CONCEPT[1] (Lat. conceptus, a thought, from concipere, to take together, combine in thought; Ger. Begriff), in philosophy, a term applied to a general idea derived from and considered apart from the particulars observed by the senses. The mental process by which this idea is obtained is called abstraction (q.v.). By the comparison, for instance, of a number of boats, the mind abstracts a certain common quality or qualities in virtue of which the mind affirms the general idea of “boat.” Thus the connotation of the term “boat,” being the sum of those qualities in respect of which all boats are regarded as alike, whatever their individual peculiarities may be, is described as a “concept.” The psychic process by which a concept is affirmed is called “Conception,” a term which is often loosely used in a concrete sense for “Concept” itself. It is also used even more loosely as synonymous in the widest sense with “idea,” “notion.” Strictly, however, it is contrasted with “perception,” and implies the mental reconstruction and combination of sense-given data. Thus when one carries one’s thoughts back to a series of events, one constructs a psychic whole made up of parts which take definite shape and character by their mutual interrelations. This process is called conceptual synthesis, the possibility of which is a sine qua non for the exchange of information by speech and writing. It should be noticed that this (very common) psychological interpretation of “conception” differs from the metaphysical or general philosophical definition given above, in so far as it includes mental presentations in which the universal is not specifically distinguished from the particulars. Some psychologists prefer to restrict the term to the narrower use which excludes all mental states in which particulars are cognized, even though the universal be present also.
In biology conception is the coalescence of the male and female generative elements, producing pregnancy.
[1] The word “conceit” in its various senses (“idea,” “plan,” “fancy,” “imagination,” and, by modern extension, an overweening sense of one’s own value) is likewise derived ultimately from the Latin concipere. It appears to have been formed directly from the English derivative “conceive” on the analogy of “deceit” from “deceive.” According to the New English Dictionary there is no intermediate form in Old French.
CONCEPTUALISM (from “Concept”), in philosophy, a term applied by modern writers to a scholastic theory of the nature of universals, to distinguish it from the two extremes of Nominalism and Realism. The scholastic philosophers took up the old Greek problem as to the nature of true reality—whether the general idea or the particular object is more truly real. Between Realism which asserts that the genus is more real than the species, and that particulars have no reality, and Nominalism according to which genus and species are merely names (nomina, flatus vocis), Conceptualism takes a mean position. The conceptualist holds that universals have a real existence, but only in the mind, as the concepts which unite the individual things: e.g. there is in the mind a general notion or idea of boats, by reference to which the mind can decide whether a given object is, or is not, a boat. On the one hand “boat” is something more than a mere sound with a purely arbitrary conventional significance; on the other it has, apart from particular things to which it applies, no reality; its reality is purely abstract or conceptual. This theory was enunciated by Abelard in opposition to Roscellinus (nominalist) and William of Champeaux (realist). He held that it is only by becoming a predicate that the class-notion or general term acquires reality. Thus similarity (conformitas) is observed to exist between a number of objects in respect of a particular quality or qualities. This quality becomes real as a mental concept when it is predicated of all the objects possessing it (“quod de pluribus natum est praedicari”). Hence Abelard’s theory is alternatively known as Sermonism (sermo, “predicate”). His statement of this position oscillates markedly, inclining sometimes towards the nominalist, sometimes towards the realist statement, using the arguments of the one against the other. Hence he is described by some as a realist, by others as a nominalist. When he comes to explain that objective similarity in things which is represented by the class-concept or general term, he adopts the theological Platonic view that the ideas which are the archetypes of the qualities exist in the mind of God. They are, therefore, ante rem, in re and post rem, or, as Avicenna stated it, universalia ante multiplicitatem, in multiplicitate, post multiplicitatem. (See [Logic], [Metaphysics].)
CONCERT (through the French from Lat. con-, with, and certare, to strive), a term meaning, in general, co-operation, agreement or union; the more specific usages being, in music, for a public performance by instrumentalists, vocalists or both combined, and in diplomacy, for an understanding or agreement for common action between two or more states, whether defined by treaty or not. The term “Concert of Europe” has been commonly applied, since the congress of Vienna (1814-1815), to the European powers consulting or acting together in questions of common interest. (See [Alliance] and [Europe]: History.)
CONCERTINA, or Melodion (Fr. concertina, Ger. Ziehharmonica or Bandoneon), a wind instrument of the seraphine family with free reeds, forming a link in the evolution of the harmonium from the mouth organ, intermediate links being the cheng and the accordion. The concertina consists of two hexagonal or rectangular keyboards connected by a long expansible bellows of many folds similar to that of the accordion. The keyboards are furnished with rows of knobs, which, on being pressed down by the fingers, open valves admitting the air compressed by the bellows to the free reeds, which are thus set in vibration. These free reeds consist of narrow tongues of brass riveted by one end to the inside surface of the keyboard, and having their free ends slightly bent, some outwards, some inwards, the former actuated by suction when the bellows are expanded, the latter by compression. The pitch of the note depends upon the length and thickness of the reeds, reduction of the length tending to sharpen the pitch of the note, while reduction of the thickness lowers it. The bellows being unprovided with a valve can only draw in and emit the air through the reed valves. In order to produce the sound, the concertina is held horizontally between the hands, the bellows being by turns compressed and expanded. The English concertina, invented and patented by Sir Charles Wheatstone in 1829, the year of the reputed invention of the accordion (q.v.), is constructed with a double action, the same note being produced on compressing and expanding the bellows, whereas in the German concertina or accordion two different notes are given out. Concertinas are made in complete families—treble, tenor, bass and double bass, having a combined total range of nearly seven octaves. The compass is as follows:—