About this time the Channel Bridge and Railway Company took in hand the design of a bridge, the preliminary plans for which were exhibited in the Paris Exhibition of 1889. The terminal points were Folkestone and Cap Grisnez, and for the sake of facilitating the laying of the pier foundations it was proposed to take the bridge over the Varne and Colbart shoals. The main girders were to be nearly 59 yds. above the sea-level, the railway itself being more than 20 ft. higher still, and the spans were to vary in length between 540 and 108 yds. As the result of a survey of the sea bottom made in 1890, a modification in the line of the bridge was adopted, and it was taken direct from Cap Blancnez to the South Foreland. It was found that in this way an excellent bottom would be obtained for the foundations, and the length of the bridge would be 3 m. less, the number of piers, by employing spans of 434 and 542 yds. alternately, being reduced to 72. The cost of this structure was estimated at £28,320,000, exclusive of interest on capital during the period of construction, which was put at seven years. The same company also worked out plans for a moving chariot or platform, capable of holding a railway train and supported by long legs on a submerged causeway or track constructed of steel or armoured concrete 45 or 50 ft. below low-water level. No attempt has been made actually to carry out either this project or that of a bridge.
In 1905 the question of establishing a train ferry from Dover across the Channel was brought forward by the Intercontinental Railway Company, and in the following year the Channel Ferry (Dover) Act was passed authorizing the work. About the same period the Channel Tunnel Company, which had amalgamated with the Submarine Railway Company, awoke to activity and started a campaign in favour of its scheme; but the bill which it promoted was opposed by the government and accordingly was withdrawn in March 1907.
See Blue-book, Correspondence respecting the proposed Channel Tunnel, Commercial No. 6 (1875); Blue-book, Correspondence with reference to the proposed Construction of a Channel Tunnel, C. 3358 (1882); Blue-book, Report from the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons on the Channel Tunnel (1883); F. J. Bramwell, “The Making and Working of a Channel Tunnel,” Proc. Roy. Inst., May 1882; Tylden Wright, “The Channel Tunnel,” North of England Inst. Min. and Mech. Eng. vol. 33 (1882); W. Boyd Dawkins, “The Channel Tunnel,” Manchester Geol. Soc., May 1882, and Brit. Assoc. Rep. (1882, 1899); E. de Rodakowski, The Channel Ferry (London, 1905).
(H. M. R.)
[1] 50° F. = 10° C.; 60.8° F. = 16° C.
ENGLISH FINANCE. The history of the English fiscal system affords the best example known of continuous financial development, in respect both of institutions and methods. Though certain great periods of change can be readily noticed, yet from the time of the Norman Conquest to the beginning of the 20th century the line of connexion is substantially unbroken. Perhaps the most revolutionary changes occurred in the 17th century, as the outcome of the Civil War, and, later on, the revolution of 1688. But even in this case there was no real breach of continuity. It is, therefore, possible to trace the normal growth and expansion of British finance as one of the aspects of the nation’s history.
The primitive financial institutions of England centre round the king’s household, or, in other words, the royal economy precedes the national one. Revenue dues collected by the king’s agents, rents, or rather returns of produce, from land, and special levies for emergencies form the elements of the royal income, which gradually acquired greater regularity and consistency. There is, however, little or no evidence of any effective financial organization until we approach the 11th century. The influence exercised from Normandy, which so powerfully affected the English rulers at this time, tended towards the creation of records of revenue claims and also of a central treasury.
With the union of England and Normandy under the same head the idea of settled administrative methods was definitely fixed and became of special importance in the field of finance. The systematizing spirit, so characteristic of both the Norman and Angevin kings, produced the great institution of the exchequer (q.v.) with its judicial and administrative sides, and its elaborate forms of account and control. Even before this organization was developed the Domesday Survey (see [Domesday Book])—now recognized as having a purely fiscal object (in Maitland’s words “a tax book, a geld book”)—shows the movement towards careful observation of the sources of revenue. It is clear that William I. initiated a policy which was followed by his successors, in spite of the serious difficulties of the period of anarchy during Stephen’s nominal reign. The obscure question as to the real origin of the special contrivances employed by the exchequer is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the financial inquirer, who may be content to hold that, granting the existence of some Old English analogies, the system, as it appears in the 12th century, was a peculiar product of the conceptions as to fiscal organization formed by Norman subtlety. It is the manner in which this institution held together and focused the revenues and expenditure of the kingdom that has to be considered. The picture presented by the “Dialogue of the Exchequer” (c. 1176) is that of a comprehensive system which secured the receipt of the royal income, and provided a thorough audit of the accounts by employing processes adapted to the circumstances of the time. It is, in fact, through the description of financial institutions that it is possible to ascertain the forms of revenue possessed by the crown. The ingenuity expended on the administrative machinery of the exchequer had as its aim the increase of the king’s resources, an object in which the official class of churchmen and lawyers was deeply interested.