GERMANY'S WAR DEBT
He followed this with a statement contrasting the financial condition of Great Britain with that of Germany, as follows:
Up to June, 1916, according to the statement of the German Financial Minister, the monthly German expenditure was $500,000,000; it is now admitted to be $937,500,000, which means a daily expenditure of $31,250,000, which is almost the same as ours. But it does not include such matters as separation allowances. As to the war debt, the German votes of credit up to July amounted to $31,000,000,000. Up to 1916 they imposed no new taxation at all, and in that year they proposed a war increment levy. Assuming that their estimates were realized, the total amount of taxation levied by the German Government was $1,825,000,000, as against our own amount.
This amount is not enough to pay the interest of the war debt which Germany has accumulated up to the end of the year. The German balance sheet, reckoned on the same basis as ours, will, with interest, sinking fund, pensions, and pre-war expenditures, be a year hence $3,600,000,000; and with additional permanent imperial revenue of $600,000,000 they will make their total additional revenue $925,000,000 per annum, and this amount, added to the pre-war revenue, makes a total of $1,675,000,000, showing a deficit at the end of the year of $1,925,000,000.
If that were our position I should say that bankruptcy was not far from the British Nation.
The German taxes have been almost exclusively indirect, imposed on commodities paid for by the mass of the people and not upon the wealthier classes, who control the Government and on whom the Government is afraid to put extra taxation.
Trade After the War
Important Report by a Commission of British Experts and Economists
Great Britain's policy with reference to future trade is outlined in the final report of the Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy After the War, of which Lord Balfour of Burleigh was Chairman, and which included in its membership Arthur Balfour, (ex-Master Cutler of Sheffield,) also the heads of the various Boards of Trade, the textile trades, with representatives of the shipping and shipbuilding industries, finance, engineering, metal trades, coal, electrical, iron and steel associations, national transport workers, and distinguished economists.
Shipping policy after the war is not dealt with in the report, but, in view of the world shortage of tonnage, the committee express the opinion that, while it may be desirable to impose for a limited period some restriction on the use of British ports by enemy vessels, any policy which might tend to check the use of English ports by foreign shipping generally would be inexpedient. They, however, urge that, in accordance with the Paris Conference resolutions, the exaction of reparation in kind from enemy countries should, in the interests of the reconstruction of industry and the mercantile marine, be carried out as fully as may be practicable.
In a general survey of the position of British industry and overseas trade in 1913, prior to the war, the committee found that the United Kingdom had taken only a limited share in the more modern branches of industrial production, and that certain branches had come to be entirely, or very largely, under German control, and in numerous branches foreign manufacturers had secured a "strong, or even predominant, position." They found that British merchants and manufacturers had also been encountering successful competition in overseas trade. They believe that the knowledge gained during the war will be a valuable asset in the development of British industry.
As to the measures which should be adopted during the transitional period, the committee reaffirm the main recommendations of their interim report, namely: