In vain. It would be, I was told, wounding to Austria's dignity, nor would we mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. We left it to our allies. I was to work for the localization of the conflict. It naturally only needed a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been!
INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS
After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer [from Berlin] than that it was an enormous "concession" on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.
Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand.
The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which, after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff, [Russian Foreign Minister,] later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] and of Bollati, [Italian Ambassador in Berlin,] my urgent advice—it was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred.
The more I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in the company of Sir Edward Grey.
So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his well-known warning. I replied that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."
GREY STILL SOUGHT PEACE
After that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.
Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. In the morning of Aug. 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Should we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should then be ready to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even toward Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and France should face one another armed, without attacking one another.