With regard to Russia there was little cause for apprehension. She had aided Bismarck to carry out his audacious schemes in the past, and there was no reason to suppose that she would change her policy in the immediate future. The Russian policy towards Germany. rapprochement dated from the Polish insurrection of 1863, when the governments of France and England, yielding to popular excitement, made strong diplomatic representations to Russia in favour of the Poles, whereas Bismarck not only refused to join in the diplomatic campaign, but made a convention with the cabinet of St Petersburg by which the Russian and German military authorities on the frontiers should aid each other in suppressing the disturbances. From that time the friendship ripened steadily. The relations between the two powers were not, it is true, always without a cloud. More than once the bold designs of Bismarck caused uneasiness and dissatisfaction in St Petersburg, especially during the Schleswig-Holstein complications of 1864 and the Austro-Prussian conflict of 1866; but the wily statesman of Berlin, partly by argument and partly by dexterously manipulating the mutual trust and affection between the two sovereigns, always succeeded in having his own way without producing a rupture, so that during the Franco-German War of 1870-71 Russia maintained an extremely benevolent neutrality, and prevented Austria and Italy from taking part in the struggle. So benevolent was the neutrality that the emperor William at the end of the campaign felt constrained to write to the tsar that he owed to His Majesty the happy issue of the campaign and would never forget the fact. Having thus helped to create the German empire, Alexander II. was not likely to take an active part in destroying it, and Bismarck could look forward confidently to a long continuance of the cordial relations between the two courts.

The second part of the German chancellor’s programme, the permanent conciliation of Austria, was not so easily carried out. Austria had been the great sufferer, more perhaps even than France, from Bismarck’s aggressive policy. For Austrian relations with Germany. generations she had resisted strenuously and successfully the efforts of the Hohenzollerns to play the leading part in Germany, and she had always considered her own influence in Germany as essential to the maintenance of her position as a first-class power. By the disastrous campaign of 1866 and the consequent treaty of Prague, Austria had been formally excluded from all direct influence in German affairs. With these events still fresh in his recollection, the emperor Francis Joseph could hardly be expected to support the new empire created by his rival at Austria’s expense, and it was known that on the eve of the Franco-German War he had been negotiating with the French government for a combined attack on Prussia. To an ordinary statesman the task of permanently conciliating such a power might well have seemed hopeless, but Bismarck did not shrink from it, and even before the signature of the treaty of Prague he had prepared the way for attaining his object. “With regard to Austria,” he himself explained on one occasion, “I had two courses open to me after her defeat, either to destroy her entirely or to respect her integrity and prepare for our future reconciliation when the fire of revenge had died out. I chose the latter course, because the former would have been the greatest possible act of folly. Supposing that Austria had disappeared, consider the consequences.” He then described very graphically those probable consequences, and drew the conclusion: “for the sake of our own life Austria must live. I had no hesitation, therefore, and ever since 1866 my constant effort has been to stitch up the great torn texture and to re-establish amicable relations with our ancient associate of the Confederation.” For this purpose he tried to soothe Austrian susceptibilities, and suggested confidentially that compensation for the losses of territory, influence and prestige in Italy and Germany might be found in south-eastern Europe, especially by the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but so long as his rival Count Beust was minister for foreign affairs in Vienna, and Austria had the prospect of being able to recover her lost position by the assistance of Russia and France, these efforts had no success. It was only when Prince Gorchakov had declined Count Beust’s advances, which took the form of suggesting the abolition of the Black Sea clauses of the treaty of Paris, and when France had been paralysed for some years by her war with Germany, that a rapprochement between the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin became possible. Bismarck lost no time in making advances. From the German headquarters at Versailles he sent a despatch to Vienna suggesting the establishing of more cordial relations between the two countries, and Count Beust replied in an equally amicable tone. The emperor Francis Joseph, finding himself isolated, had evidently accepted the inevitable with his customary resignation, and abandoned his dreams of again playing the leading part in Germany. As a further proof of the change in his disposition and aims he replaced Count Beust by Count Andrássy, who was a personal friend of Bismarck, and who wished, as a Hungarian, to see Austria liberated from her German entanglement, and he consented to pay a visit to Berlin for the purpose of drawing still closer the relations between the two governments.

