One of the reasons that induced the subject populations to accept with pleasure the establishment of the Empire was the improvement in financial treatment that it secured. The corrupt and uneconomical method of farming out the collection of the revenue was, to a great extent, replaced by collection through the officials of the imperial household. The earlier Roman treasury (aerarium) was formally retained for the receipt of revenue from the senatorial provinces, but the officials were appointed by the Princeps and became gradually mere municipal officers. The real centre of finance was the fiscus or imperial treasury, which was under the exclusive control of the ruler (“res fiscales,” says Ulpian, “quasi propriae et privatae principis sunt”), and was administered by officials of his household. Under the Republic the Senate had been the financial authority, with the Censors as finance ministers and the Quaestors as secretaries of the treasury. Never very precise, this system in the 1st century B.C. fell into extreme decay. By means of his freedmen the emperor introduced the more rigorous economy of the Roman household into public finance. The census as a method of valuation was revived; the important and productive land taxes were placed on a more definite footing; while, above all, the substitution of direct collection by state officials for the letting out by auction of the tax-collection to the companies of publicani was made general. Thus some of the most valuable lessons as to the normal evolution of a system of finance are to be learned in this connexion. Of equal, or even greater moment is the failure of the administrative reforms of the Empire to secure lasting improvement, a result due to the absence of constitutional guarantees. The close relation between finance and general policy is most impressively illustrated in this failure of benevolent autocracy.
Viewed broadly, the financial resources of the earlier Empire were obtained from (1) the public land alike of the state and the Princeps; (2) the monopolies, principally of minerals; (3) the land tax; (4) the customs; (5) the taxes on inheritances, on sales and on the purchase of slaves (vectigalia). One result of the establishment of the Principate was the consolidation of the public domain. The old “public land” in Italy had nearly disappeared; but the royal possessions in the conquered provinces and the private properties of the emperor became ultimately a part of the property of the Fiscus. Such land was let either on five-year leases or in perpetuity to coloni. Mines were also taken over for public use and worked by slaves or, in later times, by convict labour. The tendency towards state monopoly became more marked in the closing days of the Empire, the 4th and 5th centuries A.D. Perhaps the most comprehensive of the fiscal reforms of the Empire was the reconstruction of the land tax, based on a census or (to use the French term) cadastre, in which the area, the modes of cultivation and the estimated productiveness of each holding were stated, the average of ten preceding years being taken as the standard. After the reconstruction under Diocletian at the end of the 3rd century A.D., fifteen years (the indictio)—though probably used as early as the time of Hadrian—was recognized as the period for revaluation. With the growing needs of the state this taxation became more rigorous and was one of the great grievances of the population, especially of the sections that were declining in status and passing into the condition of villenage. The portoria, or customs, received a better organization, though the varying rates for different provinces continued. By degrees the older maximum of 5% was exceeded, until in the 4th century 12½% was in some cases levied. Even at this higher rate the facilities for trade were greater than in medieval or (until the revolution in transport) modern times. In spite of certain prejudices against the import of luxuries and the export of gold, there is little indication of the influence of mercantilist or protectionist ideas. The nearest approach to excise was the duty of 1% on all sales, a tax that in Gibbon’s words “has ever been the occasion of clamour and discontent.” The higher charge of 4% on the purchase of slaves, and the still heavier 5% on successions after death, were likewise established at the beginning of the Empire and specially applied to the full citizens. Escheats and lapsed legacies (caduca) were further miscellaneous sources of gain to the state.
