A good example of a grain warehouse on the combined silo bin and floor storage system is afforded by the granary at Mannheim on the Rhine, which has the storage capacity of 2100 tons. The building is 370 ft. in length, 78 ft. wide and Mannheim. 78 ft. high, and by means of transverse walls it is divided into three sections; of these one contains silos, in another section grain is stored on open floors, while the third, which is situated between the other two, is the grain-cleaning department. This granary stands by the quay side, and a ship elevator of great capacity, which serves the cleaning department, can rapidly clear any ship or barge beneath. The central or screening house section contains machinery specially designed for cleaning barley as well as wheat. The barley plant has a capacity of 5 tons per hour. There are four main elevators in this warehouse, while two more serve the screen house. The usual band conveyors fitted with throw-off carriages are provided, and are supplemented by an elaborate system of pipes which receive grain from the elevators and bands and distribute it at any required point. The plant is operated by electric motors. If desired the floors of the non-silo section can be utilized for storing other goods than grain, and to this end a lift with a capacity of 1 ton runs from the basement to the top storey. The combined capacity of the elevators and conveyors is 100 tons of grain per hour. The mechanical equipment is so complete that four distinct operations are claimed as possible. A ship may be unloaded into silos or into the granary floors, and may simultaneously be loaded either from silos or floors with different kinds of grain. Again, a cargo may be discharged either into silos or upon the floors, and simultaneously the grain may be cleaned. Grain may also be cleared from a vessel, mixed with other grain already received, and then distributed to any desired point. With equal facility grain may be cleaned, blended with other varieties, re-stored in any section of the granary, and transferred from one ship to another.
A granary with special features of interest, erected on the quay at Dortmund, Germany, by a co-operative society, is built of brick on a base of hewn stone, with beams and supports of timber. It is 78 ft. high and consists of seven floors, Dortmund. including basement and attic. Here again there are two sections, the larger being devoted to the storage of grain in low bins, while the smaller section consists of an ordinary silo house. Grain in sacks may be stored in the basement of the larger section which has a capacity of 1675 tons as compared with 825 tons in the silo department. Thus the total storage capacity is 2500 tons. In the silo house the bins, constructed of planks nailed one over the other, are of varying size and are capable of storing grain to a depth of 42 to 47 ft. Some of the bins have been specially adapted for receiving damp grain by being provided internally with transverse wooden arms which form square or lozenge-shaped sections. The object of this arrangement is to break up and aerate the stored grain. The arms are of triangular section and are slightly hollowed at the base so as to bring a current of air into direct contact with the grain. The air can be warmed if necessary. The other and larger section of the granary is provided with 105 bins of moderate height arranged in groups of 21 on the five floors between the basement and attic. On the intermediate floors and the bottom floor each bin lies exactly under the bin above. Grain is not stored in these bins to a greater depth than 5 ft. The bins are fitted with removable side walls, and damp grain is only stored in certain bins aerated for half the area of their side walls through a wire mesh. The arrangements for distributing grain in this warehouse are very complete. The uncleaned grain is taken by the receiving elevator, with a lifting capacity of 20 tons per hour, to a warehouse separator, whence it is passed through an automatic weigher and is then either sacked or spouted to the main elevator (capacity 25 tons per hour) and elevated to the attic. From the head of this main elevator the grain can either be fed to a bin in one or other of the main granary floors, or shot to one of the bins in the silo house. In the attic the grain is carried by a spout and belt conveyor to one or other of the turntables, as the appliances may be termed, which serve to distribute through spouts the grain to any one of the floor or silo bins. Alternatively, the grain may be shot into the basement and there fed back into the main elevator by a band conveyor. In this way the grain may be turned over as often as it is deemed necessary. At the bottom of each bin are four apertures connected by spouts, both with the bin below and with the central vertical pipe which passes down through the centre of each group of bins. To regulate the course of the grain from bin to bin or from bin to central pipe, the connecting spouts are fitted with valves of ingenious yet simple construction which deflect the grain in any desired direction, so that the contents of two or more bins may be blended, or grain may be transferred from a bin on one floor to a bin on a lower floor, missing the bin on the floor between. The valves are controlled by chains from the basement.
