Fig. 1.Fig. 2.

Two forms are in use: (1) the “open-tube,” in which the pressure in one limb is equal to the atmospheric pressure, and (2) the “closed-tube,” in which the experimental pressure is balanced against the liquid column and the air compressed into the upper part of a closed limb of the tube. In the “open tube” form (fig. 1) the pressure on the surface a is equal to the pressure on the surface at b (one atmosphere) plus the hydrostatic pressure exerted by the liquid column of height a b. The liquid commonly used is mercury. If a scale be placed behind the limbs of the tube, so that the difference a b can be directly determined, then the pressure in a is at once expressible as P + a b in millimetres or inches of mercury, where P is the atmospheric pressure, known from an ordinary barometric observation. In the “closed tube” form (fig. 2) the calculation is not so simple, for the variation of pressure on the mercury surface in the closed limb has to be taken into account. Suppose the length of the air column in the closed limb be h when the mercury is at the same height in both tubes. Applying the experimental pressure to the open end, if this be greater than atmospheric pressure the mercury column will rise and the air column diminish in the closed limb. Let the length of the air column be h′, then its pressure is h/h′ atmospheres. The difference in height of the mercury columns in the two limbs is 2(h − h′), and the pressure in the open limb is obviously equal to that of a column of mercury of length 2(h − h′), plus h/h′ atmospheres. These instruments are equally serviceable for determining pressures less than one atmosphere. In laboratory practice, e.g. when it is required to determine the degree of exhaust of a water pump, a common form consists of a vertical glass tube having its lower end immersed in a basin of mercury, and its upper end connected by means of an intermediate vessel to the exhaust. The mercury rises in the tube, and the difference between the barometric height and the length of the mercury column gives the pressure attained.

MANOR. Any definition of a manor, in land tenure, must take note of two elements—economic and political. The manor has an estate for its basis, although it need not coincide with an estate, but may be wider. It is also a political unit, a district formed for purposes of government, although the political functions made over to it may greatly vary. As a lordship based on land tenure, the manor necessarily comprises a ruler and a population dependent on him, and the characteristic trait of such dependence consists not in ownership extending over persons, as in slave-holding communities, nor in contractual arrangements, as in a modern economic organization, but in various forms and degrees of subjection, chiefly regulated by custom. In the sense mentioned the manor is by no means a peculiarly English institution; it occurs in every country where feudalism got a hold. Under other names we find it not only in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, but also, to a certain extent, in the Byzantine Empire, Russia, Japan, &c. It is especially representative of an aristocratic stage in the development of European nations. When tribal notions and arrangements ceased to be sufficient for upholding their commonwealths, when social and political life had to be built up on the basis of land-tenure, the type of manorial organization came forward in natural course. It was closely connected with natural economy, and was suited to a narrow horizon of economic wants and political requirements. At the same time it provided links for a kind of national federation of military estates. We shall only speak of the course of manorial evolution in France and Germany, because this presents the clearest expression of the fundamental principles of manorial life and the best material for comparison with English facts.

One problem common to the entire European world has to be considered from the very beginning. Does the manor date from the Roman Empire, or not? Can its chief features be traced in Roman institutions? There can be no doubt that at the end of the Roman period certain traits are noticeable which might, under favourable conditions, develop into a manorial combination. Great estates with political functions, populations subjected to the political lordship of landowners, appear in the closing centuries of the empire, and have to be reckoned with as precursors of medieval manorial life. The original organization of the ancient world was built up on the self-government of cities and on the sharp distinction between citizens and slaves. Both features were gradually modified by the Roman Empire. Self-government was atrophied by bureaucratic interference; the economy based on the exploitation of slaves began to give way before relations in which the elements of freedom and serfdom were oddly mixed. During the last centuries of its existence the Western Empire became more and more a conglomerate of barbaric and half-civilized populations, and it is not strange that the characteristic germs of feudalism began to show themselves within its territory as well as outside it. As far as political institutions are concerned, we notice that the central power, after claiming an absolute sway over its subjects, is obliged more and more to lean on private forces in order to maintain itself. One of its favourite resources in the 4th and 5th centuries consists in making great landowners responsible for the good behaviour of their tenants and even of their less important neighbours. The saltus, the great domain, is occasionally recognized as a separate district exempt from the ordinary administration of the city, subordinated to its owner in respect of taxes and police. Even in ordinary estates (fundi) there is a tendency to make the landowner responsible for military conscription, for the presentation of criminals to justice. On the other hand the incumbents of ecclesiastical offices are nominated in accordance with the wishes of patrons among the landowners; in the administration of justice the influence of this same class makes itself felt more and more. Nor are signs of a convergent evolution wanting on the economic side. Slaves are used more and more as small householders provided with rural tenements and burdened with rents and services. Free peasant farmers holding by free agreement get more and more reduced to a status of half-free settlers occupying their tenancies on the strength of custom and traditional ascription to the glebe. Eventually this status is recognized as a distinct class by imperial legislation. Ominous symptoms of growing political disruption and of an aristocratic transformation of society were visible everywhere at the close of the empire. Yet there could be no talk of a manorial system as long as the empire and the commercial intercourse protected by it continued to exist.

The fall of the empire hastened the course of evolution. It brought into prominence barbaric tribes who were unable to uphold either the political power or the economic system of the Romans. The Germans had from old certain manorial features in the constitution of their government and husbandry. The owner of a house had always been possessed of a certain political power within its precincts, as well as within the fenced area surrounding it: the peace of the dwelling and the peace of the hedged-in yard were recognized by the legal customs of all the German tribes. The aristocratic superiority of warriors over all classes engaged in base peaceful work was also deeply engraved in the minds of the fighting and conquering tribes. On the other hand the downfall of complicated forms of civilization and civil intercourse rendered necessary a kind of subjection in which tributary labourers were left to a certain extent to manage their own affairs. The Germanic conqueror was unable to move slaves about like draughts: he had no scope for a complicated administration of capital and work. The natural outcome was to have recourse to serfdom with its convenient system of tribute and services.

