In 1858 the scheme of Sir George Grey for the federation of the various colonies and states of South Africa had been rejected, as has been stated, by the home authorities. In 1874 the 4th earl of Carnarvon, secretary of state for the colonies, who had been successful in aiding to bring about the federation of Canada, turned his attention to a similar scheme for the confederation of South Africa. The representative government in Cape Colony had been replaced in 1872 by responsible, i.e. self-government, and the new parliament at Cape Town resented the manner in which Lord Carnarvon propounded his suggestions. A resolution was passed (June 11, 1875) stating that any scheme in favour of confederation must in its opinion originate within South Africa itself. James Anthony Froude, the distinguished historian, was sent out by Lord Carnarvon to further his policy in South Africa. As a diplomatist and a representative of the British government, the general opinion in South Africa was that Froude was not a success, and he entirely failed to induce the colonists to adopt Lord Carnarvon’s views. In 1876, Fingoland, the Idutywa reserve, and Noman’s-land, tracts of country on the Kaffir frontier, were annexed by Great Britain, on the understanding that the Cape government should provide for their government. Lord Carnarvon, still bent on confederation, now appointed Sir Bartle Frere governor of Cape Colony and high commissioner of South Africa.
Frere had no sooner taken office as high commissioner than he found himself confronted with serious native troubles in Zululand and on the Kaffir frontier of Cape Colony. In 1877 there occurred an outbreak on the part of the Galekas and the Gaikas. A considerable force of imperial and colonial troops was employed to put down this rising, and the war was subsequently known as the Ninth Kaffir war. It was in this war that the famous Kaffir chief, Sandili, lost his life. At its conclusion the Transkei, the territory of the Galeka tribe, under Kreli, was annexed by the British. In the meantime Lord Carnarvon had resigned his position in the British cabinet, and the scheme for confederation which he had been pushing forward was abandoned. As a matter of fact, at that time Cape Colony was too fully occupied with native troubles to take into consideration very seriously so great a question as confederation. A wave of feeling spread amongst the different Kaffir tribes on the colonial frontier, and after the Gaika-Galeka War there followed in 1879 a rising in Basutoland under Moirosi, whose cattle-raiding had for some time past caused considerable trouble. His stronghold was taken after very severe fighting by a colonial force, but, their defeat notwithstanding, the Basutos remained in a restless and aggressive condition for several years. In 1880 the colonial authorities endeavoured to extend to Basutoland the Peace Preservation Act of 1878, under which a general disarmament of the Basutos was attempted. Further fighting followed on this proclamation, which was by no means successful, and although peace was declared in the country in December 1882, the colonial authorities were very glad in 1884 to be relieved of the administration of a country which had already cost them £3,000,000. The imperial government then took over Basutoland as a crown colony, on the understanding that Cape Colony should contribute for administrative purposes £18,000 annually. In 1880, Sir Bartle Frere, who by his energetic and statesmanlike attitude on the relations with the native states, as well as on all other questions, had won the esteem and regard of loyal South African colonists, was recalled by the 1st earl of Kimberley, the liberal secretary of state for the colonies, and was succeeded by Sir Hercules Robinson. Griqualand West, which included the diamond fields, was now incorporated as a portion of Cape Colony.
Origin of the Afrikander Bond.—The Boer War of 1881, with its disastrous termination, naturally reacted throughout South Africa; and as one of the most important results, in the year 1882 the first Afrikander Bond congress was held at Graaff Reinet. The organization of the Bond developed into one embracing the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Cape Colony. Each country had a provincial committee with district committees, and branches were distributed throughout the whole of South Africa. At a later date the Bond in the Cape Colony dissociated itself from its Republican branches. The general lines of policy which this organization endeavoured to promote may best be gathered from De Patriot, a paper published in the colony, and an avowed supporter of the organization. The following extracts from articles published in 1882 will illustrate, better than anything else, the ambition entertained by some of the promoters of this remarkable organization.
