Our space precludes us from describing at length the series of great events that ensued. On the 22nd of August MacMahon's army, already giving melancholy proofs of weakness, indiscipline, and insubordination, had reached Rheims from the camp of Châlons; and on the 23rd it was on its way to Rethel. The march of the columns was extremely sluggish, in consequence of the bad organisation of the troops, and eye-witnesses have recorded that the unfortunate marshal was even now evidently dispirited and anxious. Rethel was not passed until the 25th; and as the movement to the Meuse and the Argmues was to be accomplished as soon as possible, MacMahon divided his army into three parts; one to go northward, by railway to Mézières, and the other two to advance easterly by Vouziers and Nouart, and Le Chène and Stonne. The Emperor and his ill-fated child attended mournfully the doomed army, but if we are to credit newspaper reports, Napoleon III. still felt confident that he was marching to assured victory. Though the dispositions of the French marshal were evidently made with a view to speed, the movement of his columns was exceedingly slow, no doubt owing to their inefficient state, and also probably to commissariat defects; and even by the morning of the 29th they had only attained Nouart and Stonne, that is, they were still a day's march from the Meuse, which they ought to have found on the 28th. These delays aggravating the inherent perils of a strategic plan essentially vicious, were sure to lead to disastrous consequences; and while MacMahon had been going northwards the German commanders had been preparing the means of utterly overwhelming him. On the 19th and 20th of August, after Bazaine had been shut up in Metz, a fourth German army had been despatched, under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, to co-operate with that of the Crown Prince of Prussia, and it had been moved by Verdun, on St. Menehould, to be in readiness for any event. Meanwhile the third German army, after passing Nancy, had advanced on the great road to Paris to Ligny and Bar le Duc, its light cavalry, the well-known Uhlans, having scoured the whole country to beyond Châlons. By the 24th the Crown Prince of Prussia, who had been rejoined by the king from Metz, had his head-quarters at Bar le Duc, and when there the news arrived that MacMahon had broken up from the camp, and was aiming northward toward Mézières and Rethel. The plan of the French was immediately perceived by the eminent strategist who in this campaign had been the genius of the German armies, and he proceeded to defeat it, and ensure victory. Orders were at once issued to the Crown Prince of Saxony to move northerly towards the Meuse, and intercept the heads of MacMahon's columns; while the third German army, under the Prussian Prince, was to advance rapidly in the same direction, and fall on the French flank and rear. By the 25th the huge German array, numbering nearly 250,000 men, with from 700 to 800 guns, was marching forward in dense masses to overwhelm the much weaker force that incautiously presented its flanks to it, and that soon would be within its formidable reach.
By the 28th and 29th of August the game began to be gradually developed. The vanguard of the Tenth German Army, having passed Verdun and reached the Meuse, appears to have crossed the river at Stenay, and it struck one of MacMahon's columns about Buzancy and again at Nouart. Meanwhile the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia advancing by Clermont, Grand Pré, and Suippes, had closed on the flank and rear of the Marshal and had made it certain that he would be overtaken. Headed thus, as they approached the Meuse, and threatened with a destructive attack, which, if successful, would prove ruinous, the French were compelled to diverge northwards, and MacMahon endeavoured to make his escape though his case was already well-nigh desperate. Drawing one of his columns towards the other, and leaving a strong rear-guard at Beaumont, with orders to make a determined resistance, he sought to concentrate his remaining forces, and having passed the Meuse between Sedan and Mouzon, to move rapidly on Carignan, and thence to march direct on Montmédy, thus eluding the tightening grasp of the Prussians. In these operations we see the windings of a general who feels that a disaster is at hand; but, situated as MacMahon was, they were the best that could have been made. By the morning of the 30th the whole French army, except the corps at Beaumont, was collected from Lethêne to near Stenay; and it has been said that the unhappy Emperor was still confident as to the issue. His powerful antagonists were not likely to allow their prey to slip out of their clutches. The German columns on the 29th had closed more firmly on their retiring enemy; and while a portion of the Fourth Army had taken possession of both banks of the Meuse, the Third was in readiness to attack Beaumont, and to press MacMahon as he crossed the river. These dispositions assured success which could hardly fail to be ultimately decisive. As the French army approached the Meuse, the Crown Prince of Prussia made an attack on the detachment which had been left at Beaumont; and these corps, commanded by the incapable De Failly, were overwhelmed after a feeble resistance. Meanwhile MacMahon had contrived to get two of his corps across the river, which had marched towards Carignan; but as the remaining ones were passing they were caught and routed by the Crown Prince of Prussia with a great loss of guns and men at Mouzon. At the same time the Fourth German Army advancing from the right bank of the Meuse, had driven the French from the road to Carignan; and thus the whole French army baffled and defeated was forced in confusion still further northward. By the evening of the 30th its routed divisions had been re-formed in front of Sedan behind the defensive line of the Chiers, the huge German forces gathering all round and hemming in their intended victim.
