Authorities.—Cyril, Catecheses; Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio Catechetica; Chrysostom, Catecheses ad illuminandos; Augustine, De rudibus Catechizandis; Mayer, Geschichte des Katechumenats ... in den ersten sechs Jahrhunderten (1868); S. Cheetham, The Mysteries, Pagan and Christian.
(H. T. A.)
[1] Apost. Constit. viii. 2.
[2] Canon 42.
CATEGORY (Gr.: κατηγορία, “accusation”), a term used both in ordinary language and in philosophy with the general significance of “class” or “group.” In popular language it is used for any large group of similar things, and still more generally as a mere synonym for the word “class.” The word was introduced into philosophy as a technical term by Aristotle, who, however, several times used it in its original sense of “accusation.” He also used the verb κατηγορεῖν, to accuse, in the specific logical sense, to predicate; τὸ κατηγορούμενον becomes the predicate; and κατηγορικὴ πρότασις may be translated as affirmative proposition. But though the word thus received a new signification from Aristotle, it is not on that account certain that the thing it was taken to signify was equally a novelty in philosophy. In fact we find in the records of Oriental and early Greek thought something corresponding to the Aristotelian classification.
Our knowledge of Hindu philosophy, and of the relations in which it may have stood to Greek speculation, scarcely enables us to give decisive answers to various questions that naturally arise on observation of their many resemblances (see Hindu philosophy. an article by Richard Garbe in Monist, iv. 176-193). Yet the similarity between the two is so striking that, if not historically connected, they must at least be regarded as expressions of similar philosophic needs. The Hindu classification to which we specially refer is that of Kanada, who lays down six categories, or classes of existence, a seventh being generally added by the commentators. The term employed is Padārtha, meaning “signification of a word.” This is in entire harmony with the Aristotelian doctrine, the categories of which may with truth be described as significations of simple terms, τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συηπλοκὴν λεγόμενα. The six categories of Kanada are Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Individuality, and Concretion or Co-inherence. To these is added Non-Existence, Privation or Negation. Substance is the permanent substance in which Qualities exist. Action, belonging to or inhering in substances, is that which produces change, Genus belongs to substance, qualities and actions; there are higher and lower genera. Individuality, found only in substance, is that by which a thing is self-existent and marked off from others. Concretion or Co-inherence denotes inseparable or necessary connection, such as that between substance and quality. Under these six classes, γένη τοῦ ὄντος, Kanada then proceeds to range the facts of the universe.[1]
Within Greek philosophy itself there were foreshadowings of the Aristotelian doctrine, but nothing so important as to warrant the conclusion that Aristotle was directly influenced by it. Doubtless the One and Many, Being and Non-Being, of the Greek philosophy Eleatic dialectic, with their subordinate oppositions, may be called categories, but they are not so in the Aristotelian sense, and have little or nothing in common with the later system. Their starting-point and results are wholly diverse. Nor does it appear necessary to do more than mention the Pythagorean table of principles, the number of which is supposed to have given rise to the decuple arrangement adopted by Aristotle. The two classifications have nothing in common; no term in the one list appears in the other; and there is absolutely nothing in the Pythagorean principles which could have led to the theory of the categories.[2]
One naturally turns to Plato when endeavouring to discover the genesis of any Aristotelian doctrine, and undoubtedly there are in the Platonic writings many detached discussions in which the matter of the categories is touched upon. Special Plato. terms also are anticipated at various times, e.g. ποιότης in the Theaetetus, ποιεῖν and πάσχειν in the Gorgias, and πρός τι in the Sophist.[3] But there does not seem to be anything in Plato which one could say gave occasion directly and of itself to the Aristotelian doctrine; and even when we take a more comprehensive view of the Platonic system and inquire what in it corresponds to the widest definition of categories, say as ultimate elements of thought and existence, we receive no very definite answer. The Platonic dialectic never worked out into system, and only in two dialogues do we get anything like a list of ultimate or root-notions. In the Sophist, Being, Rest and Motion (τὸ ὄν αύτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις) are laid down as μέγιστα τῶν γενῶν.[4] To these are presently added the Same and the Other (ταὐτὁν καὶ θάτερον), and out of the consideration of all five some light is cast upon the obscure notion of Non-Being (το μὴ ὄν). In the same dialogue (262 seq.) is found the important distinction of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα, noun and verb. The Philebus presents us with a totally distinct classification into four elements—the Infinite, the Finite, the Mixture or Unity of both and the Cause of this unity (τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ πέρας, ἡ σύμμιξις, ἡ αίτία). It is at once apparent that, however these classifications are related to one another and to the Platonic system, they lie in a different field from that occupied by the Aristotelian categories, and can hardly be said to have anything in common with them.