“The Afrikander Bond has for its object the establishment of a South African nationality by spreading a true love for what is really our fatherland. No better time could be found for establishing the Bond than the present, when the consciousness of nationality has been thoroughly aroused by the Transvaal war.” ... “The British government keep on talking about a confederation under the British flag, but that will never be brought about. They can be quite certain of that. There is just one obstacle in the way of confederation, and that is the British flag. Let them remove that, and in less than a year the confederation would be established under the Free Afrikander flag.” “After a time the English will realize that the advice given them by Froude was the best—they must just have Simon’s Bay as a naval and military station on the way to India, and give over all the rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders.” ... “Our principal weapon in the social war must be the destruction of English trade by our establishing trading companies for ourselves.” ... “It is the duty of each true Afrikander not to spend anything with the English that he can avoid.”
De Patriot afterwards became imperialist, but Ons Land, another Bond organ, continued in much the same strain.
In addition to having its press organs, the Bond from time to time published official utterances less frank in their tone than the statements of its press. Some of the Articles of the Bond’s original manifesto are entirely praiseworthy, e.g. those referring to the administration of justice, the honour of the people, &c.; such clauses as these, however, were meaningless in view of the enlightened government which obtained in Cape Colony, and for the true “inwardness” of this document it is necessary to note Article 3, which distinctly speaks of the promotion of South Africa’s independence (Zelfstandigheid). If the Bond aroused disloyalty and mistaken aspirations in one section of the Cape inhabitants, it is equally certain that it caused a great wave of loyal and patriotic enthusiasm to pass through another and more enlightened section. A pamphlet written in 1885 for an association called the Empire League by Mr Charles Leonard, who afterwards consistently championed the cause of civil equality and impartial justice in South Africa, maintained as follows:—
“(1) That the establishment of the English government here was beneficial to all classes; and (2) that the withdrawal of that government would be disastrous to every one having vested interests in the colony.... England never can, never will, give up this colony, and we colonists will never give up England.... Let us, the inhabitants of the Cape Colony, be swift to recognize that we are one people, cast together under a glorious flag of liberty, with heads clear enough to appreciate the freedom we enjoy, and hearts resolute to maintain our true privileges; let us desist from reproaching and insulting one another, and, rejoicing that we have this goodly land as a common heritage, remember that by united action only can we realize its grand possibilities. We belong both of us to a home-loving stock, and the peace and prosperity of every home in the land is at stake. On our action now depends the question whether our children shall curse or bless us; whether we shall live in their memory as promoters of civil strife, with all its miserable consequences, or as joint architects of a happy, prosperous and united state. Each of us looks back to a noble past. United, we may ensure to our descendants a not unworthy future. Disunited, we can hope for nothing but stagnation, misery and ruin. Is this a light thing?”
It is probable that many Englishmen reading Mr Leonard’s manifesto at the time regarded it as unduly alarming, but subsequent events proved the soundness of the views it expressed. The fact is that, from 1881 onwards, two great rival ideas came into being, each strongly opposed to the other. One was that of Imperialism—full civil rights for every civilized man, whatever his race might be, under the supremacy and protection of Great Britain. The other was nominally republican, but in fact exclusively oligarchical and Dutch. The policy of the extremists of this last party was summed up in the appeal which President Kruger made to the Free State in February 1881, when he bade them “Come and help us. God is with us. It is his will to unite us as a people”—“to make a united South Africa free from British authority.” The two actual founders of the Bond party were Mr Borckenhagen, a German who was residing in Bloemfontein, and Mr Reitz, afterwards state secretary of the Transvaal. Two interviews have been recorded which show the true aims of these two promoters of the Bond at the outset. One occurred between Mr Borckenhagen and Cecil Rhodes, the other between Mr Reitz and Mr T. Schreiner, whose brother became, at a later date, prime minister of Cape Colony. In the first interview Mr Borckenhagen remarked to Rhodes: “We want a united Africa,” and Rhodes replied: “So do I.” Mr Borckenhagen then continued: “There is nothing in the way; we will take you as our leader. There is only one small thing: we must, of caurse, be independent of the rest of the world.” Rhodes replied: “You take me either for a rogue or a fool. I should be a rogue to forfeit all my history and my traditions; and I should be a fool, because I should be hated by my own countrymen and mistrusted by yours.” But as Rhodes truly said at Cape Town in 1898, “The only chance of a true union is the overshadowing protection of a supreme power, and any German, Frenchman, or Russian would tell you that the best and most liberal power is that over which Her Majesty reigns.” The other interview took place at the beginning of the Bond’s existence. Being approached by Mr Reitz, Mr T. Schreiner objected that the Bond aimed ultimately at the overthrow of British rule and the expulsion of the British flag from South Africa. To this Mr Reitz replied: “Well, what if it is so?” Mr Schreiner expostulated in the following terms: “You do not suppose that that flag is going to disappear without a tremendous struggle and hard fighting?” “Well, I suppose not, but even so, what of that?” rejoined Mr Reitz. In the face of this testimony with reference to two of the most prominent of the Bond’s promoters, it is impossible to deny that from its beginning the great underlying idea of the Bond was an independent South Africa.
