In the absence of all resistance, the III. army now proceeded to carry out the original programme of marches laid down in Moltke’s memorandum of the 6th of May, and marching on a broad front through a fertile district it reached the line of the Moselle in excellent order about the 17th of August, where it halted to await the result of the great battle of Gravelotte-St Privat.
We return now to the I. army at Saarbrücken. Its position on the morning of the 7th of August gave cause for the gravest anxiety. At daylight a dense fog lay over the country, and through the mist sounds of heavy firing came Movements on the Saar. from the direction of Forbach, where French stragglers had rallied during the night. The confusion on the battlefield was appalling, and the troops in no condition to go forward. Except the 3rd, 5th and 6th cavalry divisions no closed troops were within a day’s march; hence Steinmetz decided to spend the day in reorganizing his infantry, under cover of his available cavalry. But the German cavalry and staff were quite new to their task. The 6th cavalry division, which had bivouacked on the battlefield, sent on only one brigade towards Forbach, retaining the remainder in reserve. The 5th, thinking that the 6th had already undertaken all that was necessary, withdrew behind the Saar, and the 3rd, also behind the Saar, reported that the country in its front was unsuited to cavalry movements, and only sent out a few officers’ patrols. These were well led, but were too few in number, and their reports were consequently unconvincing.
In the course of the day Steinmetz became very uneasy, and ultimately he decided to concentrate his army by retiring the VII. and VIII. corps behind the river on to the I. (which had arrived near Saarlouis), thus clearing the Saarbrücken-Metz road for the use of the II. army. But at this moment Prince Frederick Charles suddenly modified his views. During the 6th of August his scouts had reported considerable French forces near Bitche (these were the 5th, de Failly’s corps), and early in the morning of the 7th he received a telegram from Moltke informing him that MacMahon’s beaten army was retreating on the same place (the troops observed were in fact those which had marched to MacMahon’s assistance). The prince forthwith deflected the march of the Guards, IV. and X. corps, towards Rohrbach, whilst the IX. and XII. closed up to supporting distance behind them. Thus, as Steinmetz moved away to the west and north, Frederick Charles was diverging to the south and east, and a great gap was opening in the very centre of the German front. This was closed only by the III. corps, still on the battle-field, and by portions of the X. near Saargemünd,[2] whilst within striking distance lay 130,000 French troops, prevented only by the incapacity of their chiefs from delivering a decisive counter-stroke.
Fortunately for the Prussians, Moltke at Mainz took a different view. Receiving absolutely no intelligence from the front during the 7th, he telegraphed orders to the I. and II. armies (10.25 P.M.) to halt on the 8th, and impressed on Steinmetz the necessity of employing his cavalry to clear up the situation. The I. army had already begun the marches ordered by Steinmetz. It was now led back practically to its old bivouacs amongst the unburied dead. Prince Frederick Charles only conformed to Moltke’s order with the III. and X. corps; the remainder executed their concentration towards the south and east.
During the night of the 7th of August Moltke decided that the French army must be in retreat towards the Moselle and forthwith busied himself with the preparation of fresh tables of march for the two armies, his object being to swing up the left wing to outflank the enemy from the south. This work, and the transfer of headquarters to Homburg, needed time, hence no fresh orders were issued to either army, and neither commander would incur the responsibility of moving without any. The I. army therefore spent a fourth night in bivouac on the battlefield. But Constantin von Alvensleben, commanding the III. corps, a man of very different stamp from his colleagues, hearing at first hand that the French had evacuated St Avold, set his corps in motion early in the morning of the 10th August down the St Avold-Metz road, reached St Avold and obtained conclusive evidence that the French were retreating.
During the 9th the orders for the advance to the Moselle were issued. These were based, not on an exact knowledge of where the French army actually stood, but on the opinion Advance to the Moselle. Moltke had formed as to where it ought to have been on military grounds solely, overlooking the fact that the French staff were not free to form military decisions but were compelled to bow to political expediency.
Actually on the 7th of August the emperor had decided to attack the Germans on the 8th with the whole Rhine Army, but this decision was upset by alarmist reports from the beaten army of MacMahon. He then decided to retreat to the Moselle, as Moltke had foreseen, and there to draw to himself the remnants of MacMahon’s army (now near Lunéville). At the same time he assigned the executive command over the whole Rhine Army to Marshal Bazaine. This retreat was begun during the course of the 8th and 9th of August; but on the night of the 9th urgent telegrams from Paris induced the emperor to suspend the movement, and during the 10th the whole army took up a strong position on the French Nied.
Meanwhile the II. German army had received its orders to march in a line of army corps on a broad front in the general direction of Pont-à-Mousson, well to the south of Metz. The I. army was to follow by short marches in échelon on the right; only the III. corps was directed on Falkenberg, a day’s march farther towards Metz along the St Avold-Metz road. The movement was begun on the 10th, and towards evening the French army was located on the right front of the III. corps. This entirely upset Moltke’s hypothesis, and called for a complete modification of his plans, as the III. corps alone could not be expected to resist the impact of Bazaine’s five corps. The III. corps therefore received orders to stand fast for the moment, and the remainder of the II. army was instructed to wheel to the right and concentrate for a great battle to the east of Metz on the 16th or 17th.
Before, however, these orders had been received the sudden retreat of the French completely changed the situation. The Germans therefore continued their movement towards the Moselle. On the 13th the French took up a fresh position 5 m. to the east of Metz, where they were located by the cavalry and the advanced guards of the I. army.
Again Moltke ordered the I. army to observe and hold the enemy, whilst the II. was to swing round to the north. The cavalry was to scout beyond the Moselle and intercept all communication with the heart of France (see Metz). Battle of Colombey-Borny. By this time the whole German army had imbibed the idea that the French were in full retreat and endeavouring to evade a decisive struggle. When therefore during the morning of the 14th their outposts observed signs of retreat in the French position, their impatience could no longer be restrained; as at Wörth and Spicheren, an outpost commander brought up his guns, and at the sound of their fire, every unit within reach spontaneously got under arms (battle of Colombey-Borny). In a short time, with or without orders, the I., VII., VIII. and IX. corps were in full march to the battle-field. But the French too turned back to fight, and an obstinate engagement ensued, at the close of which the Germans barely held the ground and the French withdrew under cover of the Metz forts.