Three types of heresy have appeared in the history of the Christian Church.[1] The earliest may be called the syncretic; it is the fusion of Jewish or pagan with Christian elements. Ebionitism asserted “the continual obligation Types of heresy. to observe the whole of the Mosaic law,” and “outran the Old Testament monotheism by a barren monarchianism that denied the divinity of Christ” (Kurtz, Church History, i. 120). “Gnosticism was the result of the attempt to blend with Christianity the religious notions of pagan mythology, mysterology, theosophy and philosophy” (p. 98). The Judaizing and the paganizing tendency were combined in Gnostic Ebionitism which was prepared for in Jewish Essenism. In the later heresy of Manichaeism there were affinities to Gnosticism, but it was a mixture of many elements, Babylonian-Chaldaic theosophy, Persian dualism and even Buddhist ethics (p. 126).
The next type of heresy may be called evolutionary or formatory. When the Christian faith is being formulated, undue emphasis may be put on one aspect, and thus so partial a statement of truth may result in error. Thus when in the ante-Nicene age the doctrine of the Trinity was under discussion, dynamic Monarchianism “regarded Christ as a mere man, who, like the prophets, though in a much higher measure, had been endued with divine wisdom and power”; modal Monarchianism saw in the Logos dwelling in Christ “only a mode of the activity of the Father”; Patripassianism identified the Logos with the Father; and Sabellianism regarded Father, Son and Spirit as “the rôles which the God who manifests Himself in the world assumes in succession” (Kurtz, Church History, i. 175-181). When Arius asserted the subordination of the Son to the Father, and denied the eternal generation, Athanasius and his party asserted the Homoousia, the cosubstantiality of the Father and the Son. This assertion of the divinity of Christ triumphed, but other problems at once emerged. How was the relation of the humanity to the divinity in Christ to be conceived? Apollinaris denied the completeness of the human nature, and substituted the divine Logos for the reasonable soul of man. Nestorius held the two natures so far apart as to appear to sacrifice the unity of the person of Christ. Eutyches on the contrary “taught not only that after His incarnation Christ had only one nature, but also that the body of Christ as the body of God is not of like substance with our own” (Kurtz, Church History, i, 330-334). The Church in the Creed of Chalcedon in A.D. 451 affirmed “that Christ is true God and true man, according to His Godhead begotten from eternity and like the Father in everything, only without sin; and that after His incarnation the unity of the person consists in two natures which are conjoined without confusion, and without change, but also without rending and without separation.” The problem was not solved, but the inadequate solutions were excluded, and the data to be considered in any adequate solution were affirmed. After this decision the controversies about the Person of Christ degenerated into mere hair-splitting; and the interference of the imperial authority from time to time in the dispute was not conducive to the settlement of the questions in the interests of truth alone. This problem interested the East for the most part; in the West there was waged a theological warfare around the nature of man and the work of Christ. To Augustine’s doctrine of man’s total depravity, his incapacity for any good, and the absolute sovereignty of the divine grace in salvation according to the divine election, Pelagius opposed the view that “God’s grace is destined for all men, but man must make himself worthy of it by honest striving after virtue” (Kurtz, Church History, i. 348). While Pelagius was condemned, it was only a modified Augustinianism which became the doctrine of the church. It is not necessary in illustration of the second type of heresy—that which arises when the contents of the Christian faith are being defined—to refer to the doctrinal controversies of the middle ages. It may be added that after the Reformation Arianism was revived in Socinianism, and Pelagianism in Arminianism; but the conception of heresy in Protestantism demands subsequent notice.
The third type of heresy is the revolutionary or reformatory. This is not directed against doctrine as such, but against the church, its theory and its practice. Such movements of antagonism to the errors or abuses of ecclesiastical authority may be so permeated by defective conceptions and injurious influences as by their own character to deserve condemnation. But on the other hand the church in maintaining its place and power may condemn as heretical genuine efforts at reform by a return, though partial, to the standard set by the Holy Scriptures or the Apostolic Church. On the one hand there were during the middle ages sects, like the Catharists and Albigenses, whose “opposition as a rule developed itself from dualistic or pantheistic premises (surviving effects of old Gnostic or Manichaean views)” and who “stood outside of ordinary Christendom, and while no doubt affecting many individual members within it, had no influence on church doctrine.” On the other hand there were movements, such as the Waldensian, the Wycliffite and Hussite, which are often described as “reformations anticipating the Reformation” which “set out from the Augustinian conception of the Church, but took exception to the development of the conception,” and were pronounced by the medieval church as heretical for (1) “contesting the hierarchical gradation of the priestly order; or (2) giving to the religious idea of the Church implied in the thought of predestination a place superior to the conception of the empirical Church; or (3) applying to the priests, and thereby to the authorities of the Church, the test of the law of God, before admitting their right to exercise, as holding the keys, the power of binding and loosing” (Harnack’s History of Dogma, vi. 136-137). The Reformation itself was from the standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church heresy and schism.
