"Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 'Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle,' evidently knew how to throw a little sand into the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, always was pro-Entente. His present attitude reveals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward Petrograd.
"That Count Berchtold displayed certain inclinations toward Bulgaria also in its differences with Rumania is true; that we 'naturally went with him' is, however, entirely false. With our support, King Carol had the satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended second Balkan war.] If, therefore, in the case of the Bucharest peace, in which we favored the wishes and interests of Rumania, which was allied to us, our policy deviated somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe—as Prince Lichnowsky asserts—that it 'could count upon our support in case of its revision.' That Marquis San Giuliano 'is said to have warned us already in the Summer of 1913 from becoming involved in a world war,' because at that time in Austria 'the thought of a campaign against Serbia' had found entrance, is entirely unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr von Tschirschky—who certainly was rather pessimistic by nature—is said to have declared in the Spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. Therefore, I was just as ignorant of the 'important happenings' that Prince Lichnowsky here suspects as he was himself! Such events as the English visit to Paris—Sir Edward Grey's first to the Continent—surely must have been known to the Ambassador, and we informed him about the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he did not want to believe it!
"In the matter of Liman von Sander, [German reorganizer of the Turkish Army,] we made a far-reaching concession to Russia by renouncing the General's power of command over Constantinople. I will admit that this point of the agreement over the military mission was not opportune politically.
"When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having succeeded in giving the treaty a form corresponding to our wishes, this credit must not be denied him, although it certainly required strong pressure on several occasions to induce him to represent some of our desires with more emphasis.
"When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received the authorization definitely to conclude the treaty, after he previously asserts that 'the treaty was consequently dropped,' this contains a contradiction which we may let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky's assertion, however, that we delayed publication because the treaty would have been 'a public success' for him that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can only be explained through his self-centred conception of things. The treaty would have lost its practical and moral effect—one of its main objects was to create a good atmosphere between us and England—if its publication had been greeted with violent attacks upon 'perfidious Albion' in our Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. And there is no doubt that, in view of our internal position at that time, this is what the simultaneous publication of the so-called Windsor Treaty would have caused. And the howl about English perfidy that the internal contradiction between the text of the Windsor Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have called forth would hardly have been stilled in the minds of our public through the assurance of English bona fides.
"With justified precaution, we intended to allow the publication to be made only at the proper moment, when the danger of disapproving criticism was no longer so acute, if possible simultaneously with the announcement of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the point of being concluded. The fact that two great agreements had been concluded between us and England would doubtless have materially favored their reception and made it easier to overlook the aesthetic defects of the Portuguese agreement. It was consideration for the effect of the agreement—with which we wanted to improve our relations with England, not to generate more trouble—that caused our hesitation.
"It is correct that—although in a secondary degree—consideration was also taken of the efforts just then being made to obtain economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which the publication of the agreement would naturally have made more difficult to realize. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky may not have been able to perceive fully from London, but he should have trusted in our objective judgment and acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his lack of understanding with suspicions and the interjection of personal motives. He certainly would have found our arguments understood by the English statesmen themselves.
"The Ambassador's speeches aroused considerable adverse sentiment in this country. It was necessary for the creation of a better atmosphere, in which alone the rapprochement being worked for could flourish, that confidence in our English policy and in our London Ambassador be spread also among our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, did not take this motive sufficiently into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles. The charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable to be bothered with. I would only like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the 'most important things,' in so far as they were of value to his mission. On the contrary, I gave the Ambassador much more general information than used to be the custom. My own experiences as Ambassador induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely more upon his own impressions and judgment than upon the information and advice of the Central Office. To be sure, I did not always have either the motive or the authority to impart the sources of our news. Here there were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety regarding the compromising of our sources. The Prince's memorandum furnishes the best justification for the caution exercised in this regard.
Defense of Archduke
"It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances were not believed.