“With full affection for the flag which I have been born under, and the flag I represent, I can understand the sentiment and feeling of a republican who has created his independence, and values that before all; but I can say fairly that I believe in the future that I can assimilate the system, which I have been connected with, with the Cape Colony, and it is not an impossible idea that the neighbouring republics, retaining their independence, should share with us as to certain general principles. If I might put it to you, I would say the principles of tariffs, the principle of railway connexion, the principle of appeal in law, the principle of coinage, and in fact all those principles which exist at the present moment in the United States, irrespective of the local assemblies which exist in each separate state in that country.”
To this policy President Kruger and the Transvaal government offered every possible opposition. Their action in what is known as the Vaal River Drift question will best illustrate the line of action which the Transvaal government believed it expedient to adopt. A difficulty arose at the termination of the agreement in 1894 between the Cape government railway and the Netherlands railway. The Cape government, for the purposes of carrying the railway from the Vaal river to Johannesburg, had advanced the sum of £600,000 to the Netherlands railway and the Transvaal government conjointly; at the same time it was stipulated that the Cape government should have the right to fix the traffic rate until the end of 1894, or until such time as the Delagoa Bay-Pretoria line was completed. These rates were fixed by the Cape government at 2d. per ton per mile, but at the beginning of 1895 the rate for the 52 m. of railway from the Vaal river to Johannesburg was raised by the Netherlands railway to no less a sum than 8d. per ton per mile. It is quite evident from the action which President Kruger subsequently took in the matter that this charge was put on with his approval, and with the object of compelling traffic to be brought to the Transvaal by the Delagoa route, instead of as heretofore by the colonial railway. In order to compete against this very high rate, the merchants of Johannesburg began removing their goods from the Vaal river by waggon. Thereupon President Kruger arbitrarily closed the drifts (fords) on the Vaal river, and thus prevented through waggon traffic, causing an enormous block of waggons on the banks of the Vaal. A protest was then made by the Cape government against the action of the Transvaal, on the ground that it was a breach of the London Convention. President Kruger took no notice of this remonstrance, and an appeal was made to the imperial government; whereupon the latter entered into an agreement with the Cape government, to the effect that if the Cape would bear half the cost of any expedition which should be necessary, assist with troops, and give full use of the Cape railway for military purposes if required, a protest should be sent to President Kruger on the subject. These terms were accepted by Rhodes and his colleagues, of whom Mr W.P. Schreiner was one, and a protest was then sent by Mr Chamberlain stating that the government would regard the closing of the drifts as a breach of the London Convention, and as an unfriendly action calling for the gravest remonstrance. President Kruger at once reopened the drifts, and undertook that he would issue no further proclamation on the subject except after consultation with the imperial government.
On the 29th of December 1895 Dr Jameson (q.v.) made his famous raid into the Transvaal, and Rhodes’s complicity in this movement compelled him to resign the premiership of Cape Colony in January 1896, the vacant post being taken by Sir Gordon Sprigg. As Rhodes’s complicity in the raid became known, there naturally arose a strong feeling of resentment and astonishment among his colleagues in the Cape ministry, who had been kept in complete ignorance of his connexion with any such scheme. Mr Hofmeyr and the Bond were loud in their denunciation of him, nor can it be denied that the circumstances of the raid greatly embittered against England the Dutch element in Cape Colony, and influenced their subsequent attitude towards the Transvaal Boers.
In 1897 a native rising occurred under Galeshwe, a Bantu chief, in Griqualand West. Galeshwe was arrested and the rebellion repressed. On cross-examination Galeshwe stated that Bosnian, a magistrate of the Transvaal, had supplied ammunition to him, and urged him to rebel against the government of Cape Colony. There is every reason to suppose that this charge was true, and it is consistent with the intrigues which the Boers from time to time practised among the natives.
In 1897 Sir Alfred Milner was appointed high commissioner of South Africa and governor of Cape Colony, in succession to Sir Hercules Robinson, who had been created a peer under the title of Baron Rosmead in August 1896.