But, as in the case of the Roman Empire, the formation of regular manors was held back for a time in the early Germanic monarchies by the lingering influence of tribal organization. In the second period of medieval development in continental Europe, in the Carolingian epoch, the features of the estate as a political unit are more sharply marked. Notwithstanding the immense efforts of Charles Martel, Pippin and Charlemagne to strengthen the tottering edifice of the Frankish Empire, public authority had to compromise with aristocratic forces in order to ensure regular government. As regards military organization this is expressed in the recognition of the power of seniores, called upon to lead their vassals in the host; as regards jurisdiction, in the increase of the numbers of commended freemen who seek to interpose the powerful patronage of lay and secular magnates between themselves and the Crown. Great estates arose not only on the lands belonging to the king, but on that of churches and of lay potentates, and the constitution of these estates, as described for instance in the Polyptique of St Germain des Près or in the “Brevium exempla ad describendas res ecclesiasticas et fiscales” (Capitularia, ed. Boretius, i. 250), reminds us forcibly of that of later feudal estates. They contain a home-farm, with a court and a casa indominicata, or manor-house, some holdings (mansi) of free men (ingenuiles), of serfs (serviles), and perhaps of half-free people (lidiles). The rents and services of this dependent population are stated in detail, as in later custumals, and there is information about the agricultural implements, the stores and stock on the home-farm. Thus the economic basis of the manor exists in more or less complete order, but it cannot be said as yet to form the prevailing type of land tenure in the country. Holdings of independent free men and village organizations of ancient type still surround the great estates, and in the case of ecclesiastical possessions we are often in a position to watch their gradual extension at the expense of the neighbouring free settlers, by way of direct encroachment, and by that of surrender and commendation on the part of the weaker citizens. Another factor which plays a great part in the gradual process of infeudation is the rise of private jurisdictions, which falls chiefly into the 10th and 11th centuries. The struggle against Northmen, Magyars and Slavs gave a crowning touch to the process of localization of political life and of the aristocratic constitution of society.

In order to describe the full-grown continental manor of the 11th century it is better to take French examples than German, Italian or Spanish. Feudalism in France attained the greatest extension and utmost regularity, while in other European countries it was hampered and intermixed with other institutional features. The expression best corresponding to the English “manor,” in the sense of an organized district, was seigneurie. Manoir is in use, and is, of course, a French word corresponding to manerium, but it meant strictly “mansion” or chief homestead in France. Baronie is another term which might be employed in some instances as an equivalent of the English manor, but, in a sense, it designates only one species of a larger genus, the estate of a full baron in contrast to a mere knight’s fee, as well as to a principality. Some of the attributes of a baron are, however, typical, as the purest expression of manorial rights, and may be used in a general characterization of the latter.

The seigneurie may be considered from three points of view—as a unit of administration, as an economic unit, and as a union of social classes.

(a) In principle the disruption of political life brought about by feudalism ought to have resulted in the complete administrative independence of the manor. Chaque baron est souverain dans sa baronie is a proverb meant to express this radical view of manorial separatism. As a matter of fact this separatism was never completely realized, and even at the time of the greatest prevalence of feudalism the little sovereigns of France were combined into a loose federation of independent fiefs. Still, the proverb was not a mere play of words, and it took a long time for the kings of France to break in potentates, like the little Sire de Coucy in the immediate vicinity of Paris, who sported in his crest the self-complacent motto: Je ne suis ni comte, ni marquis, je suis le sire de Coucy. The institutional expression of this aspect of feudalism in the life of the seigneurie was the jurisdiction combined with the latter. The principal origin of this jurisdiction was the dismemberment of royal justice, the acquisition by certain landowners of the right of holding royal pleas. The assumption of authority over public tribunals of any kind was naturally considered as equivalent to such a transmission of royal right. But other sources may be noticed also. It was assumed by French feudal law that in all cases when land was granted by a seigneur in subinfeudation the recipients would be bound to appear as members of a court of tenants for the settlement of conflicts in regard to land. A third source may be traced in the extension of the patrimonial justice of a person over his serfs and personal dependents to the classes of free and half-free population connected with the seigneurie in one way or another. There arose in consequence of these assumptions of jurisdiction a most bewildering confusion of tribunals and judicial rights. It happened sometimes that the question as to who should be the judge in some particular contest was decided by matter-of-fact seizure—the holder of pleas who was the first on the spot to proclaim himself judge in a case was deemed entitled to jurisdiction. In other cases one seigneur held the pleas in a certain place for six days in the week, while some competitor of his possessed jurisdiction during the seventh. A certain order was brought into this feudal chaos by the classification of judiciary functions according to the four categories of high, middle, low and tenurial justice. The scope of the first three subdivisions is sufficiently explained by their names; the fourth concerned cases arising from subinfeudation. As a rule the baron or seigneur sat in justice with a court of assessors or peers, but the constitution of such courts varied a great deal. They represented partly the succession of the old popular courts with their scabini, partly courts of vassals and tenants. In strict feudal law an appeal was allowed from a lower to a higher court only in a case of a denial of justice (dénie de justice), not in error or revision of sentence. This rule was, however, very often infringed, and gave way ultimately before the restoration of royal justice.