Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Bradford, William" to "Brequigny, Louis" / Volume 4, Slice 4

by Various

Psychosis and the Fore-Brain.—Hippocrates wrote, “It is through the brain that we become mad, that delirium seizes us, that fears and terrors assail us.” “We know that pleasure and joy on the one hand and pain and grief on the other are referable to the brain. It is in virtue of it that we think, understand, see, hear, know ugliness and beauty, evil and good, the agreeable and the disagreeable.” Similarly and more precisely Descartes indicated the brain, and the brain alone, as the seat of consciousness. Finally, it was Flourens who perhaps first definitely insisted on the restriction of the seat of consciousness in higher animals to that part of the brain which is the fore-brain. A functional distinction between the fore-brain and the remainder of the nervous system seems, in fact, that consciousness and physical reactions are adjunct to the fore-brain in a way in which they are not to the rest of the system. After transection of the spinal cord, or of the brain behind the fore-brain, psychical phenomena do not belong to the reactions of the nervous arcs posterior to the transection, whereas they do still accompany reactions of the nervous arcs in front and still connected with the fore-brain. A man after severance of the spinal cord does not possess in the strict sense consciousness of the limbs whose afferent nerves lie behind the place of spinal severance. He can see them with his eyes, and if the severance lie between the arms and the legs, can feel the latter with his hands. He knows them to be a part of his body. But they are detached from his consciousness. Sensations derived from them through all other channels of sense than their own do not suffice to restore them in any adequate measure to his consciousness. He must have the sensations so called “resident” in them, that is, referred to them, without need of any logical inference. These can be yielded only by the receptive organs resident in the part itself, its skin, its joints, its muscles, &c., and can only be yielded by those receptive organs so long as the nerve impulses from them have access to the fore-brain. Consciousness, therefore, does not seem to attach to any portion of the nervous system of higher animals from which the fore-brain has been cut off. In the dog it has been found that no sign of memory, let alone intelligence, has been forthcoming after removal of the greater part of the fore-brain.

In lower vertebrates it is not clear that consciousness in primitive form requires always the co-operation of the fore-brain. In them the fore-brain does not seem a conditio sine qua non for psychosis—so far as we may trust the rather hazardous inferences which study of the behaviour of fish, &c., allows. And the difference between higher and lowlier animal forms in respect of the fore-brain as a condition for psychosis becomes more marked when the Arthropoda are examined. The behaviour of some Insecta points strongly to their possessing memory, rudimentary in kind though it may be. But in them no homologue of the fore-brain of vertebrates can be indisputably made out. The head ganglia in these Invertebrates may, it is true, be analogous in function in certain ways to the brain of vertebrates. Some experiments, not plentiful, indicate that destruction of these head ganglia induces deterioration of behaviour such as follows loss of psychical functions in cases of destruction of the fore-brain in vertebrates. Though, therefore, we cannot be clear that the head ganglia of these Invertebrates are the same structure morphologically as the brain of vertebrates, they seem to hold a similar office, exercising analogous functions, including psychosis of a rudimentary kind. We can, therefore, speak of the head ganglia of Arthropods as a brain, and in doing so must remember that we define by physiological evidence rather than by morphological.

Cerebral Control over Lower Nervous Centres.—There accrues to the brain, especially to the fore-brain of higher Vertebrates, another function besides that of grafting psychical qualities upon the reactions of the nervous system. This function is exhibited as power to control in greater or less measure the pure reflexes enacted by the system. These pure reflexes have the character of fatality, in the sense that, given a particular stimulus, a particular reaction unvaryingly follows; the same group of muscles or the same gland is invariably thrown into action in the same way. Removal of the fore-brain, i.e. of that portion of the central nervous organ to which psychosis is adjunct, renders the nervous reactions of the animal more predictable and less variable. The animal, for instance, a dog, is given over more completely to simple reflexes. Its skin is touched and it scratches the spot, its jaw is stroked and it yawns, its rump is rubbed and it shakes itself, like a dog coming out of water; and these reactions occur fatally and inopportunely, for instance, when food is being offered to it, when the dog normally would allow no such insignificant skin stimuli as the above to defer his appropriate reaction. Goltz relates the behaviour of a dog from which almost the whole fore-brain had been removed. The animal lived healthily under the careful treatment accorded it. At feeding time a little quinine (bitter) added to its sop of meat and milk led to the morsels, after being taken into the mouth, being at once and regularly rejected. None was ever swallowed, nor was the slightest hesitation in their rejection ever obtained by any coaxing or command, or encouragement of the animal by the attendant who constantly had charge of it. On the other hand, directly an undoctored piece had entered the mouth it was swallowed at once. Goltz threw to his own house-dog a piece of the same doctored meat. The creature wagged its tail and took it eagerly, then after receiving it into its mouth pulled a wry face and hesitated, astonished. But on encouragement to go on eating it the dog did so. Perhaps it deemed it unseemly to appear ungrateful to the giver and reject the gift. It overcame its reflex of rejection, and by its self-control gave proof of the intact cerebrum it possessed.