We can only devote a few sentences to describe the decisive battle that ensued. The 31st of August was spent by MacMahon in drawing up his army in a line of defence extending from Givonne on the Belgian frontier, across ranges of eminences in front of Sedan, and thence backward to the rear of the town, as far as the plateaux of La Garenne and Floiny. The left of the Marshal rested on Giomne, his centre protected by the Chiers and by the villages of Bazeilles and Balan, spread before Sedan in strong positions, and his right and right centre stretched beyond Sedan, holding the Meuse nearly to Floiny northwards. The Fourth German army in the meantime had been marched on the opposite bank of the Chiers, while that of the Crown Prince had come up to the Meuse in full force; and the German commanders now pursued the plan of hemming in MacMahon completely, and having forced him upon Sedan, of destroying him by their overwhelming strength. With this object the French left was to be turned and passed by, the centre was to be fiercely assailed, the right was to be surprised and struck, and the whole German armies, having united in a perfect circle around Sedan, were to accomplish the ruin of their entrapped enemy. Considering the extraordinary disproportion between the hosts about to join in battle—230,000 men at least with from 600 to 700 guns against 110,000 of inferior quality with one-third less pieces—this ambitious and astonishing design may be justified in a military point of view; but, notwithstanding all that has been said, it is by no means to be admired in its conception; and a great commander, who in such a position, should break out from the centre with resolute troops, might cause an attack of this kind to end in a terrible defeat. On the morning of the 1st, the Fourth German Army, in consequence of the neglect of the French outposts, effected the passage of the Chiers without loss; and its right soon turned the French left at Givonne, the defenders of that important point having offered only the feeblest resistance. At the same time a considerable part of the forces of the Crown Prince having crossed the Meuse during the previous night, attacked Bazeilles and Balan in great strength; but here the French showed a bold front, and the battle hung in suspense for hours. Meanwhile, however, the remaining corps of the Third German Army had faced the Meuse at a point much lower down the river, and falling on the extreme right of the French at or near a hill that commands Floiny, had driven it in after a brave defence, and placed themselves in communication with the victorious troops of the German army which had approached them from Givonne. The inner circle was now completed; the French centre still fighting obstinately was obliged to evacuate Bazeilles and Balan; and the whole French army was compelled to recoil inwards upon Sedan, where it was crushed by a death-dealing artillery. No alternative but a surrender remained; the German tactics had completely succeeded; and on the 2nd of September, the last army of France in the field had passed under the yoke, and was a mass of prisoners of war. The Emperor was one of the trophies of the conqueror; MacMahon, more fortunate, had been severely wounded and did not witness the capitulation; but upwards of 90,000 men and from 400 to 500 guns in the hands of the triumphant Germans attested the magnitude of the catastrophe.
