Exchange in relation to money affairs denotes a species of barter not of goods but of the value of goods, a payment in one place being exchanged for a payment in another place. The popular statement of the theory of exchange represents four principals involved in two transactions. A and B are two persons residing in one place different from the domicile of C and D; A sells goods to C; B buys goods from D; A sells his claim on C to B, who remits it to D in satisfaction of his debt, and D receives the cash from C, so that, assuming the two transactions to be of equal value, one piece of paper satisfies the four parties to these two transactions, and the trouble, expense and risk of sending money from both places are avoided. The piece of paper which performs the service may be a telegraphic order, cheque or bill of exchange. In this elementary proposition there would be no difficulty of exchange, as the full value of A’s claim on C would be paid for by B, who is under the necessity of sending in exactly similar amount of money to D; but it can be seen that in actual practice the claims of one place on another place would not be exactly balanced by the necessities of the one place to meet obligations in the other place; thus arises the complication of exchange, which may best be described as the price of monetary claims on distant debtors.
Supposing, for example, that A in London had a claim on C in Edinburgh amounting to £100, and that B in London did not require to remit more than £90 to D in Edinburgh, it is evident that B in London must be offered some inducement to take over the whole of A’s claim. B might give A £99:19:0, and could then, after satisfying his debt to D, have £10 to his credit in Edinburgh, which he could retain there at interest until he had incurred further liability to D, or he could have the balance of £10 returned him in coin at an expense, say, of sixpence; this would leave B with a profit of sixpence on the transaction, and, assuming that these figures are reasonable, exchange on Edinburgh in London would be one shilling discount per £100. Supposing the necessities of B induced him to offer A only £99 : 14 : 0 for his £100 claim, A would then prefer that C remitted him £100 in coin, which, on the above scale of expenses would cost 5s. and A would receive £99 : 15 : 0 net. On these premises, exchange on Edinburgh in London cannot fall below ¼% discount, and the same circumstances prevent it from rising above ¼% premium, for B, in no case, would pay more for A’s claim than £100 plus the cost of sending coin to Scotland. If this basis is appreciated, all exchange problems between different countries can be mastered, and the quotations in the daily papers of cable payments, sight drafts (cheques) and long bills are then understood and supply an interesting indication of the state of international financial relations. As shown above, the balance of indebtedness must eventually be remitted by coin, and consequently when exchange in any city is quoted at one or other of the limit points given in our example as ¼% discount or ¼% premium, this exchange immediately acquires a very serious importance, because with the development of modern monetary systems under which enormous trade is carried on with a most moderate foundation of actual coin the weakening or strengthening of that foundation is a very vital matter.
While the understanding of the theory is essential for any facile interpretation of an exchange, there are of course innumerable details of practice which require to be known to identify the limit points of exchange in any particular city. The limit points can only be taken advantage of by banking experts, and, although we assume a trader remitting his indebtedness in coin when he is asked to pay too high a price for his bill of exchange, in actual affairs the banker will supply the cheque or bill and himself will do the professional business of sending away bullion. Similarly, we have represented one trader drawing on another trader and selling his draft to a third trader who remits the draft to a fourth. In actual practice, however, No. 1 draws on No. 2 and disposes of his draft to a banker; No. 4 draws on No. 3 and sells his draft to a banker; because, speaking generally, whenever goods are shipped, the shipper immediately requires his money; he draws a bill against the goods, and it is the function of a banker to help, as a sort of debt-collecting agency, by buying these drafts; and the bank, being a mart for all forms of remittance, gets an immense variety of demand for cable payments, cheques and bills on all centres. This does not affect the theory, for it must be remembered that the banker is a necessary link between the buyer and seller of exchange, because the seller can only sell what he has and the buyer must have exactly what he wants.