Mr Schreiner’s Policy.—In 1898 commercial federation in South Africa advanced another stage, Natal entering the customs union. A fresh convention was drafted at this time, and under it “a uniform tariff on all imported goods consumed within such union, and an equitable distribution of the duties collected on such goods amongst the parties to such union, and free trade between the colonies and state in respect of all South African products,” was arranged. In the same year, too, the Cape parliamentary election occurred, and the result was the return to power of a Bond ministry under Mr W.P. Schreiner. From this time, until June 1900, Mr Schreiner remained in office as head of the Cape government. During the negotiations (see [Transvaal]) which preceded the war in 1899, feeling at the Cape ran very high, and Mr Schreiner’s attitude was very freely discussed. As head of a party, dependent for its position in power on the Bond’s support, his position was undoubtedly a trying one. At the same time, as prime minister of a British colony, it was strongly felt by loyal colonists that he should at least have refrained from openly interfering between the Transvaal and the imperial government during the course of most difficult negotiations. His public expressions of opinion were hostile in tone to the policy pursued by Mr Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner. The effect of them, it was believed, might conceivably be to encourage President Kruger in persisting in his rejection of the British terms. Mr Schreiner, it is true, used directly what influence he possessed to induce President Kruger to adopt a reasonable course. But however excellent his intentions, his publicly expressed disapproval of the Chamberlain-Milner policy probably did more harm than his private influence with Mr Kruger could possibly do good. On the 11th of June 1899, shortly after the Bloemfontein conference, from which Sir Alfred Milner had just returned, Mr Schreiner asked the high commissioner to inform Mr Chamberlain that he and his colleagues agreed in regarding President Kruger’s Bloemfontein proposals as “practical, reasonable and a considerable step in the right direction.” Early in June, however, the Cape Dutch politicians began to realize that President Kruger’s attitude was not so reasonable as they had endeavoured to persuade themselves, and Mr Hofmeyr, accompanied by Mr Herholdt, the Cape minister of agriculture, visited Pretoria. On arrival, they found that the Transvaal Volksraad, in a spirit of defiance and even levity, had just passed a resolution offering four new seats in the Volksraad to the mining districts, and fifteen to exclusively burgher districts. Mr Hofmeyr, on meeting the executive, freely expressed indignation at these proceedings. Unfortunately, Mr Hofmeyr’s influence was more than counterbalanced by an emissary from the Free State, Mr Abraham Fischer, who, while purporting to be a peacemaker, practically encouraged the Boer executive to take extreme measures. Mr Hofmeyr’s established reputation as an astute diplomatist, and as the trusted leader for years of the Cape Dutch party, made him as powerful a delegate as it was possible to find. If any emissary could accomplish anything in the way of persuading Mr Kruger, it was assuredly Mr Hofmeyr. Much was looked for from his mission by moderate men of all parties, and by none more so, it is fair to believe, than by Mr Schreiner. But Mr Hofmeyr’s mission, like every other mission to Mr Kruger to induce him to take a reasonable and equitable course, proved entirely fruitless. He returned to Cape Town disappointed, but probably not altogether surprised at the failure of his mission. Meanwhile a new proposal was drafted by the Boer executive, which, before it was received in its entirety, or at least before it was clearly understood, elicited from Mr Schreiner a letter on the 7th of July to the South African News, in which, referring to his government, he said:—
“While anxious and continually active with good hope in the cause of securing reasonable modifications of the existing representative system of the South African Republic, this government is convinced that no ground whatever exists for active interference in the internal affairs of that republic.”