The results of the terrible battle of Sedan—a catastrophe unparalleled in the annals of war—were the destruction of the only French army that remained to the nation in the field, the complete isolation of Bazaine at Metz with a certainty of his ultimate surrender, the exposure of Paris to an immediate siege, and the prospect of the subjection of France to the will of an implacable conqueror. At no conjuncture in military history has a strategic error of the gravest kind been fraught with such calamitous effects; and the march to Sedan will long be noted as one of those frightful mistakes of generalship which have deeply influenced the fate of kingdoms. A day or two after this dire event a revolution broke out in Paris; the empire collapsed with the captive Emperor; the Empress Regent was compelled to fly; and, although a Government of National Defence was formed, composed of men of very great eminence, who—after fruitless attempts to negotiate—bravely resolved to carry on the struggle, sooner than consent to the dismemberment of France, hardly anyone believed that the defeated nation would be able to offer serious resistance. The situation of France, indeed, appeared desperate even to her well-wishers—even to those who resented the dictum of the cynical scorner of popular rights, that whether their inhabitants liked it or not, Alsace and Lorraine 'would belong to Prussia'—and for several weeks her exulting enemies remained absolute masters of the situation, and trampled down the defenceless country. The German armies which had fought at Sedan marched without a moment's delay to Paris, arrived before the forts on the 18th September, and, having routed a few raw troops, who endeavoured to harass them at Versailles, invested the capital on all sides, and inclosed it in impenetrable lines. The surging waves of the tremendous invasion meanwhile flowed furiously over the northern provinces, carrying with them devastation and ruin. Strasburg, after a siege which clearly indicated the temper of the people of Alsace, and their assumed sympathy with their 'German liberators,' fell on the 29th September; most of the fortresses of the Vosges, with the exception of Bitsche and Phalsburg, submitted; Toul, which had gallantly resisted for weeks a whole army, met the same fate, and by the close of October the German hosts had cleared their communications with Paris, were masters of the whole region between the Seine and the Rhenish Provinces, and had laid hold of Picardy and the valley of the Loire, which locust-like they devoured by requisitions. The consummation seemed at hand, when after making many attempts to break the iron ring of his foes, Bazaine on the 27th of October surrendered the fortress he had so long held; and the whole remains of the army of the Rhine, the garrison, and a mass of auxiliary troops, became prisoners of war as they defiled from Metz. France seemed under the Caudine forks; the iron had entered into her soul; and even the most far-sighted observers believed that the end of the war was close at hand.
For two whole months after the battle of Sedan, France thus appeared altogether ruined, trampled under the hoof of a ruthless invader. Her capital was invested; her provinces were overrun; fortress after fortress became an easy prey; the grasp of the Prussian upon the country seemed day after day to become stronger, and few signs of resistance appeared except a desultory partisan warfare. Some military critics at Versailles exclaimed that the 'hour of the Latin race had come;' the King of Prussia piously resigned his spirit to the triumph that seemed close at hand; Bismark with grim humour declared that Paris was 'frying in its own fat;' writers disposed complacently of Lorraine and Alsace, and congratulated France that her fate was no worse, and only a small minority of Englishmen entertained a hope for the fallen nation. Yet during all that terrible time vitality was returning to the stricken frame, and France was preparing for mighty efforts which, whether they prove successful or not, have been some of the noblest in history, and are entitled to the highest admiration. The first symptom of reviving animation was seen in the attitude of Paris, which, under the control of General Trochu, a commander who has already won a high place in the annals of fame, put off her Sybarite pride and luxury, and from behind her ramparts prepared herself for a defence which must be pronounced astonishing. Day after day the immense capital which the Germans declared would consume itself by internal revolution and anarchy, and which was not expected to hold out a fortnight, encompassed itself with fresh defensive lines, drilled its raw levies within its walls, and arrayed itself in such a panoply of war that before long it had become evident that its speedy reduction was impossible. The bombardment which it was predicted would soon 'bring these fools to their senses,' was postponed for the simple reason, that it had not the faintest chance of success; and as amazed Europe beheld the works of Paris growing in formidable power, and actually threatening the investing circle, it learned to set a proper value on the profession that 'there was no intention to destroy by fire a noncombatant population,' as if starvation was a more humane process. Meanwhile silently, and hardly observed by the correspondents of the English Press, enormous preparations for the renewal of the contest were made in every part of the country. Arms were produced in prodigious quantities, old soldiers were recalled to their colours, recruits were summoned in hundreds of thousands, the nuclei of several armies were formed, and the splendid memories of 1793-4 were invoked by the representatives of the people, and created wide-spread martial enthusiasm. While Bismark jeered at the 'gentlemen of the pavement,' and cynically redoubled his confident insults, while telegram after telegram announced that town after town was capitulating, France was becoming a vast camp, and sternly, proudly, and in a very different spirit from that in which it began the war, the nation girded up its loins for the strife. M. Gambetta, whose journey from Paris in a balloon excited considerable ridicule at Versailles—for a while—was the mainspring of this remarkable movement, of which, if we cannot predict the success, the patriotism and force cannot be disputed.