To return to the question of limit points: if a universal currency system existed, with the same monetary standard that is used in England, and the coinage kept in a proper condition of weight and fineness, and the coin readily supplied to meet every reasonable claim—if, in fact, the pound sterling were the prevalent coin and the English banking system obtained everywhere, then we should find all exchange quotations as simple as our case of London and Edinburgh, that is to say, all exchanges would be quoted at par or a premium or a discount. The limit points in any place of the exchange on London would represent simply and obviously the cost of the transmission of the coin. These limit points would vary at each place according to the distance from London, the cost of freight, the risk involved in the transmission and the local rate of interest. On the continent of Europe some advance has been made in the direction of a universal coinage. Countries subscribing to the Latin Union have agreed on the franc as a common unit, and Belgium, Switzerland, France and Italy quote exchange between themselves at a premium or discount. Greece, Spain and other countries are also parties to the arrangement, but their currencies are in a bad state, and the exchange quotations involve a considerable element of speculation. We have, however, to deal with another factor in international finance, namely, the enormous variety of currency systems; and we have then to discover, in each case, the exchange which represents par and corresponds to our £100 for £100 in the London-Edinburgh example. The United States furnishes perhaps the easiest problem, and we must find out how many dollars in gold contain exactly the same amount of the precious metal as is contained in one hundred sovereigns. The answer is 4865⁄8, and the arithmetic is a question of the mint laws of the two countries. Gold coin in the United States contains one-tenth alloy and in England one-twelfth alloy. Ten dollars contain 258 grains of gold, nine-tenths fine. One pound contains 123.274 grains of gold, eleven-twelfths fine, consequently £100 is worth $4865⁄8, or, to be exact, $4862⁄3, and when cable payments between London and New York are quoted at 4.865⁄8 for the £1 sterling, exchange is about par. As a cable payment is an immediate transfer from one city to another, no question of interest or other charge is involved. Owing to the cost of sending gold as detailed above, the New York cable exchange varies from about 4.84 to 4.89½; at the former point gold leaves London for New York, and at the latter point gold comes to England. Besides insurance, freight, packing, commission and interest, there must also be considered the circumstance that coin taken in bulk is always a little worn and under full weight, and in the process of turning sovereigns into dollars, the result would not bear out the calculation based on the mint regulations: consequently, when taking gold from London, the demand would first fall on the raw metal as received from South Africa or Australia to be minted in the United States, then on any stock of American coin the Bank of England might have and be willing to sell by weight (which would be accounted by tale in New York), and lastly the demand would be satisfied by sovereigns taken by tale from the Bank of England and converted by weight in America.
The instance of the American quotation may be further taken to explain some of the numerous points which the study of the exchange involves. In the first place, it will be noted that we have quoted the price in dollars. In London, business in bills, &c. , on New York is quoted either in pence or in dollars, that is to say, payments are negotiated for so many dollars either at 493⁄16 pence per dollar, or at the equivalent rate $4.88 for the pound. In practice it is much more convenient to quote in London in the money of the foreign country, as it makes comparison with the foreign rate on London very simple. Some foreign countries quote exchange on London in pence, and then, of course, in relation to those countries the same practice will obtain in England, but the majority of the exchange quotations on London are in francs, marks, gulden, lire, kronen or other foreign money. Another point which must be explained is the reason why exchange varies between what we have called the limit points; why there is sometimes so much demand for bills on London and why at other times so many bills are being offered. Similar causes operate on other exchanges, and if we develop the New York case we shall provide explanations for exchange movements in other countries.
At one time the financial relations between England and America were as follows. England was the principal creditor of the United States, and the latter country had to remit continually very large amounts in payment of interest on English money and profits on English investments, in payment for shipping freights, for banking commissions, insurance premiums and an immense variety of services, besides paying for the large imports which crossed the Atlantic from English ports. In the fall of the year these payments would be more than offset by the enormous exports of food-stuffs, cotton, tobacco, &c. , so that during the first half of the year exchange would be at or about the limit of 4.89½ and gold would have to be sent from New York to supplement the deficient quantity of bills. In the autumn the produce bills would flood the exchange market and gold would be sent from London as exchange got to the other limit point of 4.84. These conditions are still very potent, but latterly another element has entered into the position, and the new development is so powerful as to reverse sometimes what we may call the natural and legitimate movement in the exchange. This new element is the more intimate banking and financial relationship which has been established between the two countries. As American conditions have become more stable, with better security for capital and an assured feeling about the currency of the United States, bankers in London have gladly allowed their banking friends in New York and other large cities to draw bills on London whenever there was a good demand for sterling remittances. We have, therefore, to consider a fresh type of bill of which the drawer has no claim on the drawee, but, on the other hand, incurs a debt to the drawee. To take a very usual method, a banker in Wall Street, New York, will advance money to stockbrokers, investors and speculators against bonds and shares with a 20% margin. He deposits this security with a trust company in New York which acts both for the American and English banker. The Wall Street banker then draws a bill at 60 days’ sight or 90 days’ sight on the banker in Lombard Street and sells this draft to supply the money he lends the stockbroker. Two or three months hence the New York banker must send money to London with which to meet the bill, so that, whereas, in the case of a commercial bill, the produce is despatched and in due course the consignee must find the money for the bill, in the case of a finance bill, as it is called, the bill is drawn and in due course the drawer must send the value with which it is to be honoured. In any event the acceptor, the London banker, has to pay the bill, so that it will be easily understood that relations of the greatest confidence are necessary between the drawer and drawee before finance bills of this class can be created.