“In the present divided state of Christendom,” says Schaff (Ante-Nicene Christianity, ii. 513-514), “there are different kinds of orthodoxy and heresy. Orthodoxy is conformity to the recognized creed or standard of public Modern use of the term. doctrine; heresy is a wilful departure from it. The Greek Church rejects as heretical, because contrary to the teaching of the first seven ecumenical councils, the Roman dogmas of the papacy, of the double procession of the Holy Ghost, the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, and the infallibility of the Pope. The Roman Church anathematized, in the council of Trent, all the distinctive doctrines of the Protestant Reformation. Among Protestant churches again there are minor doctrinal differences, which are held with various degrees of exclusiveness or liberality according to the degree of departure from the Roman Catholic Church. Luther, for instance, would not tolerate Zwingli’s view on the Lord’s Supper, while Zwingli was willing to fraternize with him notwithstanding this difference.” At the colloquy of Marburg “Zwingli offered his hand to Luther with the entreaty that they be at least Christian brethren, but Luther refused it and declared that the Swiss were of another spirit. He expressed surprise that a man of such views as Zwingli should wish brotherly relations with the Wittenberg reformers” (Walker, The Reformation, p. 174). A difference of opinion on the question of the presence of Christ in the elements at the Lord’s Supper was thus allowed to divide and to weaken the forces of the Reformation. On the problem of divine election Lutheranism and Calvinism remained divided. The Formula of Concord (1577), which gave to the whole Lutheran Church of Germany a common doctrinal system, declined to accept the Calvinistic position that man’s condemnation as well as his salvation is an object of divine predestination. Within Calvinism itself Pelagianism was revived in Arminianism, which denied the irresistibility, and affirmed the universality of grace. This heresy was condemned by the synod of Dort (1619). The standpoint of the Reformed churches was the substitution of the authority of the Scriptures for the authority of the church. Whatever was conceived as contrary to the teaching of the Bible was regarded as heresy. The position is well expressed in the Scotch Confession (1559). “Protesting, that if any man will note in this our Confession any article or sentence repugning to God’s Holy Word, that it would please him, of his gentleness, and for Christian charity’s sake, to admonish us of the same in writ, and we of our honour and fidelity do promise unto him satisfaction from the mouth of God; that is, from His Holy Scripture, or else reformation of that which he shall prove to be amiss. In God we take to record in our consciences that from our hearts we abhor all sects of heresy, and all teachers of erroneous doctrines; and that with all humility we embrace purity of Christ’s evangel, which is the only food of our souls” (Preface).
Although subsequently to the Reformation period the Protestant churches for the most part relapsed into the dogmatism of the Roman Catholic Church, and were ever ready with censure for every departure from orthodoxy—yet to-day a spirit of diffidence in regard to one’s own beliefs, and of tolerance towards the beliefs of others, is abroad. The enlargement of the horizon of knowledge by the advance of science, the recognition of the only relative validity of human opinions and beliefs as determined by and adapted to each stage of human development, which is due to the growing historical sense, the alteration of view regarding the nature of inspiration, and the purpose of the Holy Scriptures, the revolt against all ecclesiastical authority, and the acceptance of reason and conscience as alone authoritative, the growth of the spirit of Christian charity, the clamorous demand of the social problem for immediate attention, all combine in making the Christian churches less anxious about the danger, and less zealous in the discovery and condemnation of heresy.
Having traced the history of opinion in the Christian churches on the subject of heresy, we must now return to resume a subject already mentioned, the persecution of heretics. According to the Canon Law, which “was the ecclesiastical Persecution of heretics. law of medieval Europe, and is still the law of the Roman Catholic Church,” heresy was defined as “error which is voluntarily held in contradiction to a doctrine which has been clearly stated in the creed, and has become part of the defined faith of the church,” and which is “persisted in by a member of the church.” It was regarded not only as an error, but also as a crime to be detected and punished. As it belongs, however, to a man’s thoughts and not his deeds, it often can be proved only from suspicions. The canonists define the degrees of suspicion as “light” calling for vigilance, “vehement” demanding denunciation, and “violent” requiring punishment. The grounds of suspicion have been formulated “Pope Innocent III. declared that to lead a solitary life, to refuse to accommodate oneself to the prevailing manners of society and to frequent unauthorized religious meetings were abundant grounds of suspicion; while later canonists were accustomed to give lists of deeds which made the doers suspect: a priest who did not celebrate mass, a layman who was seen in clerical robes, those who favoured heretics, received them as guests, gave them safe conduct, tolerated them, trusted them, defended them, fought under them or read their books were all to be suspect” (T. M. Lindsay in article “Heresy,” Ency. Brit. 9th edition). That the dangers of heresy might be avoided, laymen were forbidden to argue about matters of faith by Pope Alexander IV., an oath “to abjure every heresy and to maintain in its completeness the Catholic faith” was required by the council of Toledo (1129), the reading of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue was not allowed to the laity by Pope Pius IV. The reading of books was restricted and certain books were prohibited. Regarding heresy as a crime, the church was not content with inflicting its spiritual penalties, such as excommunication and such civil disabilities as its own organization allowed it to impose (e.g. the heretics were forbidden to give evidence in ecclesiastical courts, fathers were forbidden to allow a son or a daughter to marry a heretic, and to hold social intercourse with a heretic was an offence). It regarded itself as justified in invoking the power of the state to suppress heresy by civil pains and penalties, including even torture and death.
