The Chinese are a colonizing race, and in Manchuria, Mongolia and Turkestan they have brought several districts under cultivation. In the regions where they settle they become the dominant race—thus southern Manchuria now differs little from a Emigration. province of China proper. In Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula and throughout the Far East Chinese are numerous as farmers, labourers and traders; in some places, such as Singapore, Chinese are among the principal merchants. This colonizing spirit is probably due more to the enterprise of the people than to the density of the population. There were Chinese settlements at places on the east coast of Africa before the 10th century A.D. Following the discovery of gold in California there was from 1850 onwards a large emigration of Chinese to that state and to other parts of America. But in 1879 Chinese exclusion acts were passed by the United States, an example followed by Australia, where Chinese immigration was also held to be a public danger. Canada also adopted the policy of excluding Chinese, but not before there had been a considerable immigration into British Columbia. Two factors, a racial and an economic, are at work to bring about these measures of exclusion. As indentured labourers Chinese have been employed in the West Indies, South America and other places (see [Coolie]).
In addition to several million Chinese settlers in Manchuria, and smaller numbers in Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet, it was estimated in 1908 that there were over 9,000,000 Chinese resident beyond the empire. Of these 2,250,000 were in Formosa, which for long formed a part of the empire, and over 6,000,000 in neighbouring regions of Asia and in Pacific Islands. In the West Indies (chiefly Cuba) the number of Chinese was estimated at 100,000, in South America (Brazil, Peru and Chile) at 72,000, in the United States at 150,000, in Canada at 12,000, and in Australia and New Zealand at 35,000. There are comparatively few Chinese in Japan (if Formosa be excepted) and Korea. The number is given in 1908 as 17,000 in Japan and 11,000 in Korea.
Social Life.
The awakening of the East which has followed the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 has affected China also. It is too soon to say how far the influx of European ideas will be able to modify the immemorial customs and traditions of perhaps the most conservative people in the world; but the process has begun, and this fact makes it difficult to give a picture of Chinese habits and customs which shall be more than historical or provisional. Moreover, the difficulty of presenting a picture which shall be true of China as a whole is enhanced by the different characteristics observable in various regions of so vast a country. The Chinese themselves, until the material superiority of Western civilization forced them to a certain degree to conform to its standards, looked down from the height of their superior culture with contempt on the “Western barbarians.” Nor was their attitude wholly without justification. Their civilization was already old at a time when Britain and Germany were peopled by half-naked barbarians, and the philosophical and ethical principles on which it was based remain, to all appearances, as firmly rooted as ever. That these principles have, on the whole, helped to create a national type of a very high order few Europeans who know the Chinese well would deny. The Chinese are naturally reserved, earnest and good-natured; for the occasional outbursts of ferocious violence, notably against foreign settlements, are no index to the national character. There is a national proverb that “the men of the Four Seas are all brothers,” and even strangers can travel through the country without meeting with rudeness, much less outrage. If the Chinese character is inferior to the European, this inferiority lies in the fact that the Chinaman’s whole philosophy of life disinclines him to change or to energetic action. He is industrious; but his industry is normally along the lines marked out by authority and tradition. He is brave; but his courage does not naturally seek an outlet in war. The jealously exclusive empire, into which in the 19th century the nations of the West forced an entrance, was organized for peace; the arts of war had been all but forgotten, and soldiers were of all classes the most despised.
The whole social and political organization of the Chinese is based, in a far more real sense than in the West, on the family. The supreme duty is that of the child to its parent; on this the whole Chinese moral system is built up. Filial piety, according to the teaching of Confucius, is the very foundation of society; the nation itself is but one great family, and the authority of the government itself is but an extension of the paternal authority, to which all its children are bound to yield implicit obedience. The western idea of the liberty and dignity of the individual, as distinct from the community to which he belongs, is wholly alien to the Chinese mind. The political unit in China is not the individual but the family, and the father of the family is supposed to be responsible for the qualities and views of all his kin. He is rewarded for their virtues, punished for their faults; the deserts of a son ennoble the father and all his ancestors, and conversely his crimes disgrace them.