Taken as a whole, the financial system of Imperial Rome shows a very high elaboration in form. The patrimonium, the tributa and the vectigalia are divisions parallel to the domaine, the contributions directes and the contributions indirectes of modern French administration; or the English “non-tax” revenue, inland revenue and “customs and excise.” The careful regulations given in the Codes and the Digest show the observance of technical conditions as to assessment and accounting. In substance and spirit, however, Roman finance was essentially backward. Without altogether accepting Merivale’s judgment that “their principles of finance were to the last rude and unphilosophical,” it may be granted that Roman statesmen never seriously faced the questions of just distribution and maximum productiveness in the tax system. Still less did they perceive the connexion between these two aspects of finance. Mechanical uniformity and minute regulation are inadequate substitutes for observance of the canons of equality, certainty and economy in the operation of the tax system. Whether (as has been suggested) an Adam Smith in power could have saved the Empire is doubtful; but he would certainly have remodelled its finance. The most glaring fault was plainly the undue and increasing pressure on the productive classes. Each century saw heavier burdens imposed on the actual workers and on their employers, while expenditure was chiefly devoted to unproductive purposes. The distribution was also unfair as between the different territorial divisions. The capital and certain provincial towns were favoured at the expense of the provinces and the country districts. Again, the cost of collection, though less than under the farming-out system, was far too great. Some alleviation was indeed obtained by the apportionment of contributions amongst the districts liable, leaving to the community to decide as it thought best between its members. The allotment of the land-tax to units (juga) of equal value whatever might be the area, was a contrivance similar in character.
The gradual way in which the several provinces were brought under the general tax system, and the equally gradual extension of Roman citizenship, account further for the irregularity and increased weight of the taxes; as the absence of publicity and the growth of autocracy explain the sense of oppression and the hopelessness of resistance so vividly indicated in the literature of the later Empire. Exemptions at first granted to the citizens were removed, while the cost of local government which continually increased was placed on the middle-class of the towns as represented by the decuriones, or members of the municipalities.
The fact that no ingenuity of modern research has been able to construct a real budget of expenditure and receipt for any part of the long centuries of the Empire is significant as to the secrecy that surrounded the finances, especially in the later period. For at the beginning of the principate Augustus seems to have aimed at a complete estimate of the financial situation, though this may be regarded as due to the influence of the freer republican traditions which the reverence that soon attached to the emperor’s dignity completely extinguished.
In addition to its value as illustrating the difficulties and defects that beset the development of a complex financial organization from the simpler forms of the city and the province, Roman finance is of special importance in consequence of its place as supplying a model or rather a guide for the administration of the states that arose on its ruins. The barbarian invaders, though they were accustomed to contributions to their chiefs and to the payment of commodities as tributes or as penalties, had no acquaintance with the working of a regular system of taxation. The more astute rulers utilized the machinery that they inherited from the Roman government. Under the Franks the land tax and the provincial customs continued as forms of revenue, while beside them the gifts and court fees of Teutonic origin took their place. Similar conditions appear in Theodoric’s administration of Italy. The maintenance of Roman forms and terms is prominent in fiscal administration. But institutions that have lost their life and animating spirit can hardly be preserved for any length of time. All over western Europe the elaborate devices of the census and the stations for the collection of customs crumbled away; taxation as such disappeared, through the hostility of the clergy and the exemptions accorded to powerful subjects. This process of disintegration spread out over centuries. The efforts made from time to time by vigorous rulers to enforce the charges that remained legally due, proved quite ineffectual to restore the older fiscal system. The final result was a complete transformation of the ingredients of revenue. The character of the change may be best indicated as a substitution of private claims for public rights. Thus, the land-tax disappears in the 7th century and only comes into notice in the 9th century in the shape of private customary dues. The customs duties become the tolls and transit charges levied by local potentates on the diminishing trade of the earlier middle ages. This revolution is in accordance with—indeed it is one side of—the movement towards feudalism which was the great feature of this period. Finance is essentially a part of public law and administration. It could, therefore, hold no prominent place in a condition of society which hardly recognized the state, as distinct from the members of the community, united by feudal ties. The same conception may be expressed in another way, viz. by the statement that the kingdoms which succeeded the Roman Empire were organized on the patrimonial basis (i.e. the revenues passed into the hands of the king or, rather, his domestic officials), and thus in fact returned to the condition of pre-classical times. Notwithstanding the differing features in the several countries, retrogression is the common characteristic of European history from the 5th to the 10th century, and it was from the ruder state that this decline created that the rebuilding of social and political organization had to be accomplished. On the financial side the work, as already suggested, was aided by the ideas and institutions inherited from the Roman Empire. This influence was common to all the continental states and indirectly was felt even in England. Each of the great realms has, however, worked out its financial system on lines suitable to its own particular conditions, which are best considered in connexion with the separate national histories.