Bismarck was delighted at this turn of affairs, but he advanced with his usual caution. He gave it to be clearly understood that improvement in his relations with Vienna must not disturb the long-established friendship with St Petersburg. The Dreikaiserbund. The tsar, on hearing privately of the intended meeting, gave a hint to Prince Reuss, the German ambassador, that he expected an invitation, and was invited accordingly. The meeting of the three sovereigns took place at Berlin at the end of August 1872. The three ministers, Prince Bismarck, Prince Gorchakov and Count Andrássy, held daily conferences, on the basis that the chief aim in view should be the maintenance of peace in Europe, and that in all important international affairs the three powers should consult with each other and act in concert. As a result of three days’ consultation the Three Emperor’s League was founded, without any formal treaty being signed. In this way the danger of a powerful coalition being formed against the young German empire was averted, for in the event of a conflict with France, Germany could count on at least the benevolent neutrality of Russia and Austria, and from the other powers she had nothing to fear. What ulterior designs Bismarck may have had in forming the league, or “Alliance” as it is often called, must be to some extent a matter of conjecture, but we shall probably not be far wrong in adopting the view of a competent Russian authority, who defines the policy of the German chancellor thus: “To make Austria accept definitively her deposition as a Germanic power, to put her in perpetual conflict with Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and to found on that irreconcilable rivalry the hegemony of Germany.”

For more than two years there was an outward appearance of extreme cordiality between the three powers. They acted together diplomatically, and on all suitable occasions the three allied monarchs exchanged visits and sent each other congratulations and good wishes. There was, however, from the beginning very little genuine confidence between them. Before the breaking up of the conferences at Berlin, Alexander II. and his chancellor had conversations with the French ambassador, in which they not only showed that they had suspicions of future aggressive designs on the part of Germany, but also gave an assurance that so long as France fulfilled her engagements to Germany she had nothing to fear. A few months later, when the emperor William paid his return visit to the tsar in St Petersburg, a defensive convention was concluded by the two monarchs behind the back of their Austrian ally. Without knowing anything about the existence of this convention, the Austrian ally did not feel comfortable in his new position. In Vienna the old anti-Prussian feeling was still strong. The so-called party of the archdukes and the military resisted the policy of Andrássy, and sought to establish closer relations with Russia, so that German support might be unnecessary, but as Bismarck has himself testified, “Russia did not yet respond. The wound caused by the conduct of Austria during the Crimean War was not yet healed. Andrássy made himself very popular in the court society of St Petersburg during his visit there with his imperial master, but the traditional suspicion of Austrian policy remained.” Altogether, the new league was not a happy family. So long as all the members of it were content to accept the status quo, the latent germs of dissension remained hidden from the outside world, but as soon as the temporary state of political quietude was replaced by a certain amount of activity and initiative, they forced their way to the surface. No one of the three powers regarded the status quo as a satisfactory permanent arrangement. In Berlin much anxiety was caused by the rapid financial and military recovery of France, and voices were heard suggesting that a new campaign and a bigger war indemnity might be necessary before the recuperation was complete. In St Petersburg there was a determination to take advantage of any good opportunity for recovering the portion of Bessarabia ceded by the treaty of Paris, and thereby removing the last tangible results of the Crimean War. In Vienna there was a desire to obtain in the Balkan Peninsula, in accordance with the suggestion of Bismarck, compensation for the losses in Italy and Germany. Thus each of the members of the league was hatching secretly a little aggressive scheme for its own benefit, and the danger for the rest of Europe lay in the possibility of their reconciling their schemes so far as to admit of an agreement for action in common. Fortunately for the onlookers there were important conflicting interests, and the task of reconciling them was extremely difficult, as the subsequent course of events proved.

