In disposition Clarke was cheerful and even playful. An intimate friend relates that he once found him swimming upon a table. At another time Clarke on looking out at the window saw a grave blockhead approaching the house; upon which he cried out, “Boys, boys, be wise; here comes a fool.” Dr Warton, in his observations upon Pope’s line,
“Unthought-of frailties cheat us in the wise,”
says, “Who could imagine that Locke was fond of romances; that Newton once studied astrology; that Dr Clarke valued himself on his agility, and frequently amused himself in a private room of his house in leaping over the tables and chairs?”
Philosophy.—Clarke, though in no way an original thinker, was eminent in theology, mathematics, metaphysics and philology, but his chief strength lay in his logical power. The materialism of Hobbes, the pantheism of Spinoza, the empiricism of Locke, the determinism of Leibnitz, Collins’ necessitarianism, Dodwell’s denial of the natural immortality of the soul, rationalistic attacks on Christianity, and the morality of the sensationalists—all these he opposed with a thorough conviction of the truth of the principles which he advocated. His fame as theologian and philosopher rests to a large extent on his demonstration of the existence of God and his theory of the foundation of rectitude. The former is not a purely a priori argument, nor is it presented as such by its author. It starts from a fact and it often explicitly appeals to facts. The intelligence, for example, of the self-existence and original cause of all things is, he says, “not easily proved a priori,” but “demonstrably proved a posteriori from the variety and degrees of perfection in things, and the order of causes and effects, from the intelligence that created beings are confessedly endowed with, and from the beauty, order, and final purpose of things.” The propositions maintained in the argument are—“(1) That something has existed from eternity; (2) that there has existed from eternity some one immutable and independent being; (3) that that immutable and independent being, which has existed from eternity, without any external cause of its existence, must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing; (4) what the substance or essence of that being is, which is self-existent or necessarily existing, we have no idea, neither is it at all possible for us to comprehend it; (5) that though the substance or essence of the self-existent being is itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the essential attributes of his nature are strictly demonstrable as well as his existence, and, in the first place, that he must be of necessity eternal; (6) that the self-existent being must of necessity be infinite and omnipresent; (7) must be but one; (8) must be an intelligent being; (9) must be not a necessary agent, but a being endued with liberty and choice; (10) must of necessity have infinite power; (11) must be infinitely wise, and (12) must of necessity be a being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral perfections, such as become the supreme governor and judge of the world.”
In order to establish his sixth proposition, Clarke contends that time and space, eternity and immensity, are not substances, but attributes—the attributes of a self-existent being. Edmund Law, Dugald Stewart, Lord Brougham, and many other writers, have, in consequence, represented Clarke as arguing from the existence of time and space to the existence of Deity. This is a serious mistake. The existence of an immutable, independent, and necessary being is supposed to be proved before any reference is made to the nature of time and space. Clarke has been generally supposed to have derived the opinion that time and space are attributes of an infinite immaterial and spiritual being from the Scholium Generale, first published in the second edition of Newton’s Principia (1714). The truth is that his work on the Being and Attributes of God appeared nine years before that Scholium. The view propounded by Clarke may have been derived from the Midrash, the Kabbalah, Philo, Henry More, or Cudworth, but not from Newton. It is a view difficult to prove, and probably few will acknowledge that Clarke has conclusively proved it.
His ethical theory of “fitness” (see [Ethics]) is formulated on the analogy of mathematics. He held that in relation to the will things possess an objective fitness similar to the mutual consistency of things in the physical universe. This fitness God has given to actions, as he has given laws to Nature; and the fitness is as immutable as the laws. The theory has been unfairly criticized by Jouffroy, Amédée Jacques, Sir James Mackintosh, Thomas Brown and others. It is said, for example, that Clarke made virtue consist in conformity to the relations of things universally, although the whole tenor of his argument shows him to have had in view conformity to such relations only as belong to the sphere of moral agency. It is true that he might have emphasized the relation of moral fitness to the will, and in this respect J.F. Herbart (q.v.) improved on Clarke’s statement of the case. To say, however, that Clarke simply confused mathematics and morals by justifying the moral criterion on a mathematical basis is a mistake. He compared the two subjects for the sake of the analogy.
Though Clarke can thus be defended against this and similar criticism, his work as a whole can be regarded only as an attempt to present the doctrines of the Cartesian school in a form which would not shock the conscience of his time. His work contained a measure of rationalism sufficient to arouse the suspicion of orthodox theologians, without making any valuable addition to, or modification of, the underlying doctrine.
Authorities.—See W. Whiston’s Historical Memoirs, and the preface by Benjamin Hoadly to Clarke’s Works (4 vols., London, 1738-1742). See further on his general philosophical position J. Hunt’s Religious Thought in England, passim, but particularly in vol. ii. 447-457, and vol. iii. 20-29 and 109-115, &c.; Rob. Zimmermann in the Denkschriften d. k. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Classe, Bd. xix. (Vienna, 1870); H. Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (6th ed., 1901), p. 384; A. Bain’s Moral Science (1872), p. 562 foll., and Mental Science (1872), p. 416; Sir L. Stephen’s English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (3rd ed., 1902), c. iii.; J. E. le Rossignol, Ethical Philosophy of S. Clarke (Leipzig, 1892).
CLARKE, THOMAS SHIELDS (1860- ), American artist, was born in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, on the 25th of April 1860, and graduated at Princeton in 1882. He was a pupil of the Art Students’ League, New York, and of the École des Beaux Arts, Paris, under J.L. Gérôme; later he entered the atelier of Dagnan-Bouveret, and, becoming interested in sculpture, worked for a while under Henri M. Chapu. As a sculptor, he received a medal of honour in Madrid for his “The Cider Press,” now in the Golden Gate Park, San Francisco, California, and he made four caryatides of “The Seasons” for the Appellate Court House, New York. He designed an “Alma Mater” for Princeton University, and a model is in the library. Among his paintings are his “Night Market in Morocco” (Philadelphia Art Club), for which he received a medal at the International Exposition in Berlin in 1891, and his “A Fool’s Fool,” exhibited at the Salon in 1887 and now in the collection of the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, Philadelphia.