(F. R. C.)
(2) From the Death of Mehemet Ali to the British Occupation.—On Ibrahim’s death in November 1848 the government of Egypt fell to his nephew Abbas I (q.v.), the son of Tusun. Abbas put an end to the system of commercial monopolies, Abbas I. and Said Pasha. and during his reign the railway from Alexandria to Cairo was begun at the instigation of the British government. Opposed to European ways, Abbas lived in great seclusion, and after a reign of less than six years he was murdered (July 1854) by two of his slaves. He was succeeded by his uncle Said Pasha, the favourite son of Mehemet Ali, who lacked the strength of mind or physical health needed to execute the beneficent projects which he conceived. His endeavour, for instance, to put a stop to the slave raiding which devastated the Sudan provinces was wholly ineffectual. He had a genuine regard for the welfare of the fellahin, and a land law of 1858 secured to them an acknowledgment of freehold as against the crown. The pasha was much under French influence, and in 1856 was induced to grant to Ferdinand de Lesseps a concession for the construction of the Suez Canal. Lord Palmerston was opposed to this project, and the British opposition delayed the ratification of the concession by the Porte for two years. To the British Said also made concessions—one to the Eastern Telegraph Company, and another (1854) allowing the establishment of the Bank of Egypt. He also began the national debt by borrowing £3,293,000 from Messrs Frühling & Göschen, the actual amount received by the pasha being £2,640,000. In January 1863 Said Pasha died and was succeeded by his nephew Ismail, a son of Ibrahim Pasha.
The reign of Ismail (q.v.), from 1863 to 1879, was for a while hailed as introducing a new era into modern Egypt. In spite of his vast schemes of reform and the éclat of his Europeanizing innovations, his oriental extravagance Ismail’s megalomania led to bankruptcy, and his reign is historically important simply for its compelling European intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt. Yet in its earlier years much was done which seemed likely to give Ismail a more important place in history. In 1866 he was granted by the sultan a firman—obtained on condition of the increase of the tribute from £376,000 to £720,000—by which the succession to the throne of Egypt was made to descend “to the eldest of thy male children and in the same manner to the eldest sons of thy successors,” instead of, after Turkish law, to the eldest male of the family. In the following year another firman bestowed upon him the title of khedive in lieu of that of vali, borne by Mehemet Ali and his immediate successors. In 1873 a further firman placed the khedive in many respects in the position of an independent sovereign. Ismail re-established and improved the administrative system organized by Mehemet Ali, and which had fallen into decay under Abbas’s indolent rule; he caused a thorough remodelling of the customs system, which was in an anarchic state, to be made by English officials; in 1865 he established the Egyptian post office; he reorganized the military schools of his grandfather, and gave some support to the cause of education. Railways, telegraphs, lighthouses, the harbour works at Suez, the breakwater at Alexandria, were carried out by some of the best contractors of Europe. Most important of all, the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. But the funds required for these public works, as well as the actual labour, were remorselessly extorted from a poverty-stricken population.
A striking picture of the condition of the people at this period is given by Lady Duff Gordon in Last Letters from Egypt. Writing in 1867 she said: “I cannot describe the misery here now—every day some new tax. Every beast, camel, cow, sheep, donkey and horse is made to pay. The fellaheen can no longer eat bread; they are living on barley-meal mixed with water, and raw green stuff, vetches, | &c. The taxation makes life almost impossible: a tax on every crop, on every animal first, and again when it is sold in the market; on every man, on charcoal, on butter, on salt.... The people in Upper Egypt are running away by wholesale, utterly unable to pay the new taxes and do the work exacted. Even here (Cairo) the beating for the year’s taxes is awful.”