With reference to the floor bins used at Dortmund, it may be observed that there are granaries built on a similar principle in the United Kingdom. It is probable that bins of moderate height are more suitable for storing grain containing a considerable amount of moisture than deep silos, whether made of wood, ferro-concrete or other material. For one thing floor bins of the Dortmund pattern can be more effectually aerated than deep silos. German wheat has many characteristics in common with British, and, especially in north Germany, is not infrequently harvested in a more or less damp condition. In the United Kingdom, Messrs Spencer & Co., of Melksham, have erected several granaries on the floor-bin principle, and have adopted an ingenious system of “telescopic” spouting, by means of which grain may be discharged from one bin to another or at any desired point. This spouting can be applied to bins either with level floors or with hoppered bottoms, if they are arranged one above the other on the different floors, and is so constructed that an opening can be effected at certain points by simply sliding upwards a section of the spout.
National Granaries.—Wheat forms the staple food of a large proportion of the population of the British Isles, and of the total amount consumed about four-fifths is sea-borne. The stocks normally held in the country being limited, serious consequences might result from any interruption of the supply, such as might occur were Great Britain involved in war with a power or powers commanding a strong fleet. To meet this contingency it has been suggested that the State should establish granaries containing a national reserve of wheat for use in emergency, or should adopt measures calculated to induce merchants, millers, &c., to hold larger stocks than at present and to stimulate the production of home-grown wheat.
Stocks of wheat (and of flour expressed in its equivalent weight of wheat) are held by merchants, millers and farmers. Merchants’ stocks are kept in granaries at ports of importation and are known as first-hand stocks. Stocks of wheat Amount of stocks. and flour in the hands of millers and of flour held by bakers are termed second-hand stocks, while farmers’ stocks only consist of native wheat. Periodical returns are generally made of first-hand or port stocks, nor should a wide margin of error be possible in the case of farmers’ stocks, but second-hand stocks are more difficult to gauge. Since the last decade of the 19th century the storage capacity of British mills has considerably increased. As the number of small mills has diminished the capacity of the bigger ones has increased, and proportionately their warehousing accommodation has been enlarged. At the present time first-hand stocks tend to diminish because a larger proportion of millers’ holdings are in mill granaries and silo houses. The immense preponderance of steamers over sailing vessels in the grain trade has also had the effect of greatly diminishing stocks. With his cargo or parcel on a steamer a corn merchant can tell almost to a day when it will be due. In fact foreign wheat owned by British merchants is to a great extent stored in foreign granaries in preference to British warehouses. The merchant’s risk is thereby lessened to a certain extent. When his wheat has been brought into a British port, to send it farther afield means extra expense. But wheat in an American or Argentine elevator may be ordered wherever the best price can be obtained for it. Options or “futures,” too, have helped to restrict the size of wheat stocks in the United Kingdom. A merchant buys a cargo of wheat on passage for arrival at a definite time, and, lest the market value of grain should have depreciated by the time it arrives, he sells an option against it. In this way he hedges his deal, the option serving as insurance against loss. This is why the British corn trade finds it less risky to limit purchases to bare needs, protecting itself by option deals, than to store large quantities which may depreciate and involve their owners in loss.
Varying estimates have been made of the number of weeks’ supply of breadstuffs (wheat and flour) held by millers at various seasons of the year. A table compiled by the secretary of the National Association of British and Irish Millers from returns for 1902 made by 170 milling firms showed 4.7, 4.9, 4.9 and 5 weeks’ supply at the end of March, June, September and December respectively. These 170 mills were said to represent 46% of the milling capacity of the United Kingdom, and claimed to have ground 12,000,000 qrs. out of 25,349,000 qrs. milled in 1902. These were obviously large mills; it is probable that the other mills would not have shown anything like such a proportion of stock of either raw or finished material. A fair estimate of the stocks normally held by millers and bakers throughout the United Kingdom would be about four weeks’ supply. First-hand stocks vary considerably, but the limits are definite, ranging from 1,000,000 to 3,500,000 qrs., the latter being a high figure. The tendency is for first-hand stocks to decline, but two weeks’ supply must be a minimum. Farmers’ stocks necessarily vary with the size of the crop and the period of the year; they will range from 9 or 10 weeks on the 1st of September to a half week on the 1st of August. Taking all the stocks together, it is very exceptional for the stock of breadstuffs to fall below 7 weeks’ supply. Between the cereal years 1893-1894 and 1903-1904, a period of 570 weeks, the stocks of all kinds fell below 7 weeks’ supply in only 9 weeks; of these 9 weeks 7 were between the beginning of June and the end of August 1898. This was immediately after the Leiter collapse. In seven of these eleven years there is no instance of stocks falling below 8 weeks’ supply. In 21 out of these 570 weeks and in 39 weeks during the same period stocks dropped below 7½ and 8 weeks’ supply respectively. Roughly speaking the stock of wheat available for bread-making varies from a two to four months’ supply and is at times well above the latter figure.