An outcome of this principle is the extraordinary importance in China of funeral rites, especially in the case of the father. The eldest son, now head of the family, or, failing him, his first-born or adopted son, fixes one of the three souls of the dead in the tablet commemorating his virtues, burns incense to his shade, and supplies him with paper money and paper representations of everything (clothes, servants, horses) that he may require in his journey to the other world. Mourning lasts for three years, during which the mourners wear white garments and abstain from meat, wine and public gatherings. Custom, too, dictates that wherever the Chinaman may die he must be brought back for burial to the place of his birth; one of the objects of the friendly societies is to provide funds to charter ships to transport home the bodies of those who have died abroad. Annually, in May, the white-clad people stream to the graves and mortuary temples with flowers, fruit and other offerings for the dead. Christian missionaries have found in this ancestor worship the most serious obstacle to the spread of a religion which teaches that the convert must, if need be, despise his father and his mother and follow Christ.
The same elaborate ceremonialism that characterizes the Chinese funeral customs is found also in their marriage rites and the rules of their social intercourse generally. Confucius is reported to have said that “all virtues have their source in etiquette,” and the due observance of the “ceremonial” (li) in the fulfilling of social duties is that which, in Chinese opinion, distinguishes civilized from barbarous peoples. The Board of Rites, one of the departments of the central government, exists for the purpose of giving decisions in matters of etiquette and ceremony. As to marriage, the rule that the individual counts for nothing obtains here in its fullest significance. The breeding of sons to carry on the ancestral cult is a matter of prime importance, and the marriage of a young man is arranged at the earliest possible age. The bride and bridegroom have little voice in the matter, the match being arranged by the parents of the parties; the lifting of the bride’s veil, so that the bridegroom may see her face, is the very last act of the long and complicated ceremony.
In the traditional Chinese social system four classes are distinguished: the literary, the agricultural, the artisan and the trading class. Hereditary nobility, in the European sense, scarcely exists, and the possession of an hereditary title gives in itself no special privileges. Official position is more highly esteemed than birth and the bureaucracy takes the place of the aristocracy in the west. There are, nevertheless, besides personal decorations for merit, such as the yellow jacket, five hereditary rewards for merit; these last only for a fixed number of lives. A few Chinese families, however, enjoy hereditary titles in the full sense, the chief among them being the Holy Duke of Yen (the descendant of Confucius). The Imperial Clansmen consist of those who trace their descent direct from the founder of the Manchu dynasty, and are distinguished by the privilege of wearing a yellow girdle; collateral relatives of the imperial house wear a red girdle. Twelve degrees of nobility (in a descending scale as one generation succeeds another) are conferred on the descendants of every emperor; in the thirteenth generation the descendants of emperors are merged in the general population, save that they retain the yellow girdle. The heads of eight houses, the “Iron-capped” (or helmeted) princes, maintain their titles in perpetuity by rule of primogeniture in virtue of having helped the Manchu in the conquest of China. Imperial princes apart, the highest class is that forming the civil service. (See also § Government and Administration.) The peasant class forms the bulk of the population. The majority of Chinese are small landowners; their standard of living is very low in comparison with European standards. This is in part due to the system of land tenure. A parent cannot, even if he wished to do so, leave all his land to one son. There must be substantially an equal division, the will of the father notwithstanding. As early marriages and large families are the rule, this process of continual division and subdivision has brought things down to the irreducible minimum in many places. Small patches of one-tenth or even one-twentieth of an acre are to be found as the estate of an individual landowner, and the vast majority of holdings run between one and three acres. With three acres a family is deemed very comfortable, and the possession of ten acres means luxury.
The only class which at all resembles the territorial magnates of other countries is the class of retired officials. The wealth of an official is not infrequently invested in land, and consequently there are in most provinces several families with a country seat and the usual insignia of local rank and influence. On the decease of the heads or founders of such families it is considered dignified for the sons to live together, sharing the rents and profits in common. This is sometimes continued for several generations, until the country seat becomes an agglomeration of households and the family a sort of clan. A family of this kind, with literary traditions, and with the means to educate the young men, is constantly sending its scions into the public service. These in turn bring their earnings to swell the common funds, while the rank and dignity which they may earn add to the importance and standing of the group as a whole. The members of this class are usually termed the literati or gentry.
The complex character of the Chinese is shown in various ways. Side by side with the reverence of ancestors the law recognizes the right of the parent to sell his offspring into slavery and among the poor this is not an uncommon practice, though in comparison with the total population the number of slaves is few. The kidnapping of children for sale as slaves is carried on, but there is no slave raiding. There are more female than male slaves; the descendants of male slaves acquire freedom in the fifth generation. While every Chinese man is anxious to have male children, girls are often considered superfluous.