In the years that followed the condition of things grew worse. Thousands of lives were lost and large sums expended in extending Ismail’s dominions in the Sudan (q.v.) and in futile conflicts with Abyssinia. In 1875 the Steps leading to the deposition of Ismail. impoverishment of the fellah had reached such a point that the ordinary resources of the country no longer sufficed for the most urgent necessities of administration; and the khedive Ismail, having repeatedly broken faith with his creditors, could not raise any more loans on the European market. The taxes were habitually collected many months in advance, and the colossal floating debt was increasing rapidly. In these circumstances Ismail had to realize his remaining assets, and among them sold 176,602 Suez Canal shares to the British government for £3,976,582[25] (see [Beaconsfield]). This comparatively small financial operation brought about the long-delayed crisis and paved the way for the future prosperity of Egypt, for it induced the British government to inquire more carefully into the financial condition of the country. In December 1875 Mr Stephen Cave, M.P., and Colonel (afterwards Sir John) Stokes, R.E., were sent to Egypt to inquire into the financial situation; and Mr Cave’s report, made public in April 1876, showed that under the existing administration national bankruptcy was inevitable. Other commissions of inquiry followed, and each one brought Ismail more under European control. The establishment of the Mixed Tribunals in 1876, in place of the system of consular jurisdiction in civil actions, made some of the courts of justice international. The Caisse de la Dette, instituted in May 1876 as a result of the Cave mission, led to international control over a large portion of the revenue. Next came (in November 1876) the mission of Mr (afterwards Lord) Goschen and M. Joubert on behalf of the British and French bondholders, one result being the establishment of Dual Control, i.e. an English official to superintend the revenue and a French official the expenditure of the country. Another result was the internationalization of the railways and the port of Alexandria. Then came (May 1878) a commission of inquiry of which the principal members were Sir Rivers Wilson, Major Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) and MM. Kremer-Baravelli and de Blignières. One result of that inquiry was the extension of international control to the enormous landed property of the khedive. Driven to desperation, Ismail made a virtue of necessity and accepted, in September 1878, in lieu of the Dual Control, a constitutional ministry, under the presidency of Nubar Pasha (q.v.), with Rivers Wilson as minister of finance and de Blignières as minister of public works. Professing to be quite satisfied with this arrangement, he pompously announced that Egypt was no longer in Africa, but a part of Europe; but before seven months had passed he found his constitutional position intolerable, got rid of his irksome cabinet by means of a secretly-organized military riot in Cairo, and reverted to his old autocratic methods of government. England and France could hardly sit still under this affront, and decided to administer chastisement by the hand of the suzerain power, which was delighted to have an opportunity of asserting its authority. On the 26th of June 1879 Ismail suddenly received from the sultan a curt telegram, addressed to him as ex-khedive of Egypt, informing him that his son Tewfik was appointed his successor. Taken unawares, he made no attempt at resistance, and Tewfik was at once proclaimed khedive.
After a short period of inaction, when it seemed as if the change might be for the worse, England and France summoned up courage to look the situation boldly in the face, and, in November 1879, re-established the Dual Control in the persons of Major Baring and M. de Blignières. For two years the Dual Control governed Egypt, and initiated the work of progress that England was to continue alone. Its essential defect was what might be called insecurity of tenure. Without any Re-establishment of Dual Control. efficient means of self-protection and coercion at its disposal, it had to interfere with the power, privileges and perquisites of a class which had long misgoverned the country. This class, so far as its civilian members were concerned, was not very formidable, because these were not likely to go beyond the bounds of intrigue and passive resistance; but it contained a military element who had more courage, and who had learned their power when Ismail employed them for overturning his constitutional ministry. Arabi and the revolt of 1882. Among the mutinous soldiers on that occasion was a fellah officer calling himself Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian. He was not a man of exceptional intelligence or remarkable powers of organization, but he was a fluent speaker, and could exercise some influence over the masses by a rude kind of native eloquence. Behind him were a group of men, much abler than himself, who put him forward as the figurehead of a party professing to aim at protecting the Egyptians from the grasping tyranny of their Turkish and European oppressors. The movement began among the Arab officers, who complained of the preference shown to the officers of Turkish origin; it then expanded into an attack on the privileged position and predominant influence of foreigners, many of whom, it must be confessed, were of a by no means respectable type; finally, it was directed against all Christians, foreign and native.[26] The government, being too weak to suppress the agitation and disorder, had to make concessions, and each concession produced fresh demands. Arabi was first promoted, then made under-secretary for war, and ultimately a member of the cabinet. The danger of a serious rising brought the British and French fleets in May 1882 to Alexandria, and after a massacre (11th of June) had been perpetrated by the Arab mob in that city, the British admiral bombarded the forts (11th of July 1882). The leaders of the national movement prepared to resist further aggression by force. A conference of ambassadors was held in Constantinople, and the sultan was invited to quell the revolt; but he hesitated to employ his troops against Mussulmans who were professing merely to oppose Christian aggression.
(3) Egypt occupied by the British.—At last the British government determined to employ armed force, and invited France to co-operate. The French government declined, and a similar invitation to Italy met with a similar refusal. England therefore, having to act alone, landed troops at Ismailia under Sir Garnet Wolseley, and suppressed the revolt by the battle of Tell-el-Kebir on the 13th of September 1882. The khedive, who had taken refuge in Alexandria, returned to Cairo, and a ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha, with Riaz Pasha as one of its leading members. On assuming office, the first thing it had to do was to bring to trial the chiefs of the rebellion. Had the khedive and Riaz been allowed a free hand, Arabi and his colleagues would have found little mercy. Thanks to the intervention of the British government, their lives were spared. Arabi pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death, the sentence being commuted by the khedive to banishment; and Riaz resigned in disgust. This solution of the difficulty was brought about by Lord Dufferin, then British ambassador at Constantinople, who had been sent to Egypt as high commissioner to adjust affairs and report on the situation. One of his first acts, after preventing the application of capital punishment to the ringleaders of the revolt, was to veto the project of protecting the khedive and his government by means of a Praetorian guard recruited from Asia Minor, Epirus, Austria and Switzerland, and to insist on the principle that Egypt must be governed in a truly liberal spirit. Passing in review all the departments of the administration, he laid down the general lines on which the country was to be restored to order and prosperity, and endowed, if possible, with the elements of self-government for future use.