The first of the three powers to move was Germany. In February 1875 M. de Radowitz was despatched to St Petersburg on a secret mission in order to discover whether, in the event of hostilities between Germany and France, The storm-cloud of 1875. Russia would undertake to maintain a neutral attitude as she had done in 1870-1871; in that case Germany might be relied on to co-operate with her in her great designs in the East. Prince Gorchakov did not take the bait with the alacrity that was expected. Having overcome in some measure his hatred of Austria, which had distorted for so many years his political vision, he had come to understand that it was not for the interests of his own country to have as neighbour a powerful united Germany instead of a weak confederation of small states, and he now perceived that it would be a grave error of policy to allow Germany to destroy still more to her own advantage the balance of power in Europe by permanently weakening France. No doubt he desired to recover the lost portion of Bessarabia and to raise Russian prestige in the East, but he did not wish to run the risk of exciting a great European war, and he believed that what he desired might be effected without war by the diplomatic skill which had warded off European intervention during the Polish troubles of 1863, and had recovered for Russia her freedom of action in the Black Sea during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. In reply, therefore, to M. de Radowitz’s inquiries and suggestions, he declared that the Russian court fostered no ambitious designs in the East or in the West, and desired only peace and the maintenance of the status quo, with possibly an amelioration in the miserable condition of the Christian subjects of the sultan. This rebuff did not suffice to dispel the gathering storm. The warlike agitation in the German inspired press continued, and the French government became thoroughly alarmed. General Leflô, the French ambassador in St Petersburg, was instructed to sound the Russian government on the subject. Prince Gorchakov willingly assured him that Russia would do all in her power to incline the Berlin cabinet to moderation and peace, and that the emperor would take advantage of his forthcoming visit to Berlin to influence the emperor William in this sense. A few days later General Leflô received similar assurances from the emperor himself, and about the same time the British government volunteered to work likewise in the cause of peace. Representations were accordingly made by both governments during the tsar’s visit to Berlin, and both the emperor William and his chancellor declared that there was no Russia and Germany divided. intention of attacking France. The danger of war, which the well-informed German press believed to be “in sight,” was thus averted, but the incident sowed the seeds of future troubles, by awakening in Bismarck a bitter personal resentment against his Russian colleague. By certain incautious remarks to those around him, and still more by a circular to the representatives of Russia abroad, dated Berlin and beginning with the words maintenant la paix est assurée, Gorchakov seemed to take to himself the credit of having checkmated Bismarck and saved Europe from a great war. Bismarck resented bitterly this conduct on the part of his old friend, and told him frankly that he would have reason to regret it. In the Russian official world it is generally believed that he took his revenge in the Russo-Turkish War and the congress of Berlin. However this may be, he has himself explained that “the first cause of coldness” was the above incident, “when Gorchakov, aided by Decazes, wanted to play at my expense the part of a saviour of France, to represent me as the enemy of European peace, and to procure for himself a triumphant quos ego to arrest by a word and shatter my dark designs!” In any case the incident marks the beginning of a new phase in the relations of the three powers; henceforth Bismarck can no longer count on the unqualified support of Russia, and in controlling the Russo-Austrian rivalry in south-eastern Europe, while professing to be impartial, he will lean to the side of Count Andrássy rather than to that of Prince Gorchakov. He is careful, however, not to carry this tendency so far as to produce a rapprochement between Russia and France. The danger of a Franco-Russian alliance hostile to Germany is already appearing on the political horizon, but it is only a little cloud no bigger than a man’s hand.

The next move in the aggressive game was made by Austria, with the connivance of Russia. During the summer of 1875 an insurrection of the Christian Slavs in Herzegovina, which received support from the neighbouring principalities of Montenegro and Servia, was fostered by the Austrian authorities and encouraged by the Russian consuls on the Adriatic coast. A European concert was formed for the purpose of settling the disturbance by means of local administrative reforms, but the efforts of the powers failed, because the insurgents hoped to obtain complete liberation from Turkish rule; and in the beginning of July, with a view to promoting this solution, Servia and Montenegro declared war against the Porte. Thereupon Russia began to show her hand more openly. The government allowed volunteers to be recruited in Moscow and St Petersburg, and the Russian general Chernayev, who had distinguished himself in Central Asia, was appointed to the command of the Servian army. When the ball had thus been set rolling, the two powers chiefly concerned considered that the Austro-Russian agreement, 1876. time had come for embodying the result of their informal confidential pourparlers in a secret agreement, which is known as the convention of Reichstadt, because it was signed at a meeting of the two emperors in the little Bohemian town of that name. It bore the date of the 8th of July 1876—exactly a week after Servia and Montenegro had declared war—and it contained the following stipulations: (1) That so long as the struggle which had just begun remained undecided, the two sovereigns should refrain from interference, and that in the event of the principalities being defeated, any modification of the territorial or political status quo ante to their detriment should be prevented; (2) that in the event of the principalities proving victorious, and territorial changes taking place, Austria should claim compensation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia should demand the restitution of the portion of Bessarabia which she had lost by the Crimean War; (3) that in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman empire, the two powers should act together to create autonomous principalities in European Turkey, to unite Thessaly and Crete to Greece, and to proclaim Constantinople a free town. The contracting parties evidently expected that the two principalities would be victorious in their struggle with the Porte, and that the compensations mentioned would be secured without a great European war. Their expectations were disappointed. Montenegro made a brave stand against superior forces, but before five months had passed Servia was at the mercy of the Turkish army, and Russia had to come to the assistance of her protégé. A Russian ultimatum stopped the advance of the Turks on Belgrade, and an armistice, subsequently transformed into a peace, was signed.

