The most important reason is undoubtedly the lack of unity among the German working classes. Even in Berlin the strike was not general; in many factories only part of the men went out, while the rest continued their work. In many cities, such as Munich, the workmen divided according to party; the Independent Socialists struck, members of the old party went on with their work. The most important industrial districts were only slightly affected. On the Rhine, in Westphalia, in Upper Silesia, even in Saxony, where lie the chief fortresses of independent socialism, only a small section struck. And even where they struck there was no kind of uniform action; in many towns, like Nürnberg, for instance, only a demonstrative strike of limited duration was decided upon, while elsewhere the intention was to hold out until the demands were obtained. In Berlin the pressmen struck, but not the compositors; one newspaper could appear, another not.
It was always the weakness of German Social Democracy that it had least influence on the very sections of the working class whose strike would involve the greatest economic danger. The railway men now take the first place in the movement in England, America, France, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and now in Russia, too; only in Germany have they always stood outside the ranks of the class-conscious workmen. Of the miners and iron founders, too, only part is Socialist; a very considerable part follows the Centre and the Polish Nationalists. These facts explain the weakness of the movement, and also the energy of the Prussian authorities. The German Government would have hesitated to take violent measures if it had had reason to fear that such measures would provoke an extension of the movement to the railways, mines, and foundries. The weakness of the movement is not a result of the energy of the authorities; on the contrary, only its weakness made that energy possible.
How is it, then, that the German working classes, after three and a half years of unheard-of sacrifice and deprivation, are not capable of carrying through a struggle for peace with the same unanimity and clearness of aim as in many former struggles? This is, at least, partially due to the unfortunate development of German Social Democracy during the war. It has united with the Centre and the Liberals in the Reichstag bloc. It has thus scored various successes—the inclusion of progressive parliamentarians in the Government; the Reichstag resolution in favor of peace by understanding; the Reform bill in the Prussian Parliament. But this policy, which made Social Democracy the ally of bourgeois parties and the support of the Government, was fiercely attacked by the Opposition, which finally constituted itself as a separate party. * * * The bloc policy and action of the masses are mutually exclusive policies; those who themselves belong in the Reichstag to the majority which supports the Government cannot create the atmosphere in which alone a united action of the masses is possible. Nor, indeed, was that the intention of the German Social Democratic majority; the mass-strike came without any act on its part and against its will. When the strike was there, the leaders (of the majority) none the less placed themselves at its head; but the masses, having been educated for three and a half years to trust the Government's intentions, were naturally not willing to make heavy sacrifices in a struggle against this very Government.
In other democratic lands such a situation can hardly arise. There the parliamentary majority decides the policy of the Government, and if the Socialists form part of that majority, they can effectively influence policy, and so there can be no idea of the working classes having to conduct a political mass-strike against this Government. In Germany it is different. Here the voting of the imperial budget and of the war credits is not much more than a theoretical confession of faith in the Fatherland; to belong to the Reichstag majority is not a guarantee of real political power. A few Generals, a few influential bank directors and big manufacturers can, under given circumstances, influence policy more effectually than the whole Reichstag majority. Thus, indeed, it can happen that the Government's policy seems very little influenced by socialism, though this latter supports the Government; that, consequently, a considerable part of the working classes decides upon a political strike against the Government which for three and a half years has enjoyed the support of the majority of working class Deputies in the Reichstag. And only thus can we explain the strange spectacle, inexplicable to any other country, that a Government in whose formation Social Democracy has had a share, and which at every division is supported by the Socialists, knows no other means of meeting a strike save by forbidding meetings, introducing a state of siege and militarizing! The bloc policy is dangerous everywhere; but these dangers are incomparably greater in the classic land of Government by authority (Obrigkeitsregierung) than in the democratic countries. The unedifying picture which German Social Democracy presents today is at bottom the result of German sham democracy, of the poverty and backwardness of German political life.
But, in spite of all, we hope that even the German strike will not have an unfavorable effect on future development. Many a struggle which had to end without tangible success has, later on, proved fruitful after all! So it will be this time. The German Government did not have to give the workmen any definite assurances; but it had learned that every extension of the war provokes the gravest social dangers; and if this time it still found it easy to dispose of the strike, because a large section of the working classes still trusts in it, all its force (Machtmittel) would avail it nothing, if the whole German working class once acquired the conviction that the Government is prolonging the war for the sake of Pan-German lust of conquest.