The laborious task of putting these general indications into a practical shape fell to Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), who arrived as consul-general and diplomatic agent, in succession to Sir Edward Malet, in January 1884. Sir Evelyn Baring appointed consul-general, 1884. At that moment the situation was singularly like that which had existed on two previous occasions: firstly, when Ismail was deposed; and secondly, when the Dual Control had undermined the existing authority without having any power to enforce its own. For the third time in little more than three years the existing authority had been destroyed and a new one had to be created. But there was one essential difference: the power that had now to reorganize the country possessed in the British army of occupation a support sufficient to command respect. Without that support Sir Evelyn Baring could have done little or nothing; with it he did perhaps more than any other single man could have done. His method may be illustrated by an old story long current in Cairo. Mehemet Ali was said to have appointed as mudir or governor in a turbulent district a young and inexperienced Turk, who asked, “But how am I to govern these people?” “Listen,” replied the pasha; “buy the biggest and heaviest kurbash you can find; hang it up in the centre of the mudirieh, well within your reach, and you will very seldom require to use it.” The British army of occupation was Sir Evelyn’s kurbash; it was well within his reach, as all the world knew, and its simple presence sufficed to prevent disorder and enforce obedience. He had one other advantage over previous English reformers in Egypt: his position towards France was more independent. The Dual Control had been abolished by a khedivial decree of 18th January 1883, and replaced by an English financial adviser. France naturally objected; but having refused to co-operate with England in suppressing the revolt, she could not reasonably complain that her offer of co-operation in the work of reorganization was declined. But though Dual Control was at an end, the Caisse de la Dette remained, and this body was to prove a constant clog on the financial measures of the Egyptian government.
At first the intention of the British government was simply to restore the power of the khedive, to keep his highness for some time in the right path by friendly advice, and to withdraw the British troops as soon as possible. As The Policy of evacuation. Lord Granville explained in a circular to the powers, the position of England in Egypt imposed on her “the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress.” But there was to be no embarking on a general scheme of reforms, which would increase unnecessarily the responsibilities of the protecting power and necessitate the indefinite prolongation of the military occupation. So far, therefore, as the British government had a definite policy in Egypt, it was a politique de replâtrage. Even this policy was not strictly adhered to. Mr Gladstone’s cabinet was as unstable as the public opinion it sought to conciliate. It had its hot fits and its cold fits, and it gave orders now to advance and now to retreat. In the long run circumstances proved too strong for it, and it had to undertake a great deal more than it originally intended. Each little change in the administration engendered a multitude of others, so that the modest attempts at reform were found to be like the letting out of water. A tiny rill gradually became a boisterous stream, and the boisterous stream grew into a great river, which spread to all sections of the administration and ended by inundating the whole country.
Of the numerous questions awaiting solution, the first to claim immediate attention was that of the Sudan. The British government had begun by excluding it from the problem, and by declaring that for events in these The Sudan question. outlying territories it must not be held responsible. In that sphere of activity, therefore, the Egyptian government might do as it thought fit. The principle of limited liability which this attitude assumed was soon found to be utterly untenable. The Sudan was an integral part of the khedive’s dominions, and caused, even in ordinary times, a deficit of £200,000 to the Egyptian treasury. At that moment it was in a state of open rebellion, stirred up by a religious fanatic who proclaimed himself a mahdi of Islam. An army of 10,000 men under an English officer, Colonel William Hicks, formerly of the Bombay army, otherwise Hicks Pasha, had been sent to suppress the revolt, and had been annihilated in a great battle fought on the 5th of November 1883, near Obeid. The Egyptian government wished to make a new attempt to recover the lost province, and the idea was certainly very popular among the governing class, but Sir Evelyn Baring vetoed the project on the ground that Egypt had neither soldiers nor money to carry it out. In vain the khedive and his prime minister, Sherif Pasha, threatened to resign, and the latter actually carried out his threat. The British representative remained firm, and it was decided that the Sudan should be, for the moment at least, abandoned to its fate. Nubar, though as strongly opposed to the abandonment policy as Sherif, consented to take his place and accepted somewhat reluctantly the new régime, which he defined as “the administration of Egypt under the government of Baring.” By this time the Mahdi was master of the greater part of the Sudan, but Khartum and some other fortified points still held out. The efforts made to extricate the garrisons, including the mission of General Gordon, the fall of Khartum, and the Nile Expedition under Lord Wolseley, are described below separately in the section of this article dealing with the military operations. The practical result was that the khedive’s authority was limited to the Nile valley north of Wadi Halfa.