The institution of slavery is a fruitful source of this kind of debased matrimony. In Roman law no slave could contract marriage whether with another slave or a free person. The union of male and female slaves (contubernium) was recognized for various purposes; a free woman entering into a union with a slave incurred under the S.C. Claudianum the forfeiture of her own liberty; but the bondwoman might be the concubine of a freeman. In the United States, where slavery was said to be regulated by the principle of the civil law, the marriage of slaves was so far recognized that on emancipation complete matrimony took effect and the children became legitimate without any new ceremony.
In Roman law no legal marriage could be contracted unless there was connubium between the parties. Originally there was no connubium between plebs and patricians, and the privilege was conceded after a long struggle by the Lex Canuleia. In later times Latini and Peregrini were excluded from connubium except where the right had been expressly conferred. The great matrimonial law of the early empire (Lex Julia et Papia Poppaea) introduced restrictions depending on the condition of the parties which later legislation extended and perpetuated. Senators under that law were forbidden to marry freedwomen or women of inferior rank, and the husband of a freedwoman becoming a senator was set free from his marriage. In the canon law[2] new restrictions were developed. Persons who bound themselves not to marry were deemed incapable of marrying. The order of the clergy were forbidden to marry. And disparity of faith was recognized by the early church as a bar to matrimony, e.g. between Christians and pagans and between orthodox and heretics (see Dictionary of Christian Antiquities, art. “Marriage”).
Concubinage, which such restrictions tended to develop, is noticed under a separate heading (q.v.). It might be described as marriage which has no consequences, or only slight and peculiar consequences, in legal status. In the left-handed or “morganatic” marriages of the German royal families we have the nearest approach ever made by concubinage to true marriage, the children being legitimate, but neither they nor the wife acquiring any right to the rank or fortune of the husband. The marriage of persons of different religions frequently requires the intervention of the law as to the faith of the children, more particularly in Europe as between Roman Catholics and Protestants. English law gives the father, except under special circumstances, the right to dictate the faith of his children (see [Infant]). The practice on this point varies in Europe—the question being ignored in French law, Germany following in some parts the same rule as England, in others giving effect to ante-nuptial stipulations. In Ireland mixed marriages (i.e. between Roman Catholic and Protestant) were by 19 Geo. II. c. 13 null and void if celebrated by a Roman Catholic priest. This act was repealed by 33 & 34 Vict. c. 110, which permits mixed marriages to be validly celebrated by an Episcopalian or Roman Catholic clergyman, subject to conditions set forth in § 38.
Roman law.—The three primitive modes of marriage were confarreatio, coemptio in manum, and usus, all of which had the effect of placing the woman in the “power” (manus) of her husband, and on the same footing as the children. The first was a religious ceremony before ten witnesses, in which an ox was sacrificed and a wheaten cake broken and divided between the spouses by the priest. Coemptio was a conveyance of the woman by mancipatio, and might be described as a fictitious sale per aes et libram, like that employed in emancipation and testamentary disposition and other processes. Usus was the acquisition of the wife by prescription, through her cohabiting with the husband for one year, without having been absent from his house three continuous nights. But a true marriage might be concluded without adopting any of these modes, and they all fell into desuetude and with them the subjection of the wife to the manus. Marriage without manus was contracted by the interchange of consent, without writing or formality of any kind. By some jurists it is regarded as incomplete until consummated by delivery of the woman, and is accordingly referred to the class of real contracts. The restrictions as to age, relationship by consanguinity and affinity, previous marriage, &c., were in the main those which have continued to prevail in modern Europe with one important exception. The consent of the paterfamilias to the marriage of the children under his power was essential.
