colonies was the not altogether unnatural rise in the manufacturing centres of the political school known as the Manchester school, which was disposed to question the value to Great Britain of the retention of colonies which were no longer bound to give her the monopoly of their commercial markets. An equally natural desire on the part of the larger colonies to profit by the opportunity which was opened to them of establishing local manufactures of their own, combined with the convenience in new countries of using the customs as an instrument of taxation, led to something like a reciprocal feeling of resentment, and there followed a period during which the policy of Great Britain was to show no consideration for colonial trade, and the policy of the principal colonies was to impose heavy duties upon British trade. By a gradual process of better understanding, largely helped by the development of means of communication, the antagonistic extreme was abandoned, and a tendency towards a system of preferential duties within the empire displayed itself.
At the Colonial Conference held in London in 1887 a proposal was formally submitted by the South Colonial preference. African delegate for the establishment within the empire of a preferential system, imposing a duty of 2% upon all foreign goods, the proceeds to be directed to the maintenance of the imperial navy. To this end it was requested that certain treaties with foreign nations which imposed restrictions on the trade of various parts of the empire with each other should be denounced. Some years later, a strong feeling having been manifested in England against any foreign engagement standing in the way of new domestic trade arrangements between a colony and the mother-country, the German and Belgian treaties in question were denounced (1897). Meanwhile, simultaneously with the movement in favour of reciprocal fiscal advantages to be granted within the empire by the many local governments to each other, there was a growth of the perception that an increase of the foreign trade of Great Britain, carried on chiefly in manufactured goods, was accompanied by a corresponding enlargement of the home markets for colonial raw material, and consequently that injury to the foreign trade of Great Britain, while as yet it so largely outweighed the trade between the United Kingdom and the colonies, must necessarily react upon the colonies. This view was definitely expressed at the Colonial Conference at Ottawa in 1894, and was one of the factors which led to the relinquishment of the demand that in return for colonial concessions there should be an imposition on the part of Great Britain of a differential duty upon foreign goods. Canada was the first important British colony to give substantial expression to the new imperial sentiment in commercial matters by the introduction in 1897 of an imperial tariff, granting without any reciprocal advantage a deduction of 25% upon customs duties imposed upon British goods. The same advantage was offered to all British colonies trading with her upon equal terms. In later years the South African states, Australia and New Zealand also granted preferential treatment to British goods. Meanwhile in Great Britain the system of free imports, regarded as "free trade" (though only one-sided free trade), had become the established policy, customs duties being only imposed for purposes of revenue on a few selected articles, and about half the national income was derived from customs and excise. In most of the colonies customs form of necessity one of the important sources of revenue. It is, however, worthy of remark that in the self-governing colonies, even those which are avowedly protectionist, a smaller proportion of the public revenue was derived from customs and excise than was derived from these sources in the United Kingdom. The proportion in Australasia before federation was about one quarter. In Canada it is more difficult to estimate it, as customs and excise form the principal provision made for federal finance, and note must therefore be taken of the separate sources of revenue in the provinces. With these reservations it will still be seen that customs, or, in other words, a tax upon the movements of trade, forms one of the chief sources of imperial revenue.
The development of steam shipping and electricity gave to the movements of trade a stimulus no less remarkable than that given by the introduction of railroads and industrial machinery to production and manufactures. Whereas at the beginning of the 19th century the journey to Australia occupied eight months, and business communications between Sydney and London could not receive answers within the year, at the beginning of the 20th century the journey could be accomplished in thirty-one days, and telegraphic despatches enabled the most important business to be transacted within twenty-four hours. For one cargo carried in the year at the beginning of the 19th century at least six could now be carried by the same ship, and from the point of view of trade the difference of a venture which realizes its profits in two months, as compared with one which occupied a whole year, does not need to be insisted on. The increased rapidity of the voyage and the power of daily communication by telegraph with the most distant markets have introduced a wholly new element into the national trade of the empire, and commercial intercourse between the southern and the northern hemispheres has received a development from the natural alternation of the seasons, of which until quite recent years the value was not even conceived. Fruit, eggs, butter, meat, poultry and other perishable commodities pass in daily increasing quantities between the northern and the southern hemispheres with an alternate flow which contributes to raise in no inconsiderable degree the volume of profitable trade. Thus the butter season of Australasia is from October to March, while the butter season of Ireland and northern Europe is from March to October. In three years after the introduction of ice-chambers into the steamers of the great shipping lines, Victoria and New South Wales built up a yearly butter trade of £1,000,000 with Great Britain without seriously affecting the Irish and Danish markets whence the summer supply is drawn. These facilities, combined with the enormous additions made to the public stock of land and labour, contributed to raise the volume of trade of the empire from a total of less than £100,000,000 in the year 1800 to a total of nearly £1,500,000,000 in 1900. The declared volume of British exports to all parts of the world in 1800 was £38,120,120, and the value of British imports from all parts of the world was £30,570,605; total, £68,690,725. As in those days the colonies were not allowed to trade with any other country this must be taken as representing imperial trade. The exact figures of the trade of India, the colonies, and the United Kingdom for 1900 were: imports, £809,178,209; exports, £657,899,363; total, £1,467,077,572.
