First of all, it should be said that any criticism of Admiral Jellicoe as to the makeup of the British advance force is not justified. The Queen Elizabeth class of dreadnoughts had been designed with the great speed of 25 knots for the purpose of working with battle cruisers on such service. This gave them a speed that was uniform with the fleet speed of Vice Admiral Beatty's battle cruiser squadrons, although the individual ships of the Lion class were faster. The name ship of this battleship class, the Queen Elizabeth, had been through a long, racking service in the Dardanelles operations, and was not with the fleet. The other four ships of the class made up the fifth battle squadron under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas, which was under Vice Admiral Beatty's command.
This disposition of Admiral Jellicoe's fleet, with the advance force flung out ahead, seems sound from every tactical point of view, with the assumption that the advance was to be in touch with the main fleet, or, if out of touch, tactical possibilities had been provided for and plans of action prearranged.
In the sweep through the North Sea, with the main body of the British Grand Fleet some fifty miles astern, Vice Admiral Beatty's advance force was cruising to southward of Admiral Jellicoe May 31, 1916, when, at 2:20 P. M., the presence of enemy ships was reported by a light cruiser. Admiral Beatty altered course "to the eastward and subsequently to northeastward, the enemy being sighted at 3:31 P. M. Their force consisted of five battle cruisers."[2]
BEGINNING OF THE ACTION
It is stated in Vice Admiral Beatty's report that it was over an hour after the first news of the vicinity of enemy ships before he increased speed to 25 knots to engage ("at 3:30 P. M."[2]). Yet Vice Admiral Beatty reports that Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas's fifth battle squadron (the four Queen Elizabeths) was still 10,000 yards away when he made this move to engage the enemy with his battle cruisers. This forces us to the conclusion that Admiral Beatty thought his six battle cruisers would be able to take care of the situation. His confidence is explained by the fact that all previous sorties of the Germans had been made by battle cruisers or small craft.
Both sides threw out screens of light cruisers, which clashed, and at 3:48 "the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both sides opening fire practically simultaneously."[3] The British battle cruisers fought on a course curving to the southeast, and then on a straight south-southeast course, and the five German battle cruisers fought them on a parallel course, instead of edging away from the superior British force. It is now easy to see that the trend of the action was absolutely in the direction of the approaching main body of the German High Seas Fleet, but this very naturally was not apparent at the time to Admiral Beatty.
The first phase of the battle may properly be studied as a fight between the British and German battle cruisers, in consequence of the before-stated gap separating the two parts of Admiral Beatty's command. This interval of 10,000 yards prevented the fifth battle squadron of Queen Elizabeth dreadnoughts from being a factor at the time. Vice Admiral Beatty reports that this squadron "opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards," and he continues: "The fifth battle squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range." (It is interesting to note this comment on a range of 20,000 yards, in view of the fantastic distances at which the Queen Elizabeth had been depicted by alarmists as shelling our coast cities.)
In this part of the action came the first of the many upsets of pre-war calculations. Comparing the given strength of the two opposing squadrons in action, it will be seen that the British battle cruisers were greatly superior; in fact, the odds would have been considered prohibitive before this battle. Yet it was the British squadron that suffered, losing one-third of its ships. Ten minutes after the beginning of the action the Indefatigable was sunk, and at 4:30 the Queen Mary met the same fate. In each case it is said that there was a great explosion up through the turrets, suggesting that a weak turret construction is really a conductor of fire to the magazine in case of a heavy hit, and pointing to the need of better separation of the supply of ammunition from the magazine.
DESTROYERS TAKE PART
At 4:15 there was an attack "simultaneously"[4] by British and German destroyers which resulted in a lively fight, but no damage to any of the capital ships. Yet the possibilities of such torpedo attacks were so evident, here and later in the battle, that the destroyer at once attained a greater value as an auxiliary of the battleship. It should also be noted that German submarines were reported present at this stage, but they accomplished nothing against the screened fighting ships. A British airplane had been sent up from a mother ship just before the engagement, though Admiral Beatty reports that it was forced to fly low on account of the clouds, and had a hard task "to identify four enemy light cruisers." There was apparently no chance of a wide observation that would have warned Admiral Beatty of the approaching German High Seas Fleet. In this short hour were concentrated many new problems of naval warfare.