Canon law.—The canon law of marriage is based partly on the Roman law, the validity of which the Church from the first recognized, partly on the Jewish law as modified by the new principles introduced by Christ and his apostles, developed by the fathers of the Church and medieval schoolmen, and regulated and defined by popes and councils. The most important of these principles was that of the indissolubility of marriage, proclaimed by Christ without qualification according to Mark x. 11, 12, and with the qualifying clause “saving for the cause of fornication” according to Matt. v. 32. This lofty view of marriage, according to which man and wife are made “one flesh” by the act of God (“What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder,” Mark x. 9) was, however, modified by the idea of the consummating act of marriage as in itself something unholy, a result of the Fall. Christ himself, indeed, did not teach this; but for St Paul marriage is clearly a concession to the weakness of the flesh (1 Cor. vii.). “The time is short,” and in view of the imminent coming of the Lord the procreation of children a matter of no importance (v. 29), but “it is better to marry than to burn” (v. 9). He is, however, obviously not clear on the point, and at the end of his argument strikes a note of doubt (v. 40); elsewhere he defends marriage, against those who would have forbidden it altogether, as a gift of God (1 Tit. iv. 3-5) and even, in seeming contradiction to 1 Cor. vii. 29, commands the bearing of children (1 Tit. v. 14). Finally it is to St Paul that the idea of marriage as a sacrament is to be traced, in the mystic comparison of the relations of husband and wife to those of Christ and his Church (Eph. v. 23-32). These are the main foundations in Scripture on which the Christian law of marriage is built up, and they are obviously principles which admit of a large amount of variety of interpretation and of practice. They were developed in the early Church under the influence of the rapidly growing passion for the celibate life, partly an outcome of the same dualistic principle which produced the asceticism of the Jewish Essenes and of the Gnostics, partly perhaps a natural reaction from the appalling moral corruption of the decaying empire. Marriage, it is true, from being no more than a terminable civil contract, became a thing holy, a mystic union of souls and bodies never to be divided; valid, indeed, but not spiritually complete, without the public blessing of the Church (Tertullian, Ad uxorem, lib. ii. cap. 9); and from Augustine’s time onward it was reckoned as a sacrament. But at the same time there was a tendency to restrict its rights and its range. So far as marriage was a physical union, this had for its object solely the perpetuation of the race and the avoidance of fornication; the most that was conceded was that the intention of having offspring not only made the conjugal act blameless, but even gave to the desire that inspired it an element of good (Augustine, de nupt. et conc. 3). But the ideal married life was that attributed to Mary and Joseph. Thus Augustine cited this as an example that a true marriage may exist where there is a mutual vow of chastity (op. cit. 12), and held that the sooner this relation was established the better (de bono conjug. 22). Marriage being then an inferior state, to be discouraged rather than the reverse, the tendency was rapidly to narrow the field within which it might be contracted. Remarriage (bigamy) was only allowed after many struggles, and then only to the laity; St Paul had laid down that a “bishop” must be “the husband of one wife,” and to this day the priests of the Orthodox Eastern Church may not remarry. Clerical celibacy, at first a counsel of perfection, was soon to become the rule of the Church, though it was long before it was universally enforced in the West; in the East it still applies only to monks, nuns and bishops (see [Celibacy]). The marriage of the laity was hampered by the creation of a number of impediments. The few and definite prohibitions of the Roman and of the Jewish law (Lev. xviii. 6-18; xx.) in the matter of marriage between kindred, were indefinitely extended; until in 506 the council of Agde laid it down that any consanguinity or affinity whatever constituted an impediment.[3] Moreover, man and wife being “one flesh,” the Church exaggerated relationship by affinity into equal importance with that of consanguinity as an impediment to matrimony; and, finally, to all this added the impediments created by “spiritual affinity,” i.e. the relations established between baptizer and baptized, confirmer and confirmed, and between godparents, their godchildren and their godchildren’s relatives.
The result of this system was hopeless confusion and uncertainty, and it was early found necessary to modify it. This was done by Pope Gregory I., who limited the impediment to the 7th degree of relationship inclusive (civil computation)[4] which was afterwards made the law of the empire by Charlemagne. Later still Innocent III. found it necessary again to issue a decree (4th Lateran Council) permitting marriages between a husband and the relations of his wife, and vice versa, beyond the 4th degree inclusive (canonical computation).[5] This remains the canonical rule of the Roman Catholic Church. As regards impediments due to spiritual affinity, these were limited by the Council of Trent to the relation of the baptizer and baptized; the baptizer and the parents of the baptized; the baptizer and the godfather and godmother; the godparents and the baptized and its parents: i.e. a godfather may not marry the mother of the child he has held at the font, nor the godmother the father of such child.
In the fully developed canon law impediments to marriage are of two kinds, public and private (impedimenta publica and privata), i.e. according as the objection arises out of the very nature of marriage itself or from consideration for the rights of particular persons; near relationship, for instance, is a public impediment, impotence (impotentia) and force (vis et metus) are private impediments. Impediments are further divided into separating (impedimenta dirimentia) or merely suspensive (impedimenta tantum impedientia); to the first class belongs, e.g. a previous marriage not dissolved by death, which involves the nullification of the marriage even where through ignorance the crime of bigamy is not involved; to the second belongs the case of one or both of the contracting parties being under the age of puberty.[6] Impediments, moreover, are absolute or relative, according as they are of universal application or only affect certain persons; near relationship, for instance, is an absolute impediment, difference of religion between the parties a relative impediment. In addition to consanguinity and affinity, impuberty and existing marriage, the canon law lays down as public and absolute impediments to marriage the taking of holy orders and the vows of chastity made on entering any of the religious orders approved by the Holy See. In these impediments the canon law further distinguishes between those which are based on the law of nature (jus naturae) and those which are based on the law of the Church (jus ecclesiae). From impediments based on the law of nature, or of God, there is no power even in the pope to dispense; e.g. marriage of father and daughter, brother and sister, or remarriage of husband or wife during the lifetime of the wife or husband of another marriage, which is held to be a violation of the very nature of marriage as an indissoluble union.[7] From impediments arising out of the law of the Church dispensations are granted, more or less readily, either by the pope or by the bishop of the diocese in virtue of powers delegated by the pope (see [Dispensation]). Thus dispensations may be granted for marriage between persons related by consanguinity in any beyond the 2nd degree and not in the direct line of ascent or descent; e.g. between uncle and niece (confined by the council of Trent to the case of royal marriages for reasons of state) and between cousins-german, or in the case