DEFIANCE, a city and the county seat of Defiance county, Ohio, U.S.A., at the confluence of the Auglaize and Tiffin rivers with the Maumee, about 50 m. S.W. of Toledo. Pop. (1890) 7694; (1900) 7579 (960 foreign-born); (1910) 7327. It is served by the Baltimore & Ohio and the Wabash railways, and by the Ohio Electric railway to Lima (42 m.). The city commands a fine view of the rivers and the surrounding country, which is well adapted to agriculture; and has large machine shops and several flour mills, besides manufactories of agricultural implements, waggons, sashes and blinds, and wood-working machinery for the manufacture of artillery wheels. Here, too, is Defiance College, an institution of the Christian Denomination, opened in 1885. Defiance was long the site of an Indian village. In 1794 General Anthony Wayne built a fort here and named it Defiance. In 1822 Defiance was laid out as a town; in 1845 it was made the county seat of the newly erected county; and in 1881 it became a city of the second class.
DEFILE, a military expression for a passage, to march through which troops are compelled to “defile,” or narrow their front (from the Fr. défiler, to march in a line, or by “files”). The word is usually applied to a ravine or gorge in a range of hills, but a causeway over a river, a bridge and even a village may equally be called a defile. The term is also used to express, without any special reference to military operations, a gorge in mountains. The verb “to defile” is used of troops marching on a narrow front, or narrowing their front, under all circumstances, and in this sense is the contrary of “deploy.”
“Defile,” in the sense of “pollute,” is another form of “defoul”; though spelt alike, the two words are pronounced differently, the accent being on the first syllable for the former and on the second for the latter.
DEFINITION (Lat. definitio, from de-finire, to set limits to, describe), a logical term used popularly for the process of explaining, or giving the meaning of, a word, and also in the concrete for the proposition or statement in which that explanation is expressed. In logic, definition consists in determining the qualities which belong to given concepts or universals; it is not concerned with individuals, which are marked by an infinity of peculiarities, any one or all of which might be predicated of another individual. Individuals can be defined only in so far as they belong to a single kind. According to Aristotle, definition is the statement of the essence of a concept (ὁρισμὸς μὲν γὰν τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ οὐσίας, Posterior Analytics, B iii. 90 b 30); that is, it consists of the genus and the differentia. In other words, “man” is defined as “animal plus rationality,” or “rational animal,”[1] i.e. the concept is (1) referred to the next higher genus, and (2) distinguished from other modes in which that genus exists, i.e. from other species. It is sometimes argued that, there being no definition of individuals as such, definition is of names (see J. S. Mill, Logic, i. viii. 5), not of things; it is generally, however, maintained that definition is of things, regarded as, or in so far as they are, of a kind. Definition of words can be nothing more than the explanation of terms such as is given in a dictionary.
The following rules are generally given as governing accurate definition. (1) The definition must be equivalent or commensurate with that which is defined; it must be applicable to all the individuals included in the concept and to nothing else. Every man, and nothing else, is a rational animal. “Man is mortal” is not a definition, for mortality is predicable of irrational animals. (2) The definition must state the essential attributes; a concept cannot be defined by its accidental attributes; those attributes must be given which are essential and primary. (3) The definition must be per genus et differentiam (or differentias), as we have already seen. These are the important rules. Three minor rules are: (4) The definition must not contain the name of the concept to be defined; if it does, no information is given. Such a proposition as “an archdeacon is one who performs archidiaconal functions” is not a definition. Concepts cannot be defined by their correlatives. Such a definition is known as a circulus in definiendo. (5) Obscure and figurative language must be avoided, and (6) Definitions must not be in the negative when they can be in the affirmative.
[1] “Rational animal” is thus the predicate of the statement constituting the definition. Sometimes the word “definition” is used to signify merely the predicate.