The story of the persecution of heretics by the state must be briefly sketched.
As long as the Christian Church was itself persecuted by the pagan empire, it advocated freedom of conscience, and insisted that religion could be promoted only by instruction and persuasion (Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Lactantius); but almost immediately after Christianity was adopted as the religion of the Roman empire the persecution of men for religious opinions began. While Constantine at the beginning of his reign (313) declared complete religious liberty, and kept on the whole to this declaration, yet he confined his favours to the orthodox hierarchical church, and even by an edict of the year 326 formally asserted the exclusion from these of heretics and schismatics. Arianism, when favoured by the reigning emperor, showed itself even more intolerant than Catholic Orthodoxy. Theodosius the Great, in 380, soon after his baptism, issued, with his co-emperors, the following edict: “We, the three emperors, will that all our subjects steadfastly adhere to the religion which was taught by St Peter to the Romans, which has been faithfully preserved by tradition, and which is now professed by the pontiff Damasus of Rome, and Peter, bishop of Alexandria, a man of apostolic holiness. According to the institution of the Apostles, and the doctrine of the Gospel, let us believe in the one Godhead of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, of equal majesty in the Holy Trinity. We order that the adherents of this faith be called Catholic Christians; we brand all the senseless followers of the other religions with the infamous name of heretics, and forbid their conventicles assuming the name of churches. Besides the condemnation of divine justice, they must expect the heavy penalties which our authority, guided by heavenly wisdom, shall think proper to inflict” (Schaff’s Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity, i. 142). The fifteen penal laws which this emperor issued in as many years deprived them of all right to the exercise of their religion, “excluded them from all civil offices, and threatened them with fines, confiscation, banishment and even in some cases with death.” In 385 Maximus, his rival and colleague, caused seven heretics to be put to death at Treves (Trier). Many bishops approved the act, but Ambrose of Milan and Martin of Tours condemned it. While Chrysostom disapproved of the execution of heretics, he approved “the prohibition of their assemblies and the confiscation of their churches.” Jerome by an appeal to Deut. xiii. 6-10 appears to defend even the execution of heretics. Augustine found a justification for these penal measures in the “compel them to come in” of Luke xiv. 23, although his personal leanings were towards clemency. Only the persecuted themselves insisted on toleration as a Christian duty. In the middle ages the church showed no hesitation about persecuting unto death all who dared to contradict her doctrine, or challenge her practice, or question her authority. The instruction and persuasion which St Bernard favoured found little imitation. Even the Dominicans, who began as a preaching order to convert heretics, soon became persecutors. In the Albigensian Crusade (A.D. 1209-1229) thousands were slaughtered. As the bishops were not zealous enough in enforcing penal laws against heretics, the Tribunal of the Inquisition was founded in 1232 by Gregory IX., and was entrusted to the Dominicans who “as Domini canes subjected to the most cruel tortures all on whom the suspicion of heresy fell, and all the resolute were handed over to the civil authorities, who readily undertook their execution” (Kurtz, Church History, ii. 137-138).
At the Reformation Luther laid down the principle that the civil government is concerned with the province of the external and temporal life, and has nothing to do with faith and conscience. “How could the emperor gain the right,” he asks, “to rule my faith?” With that only the Word of God is concerned. “Heresy is a spiritual thing,” he says, “which one cannot hew with any iron, burn with any fire, drown with any water. The Word of God alone is there to do it.” Nevertheless Luther assigned to the state, which he assumes to be Christian, the function of maintaining the Gospel and the Word of God in public life. He was not quite consistent in carrying out his principle (see Luthard’s Geschichte der christlichen Ethik, ii. 33). In the Religious Peace of Augsburg the principle “cujus regio ejus religio” was accepted; by it a ruler’s choice between Catholicism and Lutheranism bound his subjects, but any subject unwilling to accept the decision might emigrate without hindrance.
In Geneva under Calvin, while the Consistoire, or ecclesiastical court, could inflict only spiritual penalties, yet the medieval idea of the duty of the state to co-operate with the church to maintain the religious purity of the community in matters of belief as well as of conduct so far survived that the civil authority was sure to punish those whom the ecclesiastical had censured. Calvin consented to the death of Servetus, whose views on the Trinity he regarded as most dangerous heresy, and whose denial of the full authority of the Scriptures he dreaded as overthrowing the foundations of all religious authority. Protestantism generally, it is to be observed, quite approved the execution of the heretic. The Synod of Dort (1619) not only condemned Arminianism, but its defenders were expelled from the Netherlands; only in 1625 did they venture to return, and not till 1630 were they allowed to erect schools and churches. In modern Protestantism there is a growing disinclination to deal even with errors of belief by ecclesiastical censure; the appeal to the civil authority to inflict any penalty is abandoned. During the course of the 19th century in Scottish Presbyterianism the affirmation of Christ’s atoning death for all men, the denial of eternal punishment, the modification of the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures by acceptance of the results of the Higher Criticism, were all censured as perilous errors.