This letter was precipitate and unfortunate. On the 11th of July, after seeing Mr Hofmeyr on his return, Mr Schreiner made a personal appeal to President Kruger to approach the imperial government in a friendly spirit. At this time an incident occurred which raised the feeling against Mr Schreiner to a very high pitch. On the 7th of July 500 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition were landed at Port Elizabeth, consigned to the Free State government, and forwarded to Bloemfontein. Mr Schreiner’s attention was called to this consignment at the time, but he refused to stop it, alleging as his reason that, inasmuch as Great Britain was at peace with the Free State, he had no right to interdict the passage of arms through the Cape Colony. The British colonist is as capable of a grim jest as the Transvaal Boer, and this action of Mr Schreiner’s won for him the nickname “Ammunition Bill.” At a later date he was accused of delay in forwarding artillery and rifles for the defence of Kimberley, Mafeking and other towns of the colony. The reason he gave for delay was that he did not anticipate war; and that he did not wish to excite unwarrantable suspicions in the minds of the Free State. His conduct in both instances was perhaps technically correct, but it was much resented by loyal colonists.
On the 28th of July Mr Chamberlain sent a conciliatory despatch to President Kruger, suggesting a meeting of delegates to consider and report on his last franchise proposals, which were complex to a degree. Mr Schreiner, on the 3rd of August, telegraphed to Mr Fischer begging the Transvaal to welcome Mr Chamberlain’s proposal. At a later date, on receiving an inquiry from the Free State as to the movements of British troops, Mr Schreiner curtly refused any information, and referred the Free State to the high commissioner. On the 28th of August Sir Gordon Sprigg in the House of Assembly moved the adjournment of the debate, to discuss the removal of arms to the Free State. Mr Schreiner, in reply, used expressions which called down upon him the severest censure and indignation, both in the colony and in Great Britain. He stated that, should the storm burst, he would keep the colony aloof with regard both to its forces and its people. In the course of the speech he also read a telegram from President Steyn, in which the president repudiated all contemplated aggressive action on the part of the Free State as absurd. The speech created a great sensation in the British press. It was probably forgotten at the time (though Lord Kimberley afterwards publicly stated it) that one of the chief reasons why the Gladstone government had granted the retrocession of the Transvaal after Majuba, was the fear that the Cape Colonial Dutch would join their kinsmen if the war continued. What was a danger in 1881, Mr Schreiner knew to be a still greater danger in 1899. At the same time it is quite obvious, from a review of Mr Schreiner’s conduct through the latter half of 1899, that he took an entirely mistaken view of the Transvaal situation. He evinced, as premier of the Cape Colony, the same inability to understand the Uitlanders’ grievances, the same futile belief in the eventual fairness of President Kruger, as he had shown when giving evidence before the British South Africa Select Committee into the causes of the Jameson Raid. Actual experience taught him that President Kruger was beyond an appeal to reason, and that the protestations of President Steyn were insincere. War had no sooner commenced with the ultimatum of the Transvaal Republic on the 9th of October 1899, than Mr Schreiner found himself called upon to deal with the conduct of Cape rebels. The rebels joined the invading forces of President Steyn, whose false assurances Mr Schreiner had offered to an indignant House of Assembly only a few weeks before. The war on the part of the Republics was evidently not to be merely one of self-defence. It was one of aggression and aggrandisement. Mr Schreiner ultimately addressed, as prime minister, a sharp remonstrance to President Steyn for allowing his burghers to invade the colony. He also co-operated with Sir Alfred Milner, and used his influence to restrain the Bond.
The War of 1899-1902.[7]—The first shot actually fired in the war was at Kraipan, a small railway station within the colony, 40 m. south of Mafeking, a train being derailed, and ammunition intended for Colonel Baden-Powell seized. The effect of this was entirely to cut off Mafeking, the northernmost town in Cape Colony, and it remained in a state of siege for over seven months. On the 16th of October Kimberley was also isolated. Proclamations by the Transvaal and Free State annexing portions of Cape Colony were actually issued on the 18th of October, and included British Bechuanaland and Griqualand West, with the diamond fields. On the 28th of October Mr Schreiner signed a proclamation issued by Sir Alfred Milner as high commissioner, declaring the Boer annexations of territory within Cape Colony to be null and void.