The formation of a national reserve of wheat, to be held at the disposal of the state in case of urgent need during war, is beset by many practical difficulties. The father of the scheme was probably The Miller, a well-known National reserve. trade journal. In March and April 1886 two articles appeared in that paper under the heading “Years of Plenty and State Granaries,” in which it was urged that to meet the risk of hostile cruisers interrupting the supplies it would be desirable to lay up in granaries on British soil and under government control a stock of wheat sufficient for 12 or alternatively 6 months’ consumption. This was to be national property, not to be touched except when the fortune of war sent up the price of wheat to a famine level or caused severe distress. The State holding this large stock—a year’s supply of foreign grain would have meant at least 15,000,000 qrs., and have cost about £25,000,000 exclusive of warehousing—was in peace time to sell no wheat except when it became necessary to part with stock as a precautionary measure. In that case the wheat sold was to be replaced by the same amount of new grain. The idea was to provide the country with a supply of wheat until sufficient wheat-growing soil could be broken up to make it practically self-sufficing in respect of wheat. The original suggestion fell quite flat. Two years later Captain Warren, R.N., read a paper on “Great Britain’s Corn Supplies in War,” before the London Chamber of Commerce, and accepted national granaries as the only practicable safeguard against what appeared to him a great peril. The representatives of the shipping interest opposed the scheme, probably because it appeared to them likely to divert the public from insisting on an all-powerful navy. The corn trade opposed the project on account of its great practical difficulties. But constant contraction of the British wheat acreage kept the question alive, and during the earlier half of the ’nineties it was a favourite theme with agriculturists. Some influential members of parliament pressed the matter on the government, who, acting, no doubt, on the advice of their military and naval experts, refused either a royal commission or a departmental committee. While the then technical advisers of the government were divided on the advisability of establishing national granaries as a defensive measure, the balance of expert opinion was adverse to the scheme. Lord Wolseley, then commander-in-chief, publicly stigmatized the theory that Great Britain might in war be starved into submission as “unmitigated humbug.”
In spite of official discouragement the agitation continued, and early in 1897 the council of the Central and Associated Chambers of Agriculture, at the suggestion to a great extent of Mr R. A. Yerburgh, M.P., nominated Yerburgh committee. a committee to examine the question of national wheat stores. This committee held thirteen sittings and examined fifty-four witnesses. Its report, which was published (L. G. Newman & Co., 12 Finsbury Square, London, E.C.) with minutes of the evidence taken, practically recommended that a national reserve of wheat on the lines already sketched should be formed and administered by the State, and that the government should be strongly urged to obtain the appointment of a royal commission, comprising representatives of agriculture, the corn trade, shipping, and the army and navy, to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into the whole subject of the national food-supply in case of war. This recommendation was ultimately carried into effect, but not till nearly five years had elapsed. Of two schemes for national granaries put before the Yerburgh committee, one was formulated by Mr Seth Taylor, a London miller and corn merchant, who reckoned that a store of 10,000,000 qrs. of wheat might be accumulated at an average cost of 40s. per qr.—this was in the Leiter year of high prices—and distributed in six specially constructed granaries to be erected at London, Liverpool, Hull, Bristol, Glasgow and Dublin. The cost of the granaries was put at £7,500,000. Mr Taylor’s scheme, all charges included, such as 2½% interest on capital, cost of storage (at 6d. per qr.), and 2s. per qr. for cost of replacing wheat, involved an annual expenditure of £1,250,000. The Yerburgh committee also considered a proposal to stimulate the home supply of wheat by offering a bounty to farmers for every quarter of wheat grown. This proposal has taken different shapes; some have suggested that a bounty should be given on every acre of land covered with wheat, while others would only allow the bounty on wheat raised and kept in good condition up to a certain date, say the beginning of the following harvest. It is obvious that a bounty on the area of land covered by wheat, irrespective of yield, would be a premium on poor farming, and might divert to wheat-growing land unsuitable for that purpose. The suggestion to pay