Russia and Austria had now to choose between abandoning their schemes and adopting some other course of action, and unforeseen incidents contributed towards making them select the latter alternative. In June 1876 an attempt Bulgarian Question. at insurrection in Bulgaria had been repressed with savage brutality by the Turks, and the details, as they became known some weeks later, produced much indignation all over Europe. In England the excitement, fanned by the eloquence of Gladstone, became intense, and compelled the Disraeli cabinet to take part, very reluctantly, in a diplomatic campaign, with the object of imposing radical reforms on Turkey. In Russia the excitement and indignation were equally great, and the tsar gradually formed the resolution that if the powers would not act collectively and energetically, so as to compel the Porte to yield, he would undertake the work single-handed. This resolution he announced publicly in a speech delivered at Moscow on the 10th of November 1876. The powers did not like the idea of separate Russian action, and in order to prevent it they agreed to hold a conference in Constantinople for the purpose of inducing the Porte to introduce the requisite reforms. The Porte was at that moment under the influence of popular patriotic excitement which made it indisposed to accept orders, or even well-meant advice, from governments more or less hostile to it, and the inconsiderate mode of procedure suggested by General Ignatiev, and adopted by the other delegates, made it still more unconciliatory. At the first plenary sitting of the conference the proceedings were disturbed by the sound of artillery, and the Turkish representative explained that the salvo was in honour of the new Ottoman constitution, which was being promulgated by the sultan. The inference suggested was that as Turkey had spontaneously entered on the path of liberal and constitutional reform for all Ottoman subjects, it became superfluous and absurd to talk of small reforms for particular provinces, such as the conference was about to propose. The deliberations continued, but finally the Porte refused to accept what the plenipotentiaries considered an irreducible minimum, and the conference broke up without obtaining any practical result. The tsar’s Moscow declaration about employing single-handed the requisite coercive measures now came to be fulfilled.

In order to make a successful aggressive move on Turkey, Russia had first of all to secure her rear and flank by an arrangement with her two allies. In Berlin she encountered no difficulties. Bismarck had no objection to seeing Russia weaken herself in a struggle with Turkey, provided she did not upset the balance of power in south-eastern Europe, and he felt confident that he could prevent by diplomatic means any such catastrophe. He was inclined, therefore, to encourage rather than restrain the bellicose tendencies of St Petersburg. In Vienna the task of coming to a definite arrangement was much more difficult, and it was only after protracted and laborious negotiations that a convention was concluded on the 15th of January 1877, and formally signed three months later. It was a development of the agreement of Reichstadt, modified according to the changes in the situation, but retaining the essential principle that in the event of the territorial status quo being altered, Russia should recover the lost portion of Bessarabia, and Austria should get Bosnia and a part of Herzegovina. Having made these preliminary arrangements, Russia began the campaign simultaneously in Europe and Asia Minor, and after many reverses and enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure, she succeeded in imposing on the Turks the “preliminary peace” of San Stefano (3rd March 1878). That peace was negotiated with very little consideration for the interests of the other powers, and as soon as the terms of it became known in Vienna and London there San Stefano. was an outburst of indignation. In negotiating the treaty General Ignatiev had ignored the wishes of Austria, and had even, according to the contention of Andrássy, infringed the convention signed at the beginning of the war. However this may be, the peace of San Stefano brought to the surface the latent conflict of interests between the two empires. Russia’s aim was to create a big Bulgaria under the influence of St Petersburg, and to emancipate Servia and Montenegro as far as possible from Austrian influence, whereas Austria objected to the creation of any large Slav state in the Balkan Peninsula, and insisted on maintaining her influence at Belgrade and Tsetigne (Cetinje). In vain Prince Gorchakov endeavoured to conciliate Austria and to extract from Count Andrássy a clear statement of the terms he would accept. Count Andrássy was in no hurry to extricate Russia from her difficulties, and suggested that the whole question should be submitted to a European congress. The suggestion was endorsed by Great Britain, which likewise objected to the San Stefano arrangements, and Bismarck declined to bring any pressure to bear on the cabinet of Vienna.

