REGION OF HANGARD AND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, WHERE GERMANS USED TANKS FOR THE FIRST TIME
The Berlin publicity bureau advertised the fact that a direct thrust at Ypres had brought the Germans to within three miles of the town—an achievement of no particular military value—while it quite ignored the capture of Mont Kemmel, for the simple reason that its value was now discovered to repose in their ability to carry their occupation throughout the entire range.
This they have since been vainly, except for local advances, trying to do, often employing great forces of men in mass for two or three days at a time—striving vainly to broaden the salient in three places: between Dickebusch and Voormezeele, due south from Ypres; by an envelopment of Mont Rouge to the southwest; on the south by an advance in the direction of Béthune.
VON ARNIM'S EFFORTS
In the northern part of the salient the attacks reached their climax on Monday, April 29, when General Sixt von Arnim's army was hurled in wave after wave between Voormezeele and Scherpenberg and on the latter and Mont Rouge, only to end in a repulse, which, on account of the number of men believed to have been lost by the enemy, may be considered a disastrous defeat. All this time a heavy bombardment had been going on in the Béthune region in preparation for an infantry attack there; yet on account of the defeat further north, it could not be delivered.
Henceforth, until May 16, von Arnim was obviously placed on the defensive, whereas the Allies were locally on the offensive, either recovering lost strategic points or consolidating their lines. On May 5, between Locre and Dranoutre, the Franco-British forces advanced on a 1,000-yard front to the depth of 500 yards. On the 8th the Germans made a half-hearted attack on the sector south of Dickebusch Lake and entered British trenches, only to be repulsed with heavy loss. A similar attack the next day between La Clytte and Voormezeele not only met with a similar repulse, but was followed up by a strong British counterattack which won considerable ground. On the 12th the French captured Hill 44 on the north flank of Kemmel, between La Clytte and Vierstraat.
On May 13 renewed enemy artillery activity on the lines back of Béthune seemed to presage that an infantry attack was intended there. Nothing of this nature ensued, however. On the 15th the Germans made a sudden attack against Hill 44 but were hurled back by the French. On the 16th-17th they maintained a concentrated fire north of Kemmel.
GERMAN ATTACKS ON THE LYS
All these operations on the German northern salient, which is gradually coming to be called the Lys salient, have shown no indication of being intended to pave the way for a renewal of the general offensive in Flanders. Their success might, and probably would, have forced the evacuation of Ypres and affected the Picardy salient with its vertex near Amiens, forcing the evacuation of Arras. But, as we have seen, the operations on the Lys salient, meeting with an overwhelming obstruction on April 29, did not achieve these results. Throughout the next three weeks the manoeuvres of the enemy in Picardy afforded excellent opportunities for counterattacks on the part of the Allies, whose object here has been to punish the enemy as much as possible and to consolidate every strategic position on a broad front in anticipation of a renewal of Germany's original scheme to isolate the allied armies north of the Somme by a dash to the mouth of that river via Amiens.