NOTE BY EDITOR.—No official confirmation of the German losses was published. The British Admiralty maintains that the losses, including only German vessels "seen to sink," aggregated 109,220 tons. Other Admiralty claims were that the Germans lost one dreadnought of the Kronprinz type, 25,480 tons; one of the Heligoland type, 22,440 tons; battleship Pommern, 13,000 tons; battle cruiser Lützow, 28,000 tons; five Rostocks, 24,500 tons; destroyers, 4,000 tons; submarines, 800 tons; total, 117,220 tons.
British Analysis of the Jutland Battle
Expert British Admiralty writers do not concur in all the conclusions of our contributor, Mr. Frothingham, especially where he refers to the withdrawal of the British fleet.
The official report of Admiral Jellicoe states that "German vessels were entirely out of the fight at 9 o'clock," and that "the withdrawal of the British fleet was a 'manoeuvre' so as to remain between the Germans and their bases."
Sir Cyprian Bridge, a British naval expert, in referring to the situation of the German fleet when darkness fell after the battle, writes: "It was a beaten and a broken fleet that escaped from the trap," (referring to the British Battle Fleet at the north and the battle cruisers at the south, acting in strategic harmony.) "Many of its units had been lost. Its gunnery had become demoralized, and no one can blame its discretion in making for home at its top-most speed and leaving the British fleet once more in undisputed command of the North Sea. For this, in a word, was the result of the battle. * * * Whatever their effort signified, it failed to shake our hold upon the sea. * * * We have fought many indecisive actions, * * * few which have more fully freed us of all fear of what the enemy fleet might be able to accomplish. By such standards the battle off Jutland will well hold its own against all but a few of our most famous victories."
John Buchan published a description of the battle of Jutland by authority of the British Government. He, a historical authority, says: "The result of the battle of Jutland was that Britain was more confirmed than ever in her mastery of the sea. * * * From a technical point of view the battle appears as an example of a tactical division of the fleet, undertaken in order to coax a laggard enemy to battle. * * * It defeated, utterly defeated, the German plan. If it was not—as with two hours more daylight it would have been—a complete destruction of Germany's sea power, it was a complete demonstration of Britain's crushing superiority."
Arthur Pollen, an expert naval writer in British periodicals, referred to the results of the battle in these words: "Thus the Germans, who had entered the North Sea, according to their own account, to engage and destroy the British ships that have been systematically sweeping the waters north and east of the Horn Reef, attained the first part of their objective only. They did succeed in engaging. But the consequences were disastrous. The plan of overwhelming the British fast division with superior numbers was defeated by the masterly handling of the British force, combined with the effective use that force made of its artillery. So far from Sir David Beatty having been overwhelmed, he succeeded admirably in his main object, which was to draw the German fleet into a position where Sir John Jellicoe's squadrons could engage it. The enemy was only saved from total destruction by mist and by the approach of night. Not only did his whole plan miscarry, but he was driven ignominiously from the field, and with a very heavy loss in ships and men."
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Report of Vice Admiral Beatty.
[3] Report of Vice Admiral Beatty.