rapid operations. The Emperor lingered a fortnight at Paris before he went to his headquarters at Metz; even when he had arrived he passed nearly a week, uncertain, it would appear, how to strike; and thus the favourable opportunity was lost which might have changed the whole course of the war. In addition to this, it is now well known that the army was not ready to march; its commissariat was not complete; it was deficient in ammunition and supplies; and its real strength was considerably less than Napoleon III. had been led to expect. Between the irresolution of its chief, and its own ill-prepared condition, it had already forfeited its most hopeful chances before even a blow had been struck.
During these delays of the army of the Rhine Germany had been making astonishing efforts. If Bismark's reports are to be believed, the German nation was not prepared for immediate war on a gigantic scale. But considering that since the battle of Sadowa Prussia had been steadily increasing her armaments, and that it is tolerably clear from her government press that she was eager to measure her strength with France, we shall scarcely credit the Northern Confederation with any want of military readiness; still immense as their exertions were, it is not impossible that the Southern States were taken to some extent by surprise. However this may have been, the summons to arms against the ancient and dreaded foe met with but one answer from the Teutonic race; and whatever may be thought of the policy of its rulers, its patriotism and heroic attitude are entitled to the highest admiration. From the sandy wastes that border the Niemen to the valleys watered by the Moselle, and from the shores of the Northern Sea to the Danube and the Bohemian hills, the martial cry 'to the war' was heard; the integrity of the Fatherland was the one thought of the whole people; and whatever may have been the divisions caused by the events of 1866, and whatever the hopes of dispossessed sovereigns, of blind diplomatists, or of discontented nobles, it was soon evident that Napoleon III. would have to contend against an united Germany. This single circumstance shows how impolitic had been the course of the French Emperor, and how badly he had been advised; and, in fact, unless, as is not improbable, the conduct of Prussia shall tend to disunion, the war will have done more to make Germany a concordant people than any event since 1813. Within a few days the military system of the nation was in full operation; the army was 'mobilized' and increased to its war strength within the local limits assigned to its different divisions, and in an exceedingly short time a gigantic array composed of regular troops in the first line, with reserves of landwehr in the second, was in a state to commence operations under the guidance of leaders of proved ability. Those who witnessed that mighty torrent of war pouring through Germany towards the Rhenish frontier have described its tremendous power and impulse; and none who have observed how it was directed can doubt that it had been long held in hand to commence as well as to repel aggression. Towards the last days of July and the first of August, while the French were still disseminated in Lorraine, three vast German armies had taken possession of the territory of the Rhenish Palatinate, and, already in communication with each other, were being marshalled to pour into France an overwhelming tide of invasion. The first army, numbering about 80,000 men, was under the command of the aged Steinmetz, and was approaching the Saar from Treves, its outposts reaching to near Saar-Louis. The second army, nearly 200,000 strong, had crossed the Rhine at and above Mayence, and, led by King William and Prince Frederick Charles, held the centre of the Rhenish Palatinate, its outposts almost advanced to the Saar, and its rearward divisions stretching far backwards. To the left was the third army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, about 150,000 strong; it touched the right of the second army, and extended thence to the course of the Rhine, and its vanguard, along the stream of the Lauter, approached the northern frontier of Alsace, the main body being not distant, and concealed behind the adjoining fortresses. From Treves on the west to Landau on the east, and pressing forward to the very edge of France, the huge German masses were already in a state to fall on their enemy with tremendous force.
The manner in which these immense armies were formed, organised, and moved in concert within a short distance of the French frontier, was one of the most notable of strategic exploits. In the space of nineteen or twenty days 430,000 men in the highest state of efficiency for war, with guns, horses, and other material, had been arrayed and prepared for the field, and now stood on the verge of the Rhineland ready to overrun Alsace and Lorraine. We know of no finer military movement, except perhaps the splendid concentration of Napoleon's forces on the Belgian frontier on the 14th of June, 1815; and it attests clearly the calculating forethought and ability of the Prussian Government, the high training and skill of its generals, and the discipline and power of the German troops. The French army, scattered and divided on the semicircle from Thionville to Belfort, and with its first line widely separated from the second, was already in no condition to offer a successful resistance to its mighty foe; it was not only much weaker in strength, being outnumbered fully two to one at the decisive points where it was threatened, it was also so disunited in its parts, that it could hardly collect 60,000 men in any position to withstand an attack. In fact, a glance at the map will show that along the whole line of the Saar and the Lauter it was exposed to be defeated in detail by a force infinitely superior in power; and this peril was aggravated by the circumstance, placed beyond dispute by the clearest evidence, that it believed itself completely secure, and that its leaders were planning a forward movement while their enemy was close at hand to destroy them.
It is now well known that a German advance was not suspected in the French camp even during the first three days of August: the woods along the edge of the frontier were not searched by the French outposts, and the German columns were allowed to collect in force behind this deceptive screen while the Emperor and his Marshals were dreaming of a march without an obstacle into the Rhenish provinces. The consequences of this ruinous neglect and self-deception became soon evident. On the 4th of August the Crown Prince of Prussia detached a part of his vast army to attack the extreme right of the whole French line, this movement being only the first step of a general advance across the French frontier. The Prince, with about 40,000 men, fell upon a single division of about 10,000 which lay encamped near the town of Weissenburg, surprised it, it is said, when at breakfast, and drove it back in a state of confusion. The French, rallying on the Geisberg, made a gallant resistance for a short time; but the hill having been stormed by the enemy, they were ultimately driven in utter rout from beyond Weissenburg on the road to Strasburg. The first success, so important in war, had thus been decisively won; the trophies of the day were 500 prisoners, a gun, and a great deal of material; and the advanced guard of the German army stood in triumph upon the soil of France, the right wing of the French forces having been already threatened and struck, and the secret of their want of preparation having been disclosed to their able antagonists.