There is, however, one distinction between underweight and overweight which many persons lose sight of; or rather, they mistakenly deny its existence. When any article is sold by weight, it is essential that full weight should be given, or the person who sells will become liable to a penalty. But if he uses the proper weights corresponding with the standards, he will not incur a penalty by giving what is commonly called ‘thumping weight;’ that is to say, any want of precision in weighing, if it should result in an excess, would not form a good ground for a prosecution; while a similar discrepancy on the other side would do so. It is cruel to give a poor person a loaf of bread which is less than the authorised weight paid for; but if the weight is in excess of the amount purchased, there is not much harm done: the overweight was voluntary, and the tradesman cannot be punished for giving more than was paid for.
The penalties, exceptions, &c., applicable to weights also apply to measures; and the principal alteration made in our time is that the heaped measures so familiar to us in our youth were abolished in 1878. The standard unit of measure of capacity is the gallon, both for liquids and solids. The quart is one-fourth of a gallon, and the pint is one-eighth thereof. Two gallons are a peck; eight gallons are a bushel; eight bushels being a quarter; and thirty-six bushels, a chaldron. In using a measure of capacity, the same is not to be heaped, but either is to be stricken, as in the case of grain, with a round stick or roller, straight, and of the same diameter from end to end; or if the article sold cannot, from its size or shape, be conveniently stricken, the measure must be filled in all parts as nearly to the level of the brim as the size and shape of the article will admit. Many articles which used to be sold by measure are now sold by weight, such as fruit, vegetables, &c.; and therefore these regulations as to measuring are not quite so universally interesting as they would have been fifty years ago; while weights have acquired a greater degree of importance than they ever had in the olden times.
Every tradesman who values his reputation ought to have his scales and weights verified frequently; and in any case of any part of his weighing apparatus being out of order, the authorised inspector ought to be visited without delay, or some other efficient test should be applied. Nothing injures a tradesman more than a conviction for having defective weights or inaccurate scales in his possession. Whatever suspicions his customers may entertain as to their parcels being underweight, the certainty of such a conviction will impress them far more; and many who never previously thought of weighing their purchases, will begin to do so in consequence of seeing the conviction reported in the papers; and yet we are willing to believe that in many cases the conviction has been brought about by carelessness, and has not been a punishment for deliberate fraud.
IGNORANCE OF LAW AND OF FACT.
There is a great difference between the consequences of ignorance of law and ignorance of fact. Law is supposed to be universally known, though few if any persons are acquainted with all the multifarious laws which are in existence, many of them being practically obsolete, others repealed by implication, though not expressly, and the effect of others being rendered doubtful by means of inconsistent enactments, which from time to time puzzle the judges, who have to interpret the law in case of differences of opinion on the part of other persons. The latter class of laws lead to the necessity for frequent amending statutes, and some of these are still imperfect, and need further amendments. The legal system in its more positive department is thus frequently but a doubtful path on which to walk; and the common law has its difficulties as well as the statutory law. And yet the nature of the case requires that all Her Majesty’s subjects should be held bound by all the laws which are applicable to their respective positions. The rights of an unfortunate ignoramus who is kept out of his property by fraud or force are lost, and his estates become irrecoverable if those rights are not enforced within the time limited by law, although he may never have heard of there being a stipulated time for the commencement of an action.
Blackstone gives as an illustration the case of a person who, intending to kill a burglar in his own house, by mistake kills one of his own family. This being a mistake of fact, is not a criminal offence. But if another man, mistaking the law, thinks that he has a right to kill a person who is excommunicate or an outlaw, and acts upon that belief, he would be liable to be convicted for wilful murder. It may be observed that the right of a householder to kill a burglar in his dwelling-house is not an unqualified right; for in that case, a private individual would be empowered to inflict a greater punishment than would be awarded by the law after conviction. In case a burglar should attempt violence which appeared likely to lead to murder of any of the inmates of the house, the law would hold the person attacked justifiable in defending his own life, even though in doing so he were compelled to take the life of the assailant; but the necessity ought to be clearly proved, if the defence is to succeed.
In civil actions, when the facts on which the supposed cause of action arose are in dispute, and if either party has been led to make concessions to the other party by means of fraudulent misrepresentations, the ignorance of the victim of the fraud will not prevent him from taking proceedings to set aside the agreement so fraudulently obtained, when he becomes acquainted with the facts. But if the compromise were founded upon a misconception of the law, he would be bound by it; for he ought to have known the law, or employed some person who knew it to protect his interests in the matter. But having neglected this obvious precaution, he must submit to the consequences with what grace he can assume.
The system of enacting new laws is not altogether free from objection, though it is not so easy to apply a remedy as to form an objection. The laws are passed at irregular times, some coming into operation at some fixed future time; while others are binding upon all from the very day on which they receive the royal assent. It is true that when an Act of Parliament creates a new offence, and a person ignorant of its existence is convicted of the breach of such new enactment, a slight penalty is inflicted as a warning to other persons rather than as a punishment for the offender; but still the stigma remains of having been convicted for an offence against the law, which is worse to some sensitive men than a heavy fine would be to some other persons of different temperament and less unblemished previous character. The theory that all new laws should be thoroughly made known to all the persons likely to be affected thereby is like many other well-sounding theories, it possesses the inherent defect of being impracticable. This inconvenience of involuntary ignorance of new enactments has been greatly diminished of late years by the immense increase of newspapers and the general diffusion of knowledge. The Elementary Education Acts have so extended the facilities for the acquisition of the art of reading, and the taste for reading is so cultivated by cheap periodical literature, that there is much more chance now than formerly of all classes knowing something of what is being done in the way of new enactments for the guidance of the people, the parliamentary reports forming an important part of the contents of every newspaper, and newspapers have come to be classed among the necessaries of life, even by those whose incomes are of the smallest. We should, however, be glad if the legislature could devise some more efficient way of making known to all persons the laws which they are bound to observe.