The needs of the army, however, were not the only drain. A large amount of additional labor was required for agriculture, timber production, and iron ore mining, as well as for industrial purposes. The needs in these respects also were gradually supplied by reducing unessential industries and by organizing supplies of soldier, civilian, and foreign labor. Investigations were carried out as to the use of labor in different trades, and trade committees representing employers and employed were organized to deal with economy of man-power in particular industries. The evidence so obtained, while it demonstrated clearly the complexity and difficulty of a system of compulsory national service in industry, made it clear that in order to effect the best strategic use of the man power of the country, the National Service Department required extension rather than restriction. Accordingly, in August, 1917, the department was reorganized as a Ministry, recruiting was transferred from the War Office, and arrangements were made to insure effective co-operation between the Ministry and the employment exchanges for the period of the war.
Munitions
Notwithstanding the tremendous calls upon the man power of the country for the ever-increasing needs of the army, the supply of munitions has steadily increased. In addition to large consignments to other fronts of the war, there has been an increase of 30 per cent. in all kinds of guns and howitzers, and of over 100 per cent. in heavy guns and howitzers in the recent offensive in France, as compared with those of last year. The weight of shell filled per month has been more than doubled since 1916. The output of high explosives has been sufficient to meet the increased demands of our armies, to build up stocks, and to supply part of the needs of the Allies. There has been a steady improvement in the detonating value of gun ammunition and a continuous reduction in the number of premature explosions. In addition to guns, shells, and rifles, the demands of the military and naval forces during the year for aircraft, tanks, mechanical transport, railway material, and equipment of every sort and kind have been endless. Despite the immensity of the demand, it has, on the whole, been supplied. The British Army is now probably the best provided of all the armies in the field, not only in technical equipment but in clothing, food, and similar provision.
Fighting the Submarine
The most difficult problems which confronted the Administration in the early part of 1917 were those which arose from the growing inadequacy of the overseas communications of the Allies—problems which were aggravated by the introduction of the unlimited submarine campaign on Feb. 1. The expansion of the armies, the ever-increasing demand for warlike material, the fall in production, especially of foodstuffs in all allied countries through the calling of men to the colors, and the decline in cultivation, coupled with the diversion of a large part of the shipping of the Allies to purely military and naval transportation, had already put a severe strain on the shipping resources of the country. The immediate effect of the new campaign was to double the rate of losses which had been incurred during 1916, and these losses rose rapidly to a climax in March and April.
The countermeasures which were adopted by the navy, however, were successful in reducing the attack to manageable proportions, though they involved a drain upon the national resources both in man power and material which is often not fully recognized, and which is by no means the least important of the contributions of the British Empire to the war. The number of men engaged either in the navy or in supplying naval needs now exceeds a million. Unfortunately it is not possible to set forth in detail the immense scope of the Admiralty operations. But they include a very great addition to the armed craft in the service of the navy from torpedo boat destroyers to mine-sweepers, airships, and airplanes, and the organization of a vast system of patrols and mine-sweepers. As a result of the self-sacrificing devotion on the part of the men of the navy and the auxiliary services, and the steadfast performance in all weathers and seasons of their monotonous and dangerous duties, the enemy never succeeded in interfering to any vital degree with the sea communications of the Allies.
The Shipping Problem
The naval preparations, however, were only part of the measures which were necessary to deal with the shipping situation. The second step was to create the Ministry of Shipping. At the end of 1916 the tonnage requisitioned by the State was less than one-half of the whole, and this was mainly used on purely military and naval services for the British Government or the Allies. During 1917 practically the whole of the remainder of the British ocean-going mercantile marine was brought under requisition at Blue Book rates and organized as a national war service. The Dominion Government also liberated much overseas shipping for war purposes, and neutral shipping was brought as far as possible into allied service. A close scrutiny was then made of the countries from which the necessary imports could be derived, and shipping was concentrated on the shortest routes, thereby multiplying the number of voyages the ships could make in the year. Leading regulations were revised, which increased the carrying capacity from the 1913 figure of 106 to 150 tons per 100 tons net of shipping entering our ports, and arrangements were made for shortening the time occupied in the turn round of ships at the ports. In the latter part of the year the convoy system was introduced, which reduced the shipping losses, though it involved certain delays to individual ships.
In addition to these improvements in the methods of using shipping, a large program of shipbuilding was put into operation, not only in British yards but in all the available yards in neutral countries as well. To insure greater speed in building a large number of the new ships were ordered to a standard design. In spite of the difficulties of all kinds which have confronted the production of ships, notably the shortage in the supply of steel plates and of labor, the output has steadily mounted. During 1917 1,163,500 tons of new ships were built, as against 542,000 tons in 1916, and by the end of 1918 the rate of output of all ships, war and merchant, ought to be double that of any previous year in British history. In order to make possible this increase forty-five new berths have been provided in private shipyards, and the construction of three new national shipyards, containing thirty-four berths, has been begun. Besides this effort at home 175,000 tons of shipping were purchased abroad, an amount which would have been very greatly exceeded if the United States had not taken over the whole program of ships being constructed on British account when they entered the war.
The third step in dealing with the shipping problem was a drastic reduction of imports. In 1916 imports were cut down by 1,600,000 tons. Early in 1917 a committee was appointed which recommended a preliminary program of reductions amounting to 6,000,000 tons. This was approved and came into operation on March 1. The program was shortly afterward increased by further severe restrictions of the imports of timber. The outcome of this policy has been that practically all cargo space is now reserved for goods carried directly or indirectly on Government account, and consists almost entirely of essential foodstuffs, raw materials required for the manufacture of national necessities and military needs or of munitions of war. The chief reductions were in timber, paper, feeding stuffs, and brewing materials. The unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the restriction of imports and of the diversion of shipping from trading to war routes has been a large diminution in exports.