The profit arising from the transaction we have sketched is realized by the separate parties in this way. The New York banker lends money for three months, say, at 5% per annum, he pays a commission of 1⁄32% to the trust company which has custody of the security, a charge equivalent to 1/8% interest per annum. He draws on London at 90 days’ sight and sells the bill at 4.835⁄8, the cable rate being 4.87¾, the buyer of a three months’ bill making the allowance for the English bill stamp of ½ per mille and the London discount rate of 3%. The drawer of the bill must also pay a commission of 3⁄16% to the London banker who accepts the draft; this is equivalent to another ¾% per annum in the rate of discount, so that money raised in this way costs 1⁄8% for the trust company, 3% the London discount rate, about ¼% for bill stamps, and ¾% for London commission—altogether, 41⁄8%; and, as the money is loaned at 5%, there appears to be 7⁄8% profit to the drawer of the bill. This, however, is on the assumption that the cable rate is still 4.87¾ when the bill falls due for payment and that the drawer would have to pay that price to telegraph the money to meet the draft. But exchange on London can go up or down between 4.84 and 4.89½, and if at the end of the three months the cable rate is 4.84 the New York banker will be able to cover his bill at almost the same rate at which he sold it and will only be out of pocket to the extent of the commissions and stamps, so that the accommodation will only cost him 1½% and his profit will be 3½%. If he has to pay more than 4.87¾ for his cable at the maturity of the bill his profit will be less than 7⁄8%, and he may even be a loser on the transaction.
It is obvious, then, that a high rate of interest in New York, with a high rate of exchange on London and a low rate of discount in England, would induce the creation of these finance bills. The supply of these bills would prevent New York exchange reaching the limit point at which gold leaves the United States, and the maturity of these bills in the autumn would ensure a demand for the produce bills and possibly prevent exchange from falling to the other limit point at which London has to send gold to New York.
We have pointed out the essential difference between these finance bills and what we have called produce bills, but there is another very striking difference, that of the question of supply. These finance bills are obviously very difficult to limit in their amounts; produce bills are, of course, limited by the extent of the surplus crops of the United States and by the demand for the produce in Europe, but so long as it is mutually satisfactory to the big finance houses in both countries to draw on credit granted in London, so long may these accommodation bills be created, and the pressure of the bills in New York may depress exchange so much that gold leaves London at a time when it is required in other directions. In such a case the embarrassment caused by this artificial drain of the gold reserve would much more than offset the amount of the commission earned by the accepting houses. The Bank of England may have to raise its rate of discount at the expense of the entire home trade; probably, also, with the rise in the value of money, consequent on the diminished resources, all investment securities fall in value and more onerous terms must be submitted to by the government, corporations and colonies, in the issue of any loans they may require. It will, therefore, be appreciated that, although these finance bills may be perfectly safe, their excessive creation is viewed with great disfavour, and considerable apprehension is felt when the adventures of speculators in New York make great demands for loans against stocks and shares, and, through the instrumentality of these finance bills, shift the burden on to the shoulders of the London discount market. The effect of this is to level money rates as between New York and London, and in the process the pressure falls on London and the relief goes to America. Eventually, of course, the bills must be met and funds sent for that purpose from across the Atlantic, but in the meanwhile the disturbance of the gold supply is an inconvenience.
We have explained the process of employing credits granted in London to finance Wall Street; there are, also, many other types of bill to which the acceptor lends his name on the assurance that he will in due course be supplied with the funds required to meet the acceptance. In the case of the produce bills, a London banker will accept the bills in order that they may be more easily marketable than if they were drawn direct on the actual consignee of the cotton, tobacco or wheat. The consignees in Liverpool, &c. , pay a commission for this assistance and reimburse the London bank as the produce is gradually disposed of. The transaction appears slightly more complicated when English bankers accept bills for produce shipped from the United States to merchants living in Hamburg, Genoa, Singapore and all other great ports, but the principle is the same, and the influence of such business on the exchange affects, in the first instance, the quotation between America and London, but afterwards, when money must be sent to London with which to honour the bills, the exchanges with Germany, Italy or the Straits Settlements bear their share in the eventual adjustment, the spinners, tobacco manufacturers and corn factors requiring drafts on London where so much of the trade of the world is financed.