Running through the different national systems there are some common elements the result not of inheritance merely but still more of necessity, or at the lowest of similarity in environment. Over and above the details of financial development there is a thread of connexion which requires treatment under Finance taken as a whole. As the great aim of this side of public activity is to secure funds for the maintenance of the state’s life and working, the administration which operates for this end is the true nucleus of all national finance. The first sign of revival from the catastrophe of the invasions is the reorganization of the Imperial household under Charlemagne with the intention of establishing a more exact collection of revenue. The later German empire of Otto and the Frederics; the French Capetian monarchy and, in a somewhat different sphere, the medieval Italian and German cities show the same movement. The treasury is the centre towards which the special receipts of the ruler or rulers should be brought, and from it the public wants should be supplied. Feudalism, as the antithesis of this orderly treatment, had to be overthrown before national finance could become established. The development can be traced in the financial history of England, France and the German states; but the advance in the French financial organization of the 15th and 16th centuries affords the best illustration. The gradual unification operates on all the branches of finance,—expenditure, revenue, debt and methods of control. In respect to the first head there is a well-marked “integration” of the modes for meeting the cost of the public services. What were semi-private duties become public tasks, which, with the growing importance of “money-economy,” have to be defrayed by state payments. Thus, the creation of the standing army in France by Charles VII. marks a financial change of the first order. The English navy, though more gradually developed, is an equally good illustration of the movement. All outlay by the state is brought into due co-ordination, and it becomes possible for constitutional government to supervise and direct it. This improvement, due to English initiative, has been adopted amongst the essential forms of financial administration on the continent. The immense importance of this view of public expenditure as representing the consumption of the state in its unified condition is obvious; it has affected, for the most part unconsciously, the conception of all modern peoples as to the functions of the state and the right of the people to direct them.
On the side of receipts a similar unifying process has been accomplished. The almost universal separation between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” receipts, taxation being put under the latter head, has completely ceased. It was, however, the fundamental division for the early French writers on finance, and it survives for England as late as Blackstone’s Commentaries. The idea that the ruler possessed a normal income in certain rents and dues of a quasi-private character, which on emergency he might supplement by calls on the revenues of his subjects, was a bequest of feudalism which gave way before the increasing power of the state. In order to meet the unified public wants, an equally unified public fund was requisite. The great economic changes which depreciated the value of the king’s domain contributed towards the result. Only by well-adjusted taxation was it possible to meet the public necessities. In respect to taxation also there has been a like course of readjustment. Separate charges, assigned for distinct purposes, have been taken into the national exchequer and come to form a part of the general revenue. There has been—taking long periods—a steady absorption of special taxes into more general categories. The replacement of the four direct taxes by the income tax in France, as proposed in 1909, is a very recent example. Equally important is the growth of “direct” taxation. As tax contributions have taken the places of the revenue from land and fees, so, it would seem, are the taxes on commodities likely to be replaced or at least exceeded by the imposts levied on income as such, in the shape either of income taxes proper or of charges on accumulated wealth. The recent history of the several financial systems of the world is decisive on this point. A clearer perception of the conditions under which the effective attainment of revenue is possible is another outcome of financial development. Security, and in particular the absence of arbitrary impositions, combined with convenient modes of collection, have come to be recognized as indispensable auxiliaries in financial administration which further aims at the selection of really productive forms of charge. Unproductiveness is, according to modern standard, the cardinal fault of any particular tax. How great has been the progress in these aspects is best illustrated in the case of English finance, but both French and German fiscal history can supply many instructive examples.
In a third direction the co-ordination of finance has been just as remarkable. Financial adjustment implies the conception of a balance, and this should be found in the relation of outlay and income. Under the pressure of war and other emergencies it has been found impossible to maintain this desirable equilibrium. But the use of the system of credit, and the general establishment of constitutional government, have enabled the difficulty to be surmounted by the creation on a vast scale of national debts. Apart from the special problems that this system of borrowing raises, there is the general one of its aid in making national finance continuous and orderly. Deficits can be transferred to the capital account, and the country’s resources employed most usefully by repaying liabilities contracted in times of extreme need. The growth of this department, parallel with the general progress of finance, is significant of its function.