The first symptom in the turn of the tide which made itself distinctly perceived, was an engagement which took place on the 9th of November. A mass of raw levies and depôt battalions, to which had been given the name of the Army of the Loire, had been driven out of Orleans in October; and it was generally supposed that it had been all but destroyed. But a general had been placed at its head who had given it consistency and strength; it had been furnished with good artillery, and on the ninth of November it recrossed the Loire and defeated the Bavarian force in its front, which it succeeded in almost surrounding. After this the nuclei of armies, in the west, the north, and the south-east of France, have made their appearance, and are growing formidable; and the military strength of what had been deemed the effete and worn-out nation, has shown itself to be great and threatening. The attitude of the armies of the Loire and of the West has compelled the Germans to draw in almost their whole available forces to cover the immense circle of their lines around Paris; and though as yet they have suffered no reverse, and have even gained some important successes, their enemies still confront them in the field with rapidly improving power and discipline, and so long as they hold their present positions, they are exposed to considerable danger. In fact the German armies round Paris would be placed in imminent peril, if the covering armies on the circumference outside, were to meet anything like a defeat; and as the French levies are day after day acquiring an increase of numbers and force, this is by no means an impossible contingency. Meanwhile the beleaguered capital of France has offered to the besiegers a resistance which has astonished and confounded the world, and its illustrious governor, General Trochu, has literally created out of the young and demoralised troops within its walls, armies of unquestionable valour and worth. These armies commenced offensive operations on the 29th and 30th November, by making immense sorties from the capital; and though they have not succeeded in breaking through the net which hems them in, it is not impossible that they may yet do so. The situation, in fact, has so completely changed since the beginning of the month of November, that all competent persons now think that if Paris can hold out five or six weeks more, the result may be fatal to the Germans. It is almost useless to speculate on events which may be solved before these lines shall be printed, but we venture to hazard a glance into the future. It appears to us that in all probability Paris will ultimately succumb to famine, that it will not be relieved from without, and that General Trochu and his brave troops will have to yield to adverse fortune. This blow, if it happens, will be terrible, but if France continues to evince the resolution and energy of the last two months, its military consequences need not be decisive. In that event the defence of France will have to be undertaken on the Loire; and if her young armies are carefully husbanded; if her generals and statesmen admit the truth that the siege of Paris has gained time for developing her restored vigour; and if no fatal mistakes are made, we believe that she yet may repel the invader. What is most to be feared is, that if Paris falls, a collapse of authority may ensue, that Red Republicanism may lift its head, and that the men who have done such eminent service, may be overthrown by popular fear and terror. But if France is true to herself, if she goes on as she has done lately, and if her forces are rationally handled, she may possibly succeed in shaking off her assailants, and avoid the dismemberment with which she is threatened. Let the nation comprehend that if Paris falls, it will have done wonders in gaining time, and in allowing the spirit of France to revive, and then let it go on with the contest, obedient as a man to the existing Government, and looking steadily to the one great object, deliverance from impending subjugation.