There seems a connexion between consciousness and the power to modify reflex action to meet the exigencies of the occasion. Pure reflexes are admirably adapted to certain ends. They are reactions which have long proved advantageous to the phylum of which the existent animal is the representative embodiment. But the reflexes have a machine-like fatality, and conscious aim does not forerun their execution. The subject as active agent does not direct them. Yet they lie under the control of higher centres. The cough, the eye-closure, the impulse to smile, all these can be suppressed. The innate respiratory rhythm can be modified to meet the requirements of vocal utterance. In other words, the reaction of reflex arcs is controllable by the mechanism to whose activity consciousness is adjunct. The reflexes controlled are often reactions but slightly affecting consciousness, but consciousness is very distinctly operative with the centres which exert the control. It may be that the primary aim, object and purpose of consciousness is control. “Consciousness in a mere automaton,” writes Professor Lloyd Morgan, “is a useless and unnecessary epiphenomenon.” As to how this conscious control is operative on reflexes, how it intrudes its influence on the running of the reflex machinery, little is known.

The Cerebrum an Organ giving Adaptation and Readjustment of Motor Acts.—The exercise of this control and the acquirement of skilled actions have obviously elements in common. By skilled actions, we understand actions not innately given, actions acquired by training in individual experience. The controlling centres pick out from an ancestral motor action some part, and isolate and enhance that until it becomes a skilled act. The motor co-ordination ancestrally provided for the ring finger gives an extending of it only in company with extension of the fingers on either side of it. The isolated lifting of the ring finger can, however, soon be acquired by training. In such cases the higher centre with conscious effort is able to dissociate a part from an ancestral co-ordination, and in that way to add a skilled adapted act to the powers of the individual.

The nervous organs of control form, therefore, a special instrument of adaptation and of readjustment of reaction, for better accommodation to requirements which may be new. The attainment of more precision and speed in the use of a tool, or the handling of a weapon, means a process in which nervous organs of control modify activities of reflex centres themselves already perfected ancestrally for other though kindred actions. This process of learning is accompanied by conscious effort. The effort consists not so much in any course of reasoning but rather in the acquiring of new sensorimotor experience. To learn swimming or skating by simple cogitation or mere visual observation is of course impossible. The new ideas requisite cannot be constructed without motor experience, and the training must include that motor experience. Hence the training for a new skilled motor manoeuvre must be simply ad hoc, and is of itself no training for another motor co-ordination.

The more complex an organism the more points of contact does it have with its environment, and the more does it need readjustment amid an environment of shifting relationships. Hence the organs of consciousness and control, being organs of adaptation and readjustment of reaction, will be more pronounced the farther the animal scale is followed upward to its crowning species, man. The cerebrum and especially the cerebral cortex may be regarded as the highest expression of the nervous organ of individual adaptation of reactions. Its high development in man makes him the most successful animal on earth’s surface at the present epoch. The most important part of all this adjustment in his case, as he stands now, consists doubtless in that nervous activity which is intellectual. The mentality attached to his cerebrum includes reason in higher measure than is possessed by the mentality of other animals. He, therefore, more than they, can profitably forecast the future and act suitably to meet it from memory of the past. The cerebrum has proved itself by his case the most potent weapon existent for extending animal dominance over the environment.

Means and Present Aims of Physiological Study of the Brain.—The aspects of cerebral activity are therefore twofold. There is the contribution which it makes to the behaviour of the animal as seen in the creature’s doings. On the other hand there is its product in the psychical life of the animal. The former of these is subject matter for physiology; the latter is especially the province of psychology. Physiology does, however, concern itself with the psychical aspect of cerebral functions. Its scope, embracing the study of the bodily organs in regard to function, includes the psychic as well as the material, because as just shown the former inextricably interlace with the latter. But the relation between the psychic phenomena and the working of the brain in regard to any data of fundamental or intimate character connecting the two remains practically as unknown to us as to the Greek philosophers. What physiology has at present to be content with in this respect is the mere assigning of certain kinds of psychic events to certain local regions of the cerebrum. This primitive quest constitutes the greater part of the “neurology” of our day, and some advance has been made along its lines. Yet how meagre are really significant facts will be clear from the brief survey that follows. Before passing finally from these general considerations, we may note that it becomes more and more clear that the brain, although an organ than can be treated as a whole, is complex in the sense that separable functions belong in some measure to its several parts.

The means principally adopted in studying the functions of the brain—and it must be remembered that this study in its present phase is almost exclusively a mere search for localization—are four. These are the physiological, the clinico-pathological, the histological and the zoological. The first named proceeds by observing the effects of artificial excitation, chiefly electric, of various parts of the brain, and the defects produced by destruction or removal of circumscribed portions. The clinico-pathological proceeds by observing the disturbances of body and mind occurring in disease or injury, and ascertaining the extent of the disease or injury, for the most part post mortem. The histological method examines the microscopic structure of the various regions of the brain and the characters and arrangement of the nerve-cells composing it. The zoological follows and compares the general features of the brain, as represented in the various types of animal creation.

It is on the functions of the fore-brain that interest now mainly focuses, for the reasons mentioned above. And the interest in the fore-brain itself chiefly attaches to the functions of its cortex. This is due to several causes. In man and the animals nearest him the cortex forms by far the larger part of the whole cerebral hemisphere. More than any other part it constitutes the distinctively human feature. It lies accessible to various experimental observations, as also to traumatic lesions and to the surgeon’s art. It is composed of a great unbroken sheet of grey matter; for that reason it is a structure wherein processes of peculiar interest for the investigation in view are likely to occur. To make this last inference more clear a reference to the histology of nervous tissue must be made. The whole physiological function of the nervous system may be summed up in the one word “conduction.” This “conduction” may be defined as the transmission of states of excitement (nerve-impulses) along the neural arcs composing the system. The whole nervous system is built up of chains of nerve-cells (neurones) which are nervous conductors, the chains often being termed arcs. Each neurone is an elongated cell which transmits nerve-impulses from its one end to its other, without so far as is known modifying the impulses in transit, unless in that part of the nerve-cell where the nucleus lies. That part of the neurone or nerve-cell is called the perikaryon or cell-body, and from that part usually many branches of the cell (each branch being a nerve-fibre) ramify. There is no evidence that impulses are modified in transit along a branch of a nerve-cell, but there is clear evidence of manifold modification of nerve-impulses in transit along the nerve-arcs of the nervous system. These nerve-arcs are neurone-chains. In them one neurone continues the line of conduction where the immediately foregoing neurone left it. That is, the neurones are laid in conductive series, the far end of one apposed to the near end of its precursor. The place of juxtaposition of the end of one neurone against the beginning of another is called the synapse. At it the conduction which has so far been wholly intra-neuronic is replaced by an inter-neuronic process, in which the nerve impulse passes from one neurone to the next. The process there, it is natural to think, must be physiologically different from that conductive process that serves for transmission merely within the neurone itself. It may be that to this inter-neuronic conduction are due the differences between conduction in nerve-arcs and nerve-trunks (nerve-fibres) respectively. Significant of the former are changes in rhythm, intensity, excitability and modifications by summation and inhibition; in fact a number of the main features of nervous reaction. These characters impressed upon conduction in nerve arcs (neurone-chains) would therefore be traceable to the intercalation of perikarya and synapses, for both these structures are absent from nerve-trunks. It is therefore probably to perikarya and synapses that the greater part of the co-ordination, elaboration and differentiation of nervous reactions is due. Now, perikarya and synapses are not present in the white matter of the central nervous organ, any more than they are in nerve-trunks. They are confined exclusively to those portions of the central organ which consist of grey matter (so called from its naked-eye appearance). Hence it is to the great sheet of grey matter which enfolds the cerebrum that the physiologist turns, as to a field where he would expect to find evidences of the processes of cerebral co-ordination at work. It is therefore to items regarding the functions of the great sheet of cerebral cortex that we may now pass.