Deceived in her expectations of active support from her two allies, Russia found herself in an awkward position. From a military point of view it was absolutely necessary for her to come to an arrangement either with Austria or with England, because the communications of her army before Constantinople with its base could be cut by these two powers acting in concert—the land route being dominated by Austria, and the Black Sea route by the British fleet, which was at that time anchored in the Sea of Marmora. As soon, therefore, as the efforts to obtain the support of her two allies against the demands of England had failed, negotiations were opened in London, and on the 30th of May a secret convention was signed by Lord Salisbury and Count Schuvalov. By that agreement the obstacles to the assembling of the congress were removed. The Berlin Congress. congress met in Berlin on the 13th of June, and after many prolonged sittings and much secret negotiation the treaty of Berlin was signed on the 13th of July. By that treaty the preliminary peace of San Stefano was considerably modified. The big Bulgaria defined by General Ignatiev was divided into three portions, the part between the Danube and the Balkans being transformed into a vassal principality, the part between the Balkans and the Rhodope being made into an autonomous province, called Eastern Rumelia, under a Christian governor named by the sultan with the assent of the powers, and the remainder being placed again under the direct rule of the Porte. The independence of Montenegro, Servia and Rumania was formally recognized, and each of these principalities received a considerable accession of territory. Rumania, however. in return for the Dobrudja, which it professed not to desire, was obliged to give back to Russia the portion of Bessarabia ceded after the Crimean War. In Asia Minor Russia agreed to confine her annexations to the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, and to restore to Turkey the remainder of the occupied territory. As a set-off against the large acquisitions of the Slav races, the powers recommended that the sultan should cede to the kingdom of Greece the greater part of Thessaly and Epirus, under the form of a rectification of frontiers. At first the sultan refused to act on this recommendation, but in March 1881 a compromise was effected by which Greece obtained Thessaly without Epirus. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, and the Austrian authorities were to have the right of making roads and keeping garrisons in the district of Novi-Bazar, which lies between Servia and Montenegro. In all the provinces of European Turkey for which special arrangements were not made in the treaty, the Porte undertook (Art. 23) to introduce organic statutes similar to that of Crete, adapted to the local conditions. This article, like many of the subordinate stipulations of the treaty, remained a dead letter. We may mention specially Art. 61, in which the Sublime Porte undertook to realize without delay the ameliorations and reforms required in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their safety against the Circassians and Kurds. Equally unreliable proved the scheme of Lord Beaconsfield to secure good administration throughout the whole of Asia Minor by the introduction of reforms under British control, and to prevent the further expansion of Russia Cyprus Convention. in that direction by a defensive alliance with the Porte. A convention to that effect was duly signed at Constantinople a few days before the meeting of the congress (4th June 1878), but the only part of it which was actually realized was the occupation and administration of Cyprus by the British government. The new frontiers stipulated in the treaty of San Stefano, and subsequently rectified by the treaty of Berlin, are shown in the accompanying sketch-map.

The secret schemes of Russia and Austria, in so far as they were defined in the agreement of Reichstadt and the subsequent Austro-Russian treaty of Vienna, had thus been realized. Russia had recovered the lost portion of Bessarabia, and Austria had practically annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the nominal suzerainty of the sultan over the two provinces was maintained. But Russia was far from satisfied with the results, which seemed to her not at all commensurate with the sacrifices imposed on her by the war, and her dissatisfaction led to a new grouping of the powers. Before the opening of the Berlin congress Bismarck had announced publicly that he would refrain from taking sides with any of the contending parties, and would confine himself to playing the part of an honest broker. The announcement was received by the Russians with astonishment and indignation. What they expected was not an impartial arbiter, but a cordial and useful friend in need. In 1871 the emperor William, as we have seen, had spontaneously declared to the tsar that Germany owed to His Majesty the happy issue of the war, and that she would never forget it, and we may add that on that occasion he signed himself “Your ever grateful Friend.” Now, in 1878, when the moment had come for paying at least an instalment of this debt, and when Russia was being compelled to make concessions which she described as incompatible with her dignity, Bismarck had nothing better to offer than honest brokerage. The indignation in all classes Russian resentment against Bismarck. was intense, and the views commonly held regarding Bismarck’s “duplicity” and “treachery” were supposed to receive ample confirmation during the sittings of the congress and the following six months. On the 4th of February 1879 Prince Gorchakov wrote to the ambassador in Vienna: “Needless to say, that in our eyes the Three Emperors’ Alliance is practically torn in pieces by the conduct of our two allies. At present it remains for us merely to terminate the liquidation of the past, and to seek henceforth support in ourselves alone.” The same view of the situation was taken in Berlin and Vienna, though the result was attributed, of course, to different causes, and the danger of serious complications became so great that Bismarck concluded with Andrássy in the following October (1879) a formal defensive alliance, which was avowedly directed against Russia, and which subsequently developed into the Triple Alliance, directed against Russia and France.