Such has been, up to the middle of December, the memorable war of 1870. We have well-nigh exhausted our space, and can only make a few brief reflections. History has yet to describe the real causes of this terrible and devouring conflict, and the persons really responsible for it; but, allowing that Napoleon was in the wrong for throwing down the gauntlet to Prussia, what is now to be thought of the Power which is carrying on an internecine contest after she has received offers of ample compensation, and is endeavouring to dismember France, and to annex two of her most loyal provinces for the sole purpose, we fear, of making her former rival her vassal? Ever since the interview with Bismark at Ferrières, when, after Sedan, M. Jules Favre proposed to give Prussia more than satisfaction for all losses incurred by her, the war has been one of simple conquest on the part of King William and his minister. France, who at the outset of the conflict may have been, at least through her ruler, in the wrong, is now fighting against an invader for her national existence and her place in history; and beaten down as she is, it is not impossible that she may yet succeed; certainly she is rapidly winning the sympathy which was at first denied her. It is creditable to the mind of England, which was at first almost unanimously on the side of Germany, believing that it was unjustly attacked, that the majority of our countrymen are beginning to see through the ambition of Prussia, to distrust the cynical fraud of Bismark, and to wish well to the nation which is now really fighting for all that makes life dear. But it may be said, 'France has been beaten; the victor offers her peace on the terms of the cession of Alsace and Lorraine, which after all were at one time German; why does she not admit her overthrow, and thus restore quiet to awed Europe?' But to such suggestions, France, we believe, will not listen. We do not see how, until her resources are destroyed, she can consent to abandon Alsace and Lorraine, because these provinces are absolutely necessary to her safety as an important Power, as any military student must know; nor ought she, as a leader of civilization, to give up populations devoted to her to invaders whom they detest. As for the ethnological argument derived from the German origin of their territories, France may fairly adduce their present attitude as evidence of the real sentiments of the inhabitants.
We cannot dwell at the present moment on the lessons to be deduced from this war. Those who think that it conclusively proves the superiority of the German over the French soldier, will do well to read a little history and to study the battles of Jena and Austerlitz. No doubt on several occasions the French have fought badly under the moral depression of repeated and overwhelming defeats; but nothing has yet been seen in this campaign compared to the demoralization of Prussia in 1806. Nor may we assume that the French military character has deteriorated, though a corrupt layer of Imperialism has injured the upper ranks of society; the nation which after crushing reverses can still show such an indomitable front, will be yet found by its foes to be terrible. What the campaign proves is the immense superiority of German generalship over its antagonists, a superiority which, seconded by irresistible force, and by great advantages in artillery, has produced results of an astonishing kind, yet not more marvellous than those witnessed sixty years ago on the other side when Napoleon commanded the Grand Army. As to the military operations of the French commanders, they have been throughout as bad as possible. From the outset of the campaign to the first battles we see nothing but reckless rashness; we then behold vacillation and weakness followed by the astonishing blunders of Sedan; and the news which has just arrived of the defeats of the Army of the Loire at Orleans, prove, we fear, that another series of mistakes in the plainest strategy have been committed. These have been the causes of the disasters of France of which an able adversary has reaped the advantage; and to these we should add the enervating results of Imperialism on the upper classes, corruption and peculation in the higher ranks of the army, the false confidence engendered by martial traditions, and not least, the numerical inferiority of the French forces to those of the Germans. Yet we do not doubt that if France continues her present resolute attitude, if common sense prevails in her councils, if she remains united and patriotic, she may yet pluck safety out of her dangers; and in a long and internecine struggle the Power which has the command of the sea, superior wealth, and more compact unity, may in our judgment ultimately triumph. For ourselves this cruel and fearful war ought to teach us to look after our national defences, to array ourselves in complete panopoly, to take good assurance that this England of ours, the home of freedom and good government, shall at least be secure in the shock of arms now crashing over a large part of the Continent. It cannot be questioned that the sudden rise of Bismarkian Prussia is a threat and a peril to the world; the demands of Gortschakoff and the letters of Bernstorff already prove that it bodes no good to England; and we shall do better to look after our fleets, and to put our military organization in order, than to believe the idyls of sentimental professors who assure us that the plunderer of Silesia, the divider of Poland, and the despoiler of Denmark, is 'wise, pious, moral, and unambitious.' If it is not our duty to interfere actively in the interest of the balance of Europe, we, at least, in the conflict now rending France ought to read a warning address to ourselves; and while the boundaries of nations are being shifted, while justice and right are in danger of being trampled under foot, that brute force may work its will, we ought to take good heed that this our England shall retain her high position in the world, shall be able when necessary to lift her hand in the cause of civilization and human progress, shall never 'lie' at the proud foot of a conqueror, shall be as powerful as she is great and glorious.
Contemporary Literature.