a bounty of say 3s. to 5s. per qr. for all wheat grown and stacked for a certain time stands on a different basis; it is conceivable that a bounty of 5s. might expand the British production of wheat from say 7,000,000 to 9,000,000 qrs., which would mean that a bounty of £2,250,000 per annum, plus costs of administration, had secured an extra home production of 2,000,000 qrs. Whether such a price would be worth paying is another matter; the Yerburgh committee’s conclusion was decidedly in the negative. It has also been suggested that the State might subsidize millers to the extent of 2s. 6d. per sack of 280 ℔. per annum on condition that each maintained a minimum supply of two months’ flour. This may be taken to mean that for keeping a special stock of flour over and above his usual output a miller would be entitled to an annual subsidy of 2s. 6d. per sack. An extra stock of 10,000,000 sacks might be thus kept up at an annual cost of £1,250,000, plus the expenditure of administration, which would probably be heavy. With regard to this suggestion, it is very probable that a few large mills which have plenty of warehouse accommodation and depots all over the country would be ready to keep up a permanent extra stock of 100,000 sacks. Thus a mill of 10,000 sacks’ capacity per week, which habitually maintains a total stock of 50,000 sacks, might bring up its stock to 150,000 sacks. Such a mill, being a good customer to railways, could get from them the storage it required for little or nothing. But the bulk of the mills have no such advantages. They have little or no spare warehousing room, and are not accustomed to keep any stock, sending their flour out almost as fast as it is milled. It is doubtful therefore if a bounty of 2s. 6d. per sack would have the desired effect of keeping up a stock of 10,000,000 sacks, sufficient for two to three months’ bread consumption.
The controversy reached a climax in the royal commission appointed in 1903, to which was also referred the importation of raw material in war time. Its report appeared in 1905. To the question whether the unquestioned Royal commission, 1903-1905. dependence of the United Kingdom on an uninterrupted supply of sea-borne breadstuffs renders it advisable or not to maintain at all times a six months’ stock of wheat and flour, it returned no decided answer, or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the commission was hopelessly divided. The main report was distinctly optimistic so far as the liability of the country to harass and distress at the hands of a hostile naval power or combination of powers was concerned. But there were several dissentients, and there was hardly any portion of the report in chief which did not provoke some reservation or another. That a maritime war would cause freights and insurance to rise in a high degree was freely admitted, and it was also admitted that the price of bread must also rise very appreciably. But, provided the navy did not break down, the risk of starvation was dismissed. Therefore all the proposals for providing national granaries or inducing merchants and millers to carry bigger stocks were put aside as unpractical and unnecessary. The commission was, however, inclined to consider more favourably a suggestion for providing free storage for wheat at the expense of the State. The idea was that if the State would subsidize any large granary company to the extent of 6d. or 5d. per qr., grain now warehoused in foreign lands would be attracted to the British Isles. But on the whole the commission held that the main effect of the scheme would be to saddle the government with the rent of all grain stored in public warehouses in the United Kingdom without materially increasing stocks. The proposal to offer bounties to farmers to hold stocks for a longer period and to grow more wheat met with equally little favour.
To sum up the advantages of national granaries, assuming any sort of disaster to the navy, the possession of a reserve of even six months’ wheat-supply in addition to ordinary stocks would prevent panic prices. On the other hand, the difficulties in the way of forming and administering such a reserve are very great. The world grows no great surplus of wheat, and to form a six months’, much more a twelve months’, stock would be the work of years. The government in buying up the wheat would have to go carefully if they would avoid sending up prices with a rush. They would have to buy dearly, and when they let go a certain amount of stock they would be bound to sell cheaply. A stock once formed might be held by the State with little or no disturbance of the corn market, although the existence of such an emergency stock would hardly encourage British farmers to grow more wheat. The cost of erecting, equipping and keeping in good order the necessary warehouses would be, probably, much heavier than the most liberal estimate hitherto made by advocates of national granaries.