Mr Hofmeyr’s Policy.—In 1882 an act was passed in the Cape legislative assembly, empowering members to speak in the Dutch language on the floor of the House, if they so desired. The intention of this act was a liberal one, but the moment of its introduction was inopportune, and its effect was to give an additional stimulus to the policy of the Bond. It was probably also the means of bringing into the House a number of Dutchmen, by no means well educated, who would not have been returned had they been obliged to speak English. By this act an increase of influence was given to the Dutch leaders. The head of the Afrikander Bond at this time in Cape Colony, and the leader of Dutch opinion, was Mr J.H. Hofmeyr, a man of undoubted ability and astuteness. Although he was recognized leader of the Dutch party in Cape Colony, he consistently refused to take office, preferring to direct the policy and the action of others from an independent position. Mr Hofmeyr sat in the house of assembly as member for Stellenbosch, a strong Dutch constituency. His influence over the Dutch members was supreme, and in addition to directing the policy of the Bond within the Cape Colony, he supported and defended the aggressive expansion policy of President Kruger and the Transvaal Boers. In 1883, during a debate on the Basutoland Dis-annexation Bill, Rhodes openly charged Mr Hofmeyr in the House with a desire to see a “United States of South Africa under its own flag.” In 1884 Mr Hofmeyr led the Bond in strongly supporting the Transvaal Boers who had invaded Bechuanaland (q.v.), proclaiming that if the Bechuanaland freebooters were not permitted to retain the territories they had seized, in total disregard of the terms of the conventions of 1881 and 1884, there would be rebellion among the Dutch of Cape Colony. Fortunately, however, for the peace of Cape Colony at that time, Sir Charles Warren, sent by the imperial government to maintain British rights, removed the invading Boers from Stellaland and Goshen—two so-called republics set up by the Boer freebooters—in March 1885 and no rebellion occurred. Nevertheless the Bond party was so strong in the House that they compelled the ministry under Sir Thomas Scanlen to resign in 1884. The logical and constitutional course for Mr Hofmeyr to have followed in these circumstances would have been to accept office and himself form a government. This he refused to do. He preferred to put in a nominee of his own who should be entirely dependent on him. Mr Upington, a clever Irish barrister, was the man he selected, and under him was formed in 1884 what will always be known in Cape history as the “Warming-pan” ministry. This action was denounced by many British colonists, who were sufficiently loyal, not only to Great Britain, but also to that constitution which had been conferred by Great Britain upon Cape Colony, to desire to see the man who really wielded political power also acting as the responsible head of the party. It was Mr Hofmeyr’s refusal to accept this responsibility, as well as the nature of his Bond policy, which won for him the political sobriquet of the “Mole.” Open and responsible exercise of a power conferred under the constitution of the country, Englishmen and English colonists would have accepted and even welcomed. But that subterranean method of Dutch policy which found its strongest expression in Pretoria, and which operated from Pretoria to Cape Town, could not but be resented by loyal colonists. From 1881 down to 1898, Mr Hofmeyr practically determined how Dutch members should vote, and also what policy the Bond should adopt at every juncture in its history. In 1895 he resigned his seat in parliament—an action which made his political dictatorship still more remarkable. This influence on Cape politics was a demoralizing one. Other well-known politicians at the Cape subsequently found it convenient to adapt their views a good deal too readily to those held by the Bond. In justice to Mr Hofmeyr, however, it is only fair to say that after the Warren expedition in 1885, which was at least evidence that Great Britain did not intend to renounce her supremacy in South Africa altogether, he adopted a less hostile or anti-British attitude. The views and attitude of Mr Hofmeyr between 1881 and 1884—when even loyal British colonists, looking to the events which followed Majuba, had almost come to believe that Great Britain had little desire to maintain her supremacy—can scarcely be wondered at.