A question of sovereign importance to the continued existence of the empire is the question of defence. A country of which Imperial defence. the main thoroughfares are the oceans of the world demands in the first instance a strong navy. It has of late years been accepted as a fundamental axiom of defence that the British navy should exceed in strength any reasonable combination of foreign navies which could be brought against it, the accepted formula being the "two-power standard," i.e. a 10% margin over the joint strength of the two next powers. The expense of maintaining such a floating armament must be colossal, and until within the decade 1890-1900 it was borne exclusively by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom. As the benefits of united empire have become more consciously appreciated in the colonies, and the value of the fleet as an insurance for British commerce has been recognized, a desire has manifested itself on the part of the self-governing colonies to contribute towards the formation of a truly imperial navy. In 1895 the Australasian colonies voted a subsidy of £126,000 per annum for the maintenance of an Australasian squadron, and in 1897 the Cape Colony also offered a contribution of £30,000 a year to be used at the discretion of the imperial government for naval purposes. The Australian contribution was in 1902 increased to £240,000, and that of the Cape to £50,000, while Natal voted £35,000 a year and Newfoundland £3000. But apart from these comparatively slight contributions, and the local up-keep of colonial fortifications,—and the beginning in 1908-1909 of an Australian torpedo-boat flotilla provided by the Commonwealth,—the whole cost of the imperial navy, on which ultimately the security of the empire rested, remained to be
borne by the taxpayers in the British islands. The extent of this burden was emphasized in 1909 by the revelations as to the increase of the German (and the allied Austrian) fleet. At this crisis in the history of the two-power standard a wave of enthusiasm started in the colonies, resulting in the offer of "Dreadnoughts" from New Zealand and elsewhere; and the British government called an Imperial Conference to consider the whole question afresh.
Land defence, though a secondary branch of the great question of imperial defence, has been intimately connected with the development and internal growth of the empire. In the case of the first settlement of the American colonies they were expected to provide for their own land defence. To some extent in the early part of their career they carried out this expectation, and even on occasion, as in the taking of Louisburg, which was subsequently given back at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle as the price of the French evacuation of Madras, rendered public service to the empire at large. In India the principle of local self-defence was from the beginning carried into practice by the East India Company. But in America the claim of the French wars proved too heavy for local resources. In 1755 Great Britain intervened with troops sent from home under General Braddock, and up to the outbreak of the American War the cost of the defence of the North American colonies was borne by the imperial exchequer. To meet this expense the imperial parliament took upon itself the right to tax the American colonies. In 1765 a Quartering Act was passed by which 10,000 imperial troops were quartered in the colonies. As a result of the American War which followed and led to the loss of the colonies affected, the imperial authorities accepted the charge of the land defences of the empire, and with the exception of India and the Hudson Bay territories, where the trading companies determined to pay their own expenses, the whole cost of imperial defence was borne, like the cost of the navy, by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom. This condition of affairs lasted till the end of the Napoleonic Wars. During the thirty years' peace which followed there came time for consideration. The fiscal changes which towards the middle of the 19th century gave to the self-governing colonies the command of their own resources very naturally carried with them the consequence that a call should be made on colonial exchequers to provide for their own governing expenses. Of these defence is obviously one of the most essential. Coincidently, therefore, with the movements of free trade at home, the renunciation of what was known as the mercantile system and the accompanying grants of constitutional freedom to the colonies, a movement for the reorganization of imperial defence was set on foot. In the decade which elapsed between 1846 and 1856 the movement as regards the colonies was confined chiefly to calls made upon them to contribute to their own defence by providing barracks, fortifications, &c., for the accommodation of imperial troops, and in some cases paying for the use of troops not strictly required for imperial purposes. In 1857 the Australian colonies agreed to pay the expenses of the imperial garrison quartered in Australia. This was a very wide step from the imperial attempt to tax the American colonies for a similar purpose in the preceding century. Nevertheless, in evidence given before a departmental committee in 1859, it was shown that at that time the colonies of Great Britain were free from almost every obligation of contributing either by personal service or money payment towards their own defence, and that the cost of military expenditure in the colonies in the preceding year had amounted in round figures to £4,000,000. A committee of the House of Commons sat in 1861 to consider the question, and in 1862 it was resolved, without a division, that "colonies exercising the right of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence." The decision was accepted as the basis of imperial policy. The first effect was the gradual withdrawing of imperial troops from the self-governing colonies, together with the encouragement of the development of local military systems by the loan, when desired, of imperial military experts. A call was also made for larger military contributions from some of the crown colonies. The committee of 1859 had emphasized in its report the fact that the principal dependence of the colonies for defence is necessarily upon the British navy, and in 1865, exactly 100 years after the Quartering Act, which had been the cause of the troubles that led to the independence of the United States, a Colonial Naval Defence Act was passed which gave power to the colonies to provide ships of war, steamers, and volunteers for their own defence, and in case of necessity to place them at the disposal of the crown. In 1868 the Canadian Militia Act gave the fully organized nucleus of a local army to Canada. In the same year the imperial troops were withdrawn from New Zealand, leaving the colonial militia to deal with the native war still in progress. In 1870 the last imperial troops were withdrawn from Australia, and in 1873 it was officially announced that military expenditure in the colonies was almost "wholly for imperial purposes." In 1875 an imperial officer went to Australia to report for the Australian government upon Australian defence. The appointment in 1879 of a royal commission to consider the question of imperial defence, which presented its report in 1882, led to a considerable development and reorganization of the system of imperial fortifications. Coaling stations were also selected with reference to the trade routes. In 1885 rumours of war roused a very strong feeling in connexion with the still unfinished and in many cases unarmed condition of the fortifications recommended by the commission of 1879. Military activity was stimulated throughout the empire, and the Colonial Defence Committee was created to supply a much-felt need for organized direction and advice to colonial administrations acting necessarily in independence of each other. The question of colonial defence was among the most important of the subjects discussed at the colonial conference held in London in 1887, and it was at this conference that the Australasian colonies first agreed to contribute to the expense of their own naval defence. From this date the principle of local responsibility for self-defence has been fully accepted. India has its own native army, and pays for the maintenance within its frontiers of an imperial garrison. Early in the summer of 1899, when hostilities in South Africa appeared to be imminent, the governments of the principal colonies took occasion to express their approval of the South African policy pursued by the imperial government, and offers were made by the governments of India, the Australasian colonies, Canada, Hong-Kong, the Federal Malay states, some of the West African and other colonies, to send contingents for active service in the event of war. On the outbreak of hostilities these offers, on the part of the self-governing colonies, were accepted, and colonial contingents upwards of 30,000 strong were among the most efficient sections of the British fighting force. The manner in which these colonial contingents were raised, their admirable fighting qualities, and the service rendered by them in the field, disclosed altogether new possibilities of military organization within the empire, and in subsequent years the subject continued to engage the attention of the statesmen of the empire. Progress in this field lay chiefly in the increased support given in the colonial states to the separate local movements for self-defence; but in 1909 a scheme was arranged by Mr Haldane, by which the British War Office should co-operate with the colonial governments in providing for the training of officers and an interchange of views on a common military policy.
The important questions of justice, religion and instruction will be found dealt with in detail under the headings of separate Justice, &c. sections of the empire. Systems of justice throughout the empire have a close resemblance to each other, and the judicial committee of the privy council, on which the self-governing colonies and India are represented, constitutes a supreme court of appeal (q.v.) for the entire empire. In the matter of religion, while no imperial organization in the strict sense is possible, the progress made by the Lambeth Conferences and otherwise (see Anglican Communion) has done much to bring the work of the Church of England in different parts of the world into a co-operative system. Religion, of which the forms are infinitely varied, is however everywhere free,
except in cases where the exercise of religious rites leads to practices foreign to accepted laws of humanity. It is perhaps interesting to state that the number of persons in the empire nominally professing the Christian religion is 58,000,000, of Mahommedans 94,000,000, of Buddhists 12,000,000, of Hindus 208,000,000, of pagans and others 25,000,000. Systems of instruction, of which the aim is generally similar in the white portions of the empire and is directed towards giving to every individual the basis of a liberal education, are governed wholly by local requirements. Native schools are established in all settled communities under British rule.
Literature.—In recent years the subject of British imperialism has inspired a growing literature, and it is only possible here to name a selected number of the more important works which may usefully be consulted on different topics: Sir C.P. Lucas, Historical Geography of the British Colonies (1888, et seq.); H.E. Egerton, Short History of British Colonial Policy (1897); H.J. Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas (1902); Sir J.R. Seeley, Expansion of England (1883); Growth of British Policy (1895); Sir Charles Dilke, Greater Britain (1869), Problems of Greater Britain (1890), The British Empire (1899); G.R. Parkin, Imperial Federation (1892); Sir John Colomb, Imperial Federation, Naval and Military (1886); Sir G.S. Clarke, Imperial Defence (1897); Sidney Goldmann and others, The Empire and the Century (1905); J.L. Garvin, Imperial Reciprocity (1903); J.W. Welsford, The Strength of a Nation (1907); Compatriots Club Essays (1906); Sir H. Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond the Seas (1902); Bernard Holland, Imperium et libertas (1901); (for an anti-imperialist view) J.A. Hobson, Imperialism (1902). See also the Reports of the various colonial conferences, especially that of the Imperial Conference of 1907; and for trade statistics, J. Holt Schooling's British Trade Book. For the tariff reform movement in England see the articles Free Trade and Protection.
(F. L. L.)