The next step to which I should like to call the attention of the House is the material and dramatic assistance rendered by President Wilson in this emergency—one of the most important decisions in the war. In fact, the issue of the battle might very well be determined by this decision.
In America there is a very considerable number of men in the course of training, and the Allies looked forward to having a large American army in France in the Spring. It has taken longer than was anticipated to turn those soldiers into the necessary divisional organizations. If America waited to complete these divisional organizations it would not be possible for these fine troops in any large numbers to take part in this battle in this campaign, although it might be very well the decisive battle of the war.
This was, of course, one of the most serious disappointments from which the Allies had suffered. It is no use pretending it was not one of our chief causes of anxiety. We depend upon it largely to make up the defection of Russia.
For many reasons—reasons, perhaps of transport, reasons connected with the time it takes, not merely to train troops and their officers, but to complete the necessary organization—it was quite impossible to put into France the number of divisions every one had confidently expected would be there. Under the circumstances we, therefore, submitted to the President of the United States a definite proposal. We had the advantage of having the Secretary of State for War in this country within two or three days after the battle had commenced. Mr. Balfour and I had a long conversation with him upon the whole situation, and we submitted to him certain recommendations which we had been advised to make to Mr. Baker and the American Government.
Proposal of Earl of Reading
On the strength of the conversation we submitted proposals to President Wilson, with the strong support of Premier Clemenceau, to enable the combatant strength of the American Army to come into action during this battle, inasmuch as there was no hope of it coming in as a strong separate army. By this decision American battalions will be brigaded with those of the Allies.
This proposal was submitted by the Earl of Reading on behalf of the British Government to President Wilson, and President Wilson assented to the proposal without any hesitation, with the result that arrangements are now being made for the fighting strength of the American Army to be immediately brought to bear in this struggle—a struggle which is only now beginning—to this extent, and it is no mere small extent, that the German attack has been held up. It has stirred up the resolution and energy of America beyond anything which has yet occurred.
Another important decision taken by the allied Governments I must also call the attention of the House to. It became more obvious after the battle than ever before that the allied armies were suffering from the fact that they were fighting as two separate armies and had to negotiate support with each other. Valuable time was thus lost. Some of us had been deeply impressed by this peril for some time and had done our best to avert it.
But the inherent difficulties to be overcome are tremendous. There are national prejudices, national interests, professional prejudices and traditions. The inherent difficulties of getting two or three separate armies to fight as one are almost insurmountable, and it can only be done if public opinion in all these countries insists upon it as one condition of success.
The Versailles conference was an effort at a remedy. How were the Versailles decisions carried out, and the extent to which they were not carried out? This is not the time to inquire.