The publication created a profound sensation throughout Europe. It evoked passionate rebukes of the Prince in the Reichstag and drew forth an important utterance from the former German Foreign Minister, who failed to refute its supremely important revelations. It was reported early in April that the German Government had taken steps to institute proceedings against the Prince on the charges of revealing State secrets and of treason to the State.
The memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about eighteen months ago for the purpose of explaining and justifying his position to his personal friends, and only half a dozen typewritten copies were made. One of these copies, through a betrayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and caused a great scandal, and another was communicated to some members of the Minority Socialist Party. But how it happened that a copy got across the German frontier remains a mystery. Internal evidence, however, leaves no doubt in regard to the authenticity of the document. It is entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914," and is dated "Kuchelna, (Prince Lichnowsky's country seat,) August, 1916."
Prince Lichnowsky begins with a recital of the circumstances which led to his being appointed to London after many years of retirement from diplomacy, and a description of the European position as he then found it. The moment, he believes,
was undoubtedly favorable for a new attempt to get on a better footing with England. Our enigmatical Moroccan policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful disposition and aroused the suspicion that we were not quite sure what we wanted, or that our intention was to keep Europe in suspense, and, when occasion served, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was long in Paris, said to me, "If the French begin to forget révanche, you regularly remind them of it by treading heavily on their toes."
After rejecting M. Delcassé's attempt to come to an agreement with us in regard to Morocco, and declaring that we had no political interests there, an attitude which was in full accordance with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy, we suddenly recognized in Abdul Aziz a Kruger No. 2. To him, also, like the Boers, we promised the powerful support of the German Empire—at the same cost and with the same result. For both affairs ended, as they had to end, unless we were already then resolved to undertake a world war—namely, in withdrawal.
Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and the Russo-British rapprochements. In face of the German peril all other conflicts fell into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war had become evident.
THE BRITISH PROGRAM
After describing the futility of Germany's Moroccan policy, Prince Lichnowsky goes on:
When I arrived in London, in November, 1912, public opinion had calmed about the Morocco question. Mr. Haldane's mission had certainly failed, since we had demanded a promise of neutrality instead of satisfying ourselves with a compact which would secure us against a British attack or an attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up the idea of reaching an agreement with us and, as a beginning, made an attempt in this direction in the economic and colonial spheres. With Herr von Kühlmann as expert intermediary, an exchange of views took place concerning the renewal of the Portuguese Colonial Agreement and the Bagdad Railway, the object of which was to divide the aforesaid colonies, as well as Asia Minor, into spheres of interest. The British statesman desired, since the old disputes with France and Russia were settled, to reach a corresponding agreement with us. His aim was not to isolate us, but to get us to take part in the already established concert. Having succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Franco-British and Russo-British divisions, he wished also, as far as possible, to remove the causes of friction between England and Germany, and, by a network of agreements—to which might well eventually have been added an agreement on the unfortunate naval question—to secure the peace of the world.
This was Sir Edward Grey's program. In his own words "Without prejudice to the existing friendly understandings with France and Russia, which pursued no aggressive aims, and involved in themselves for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany." In short, to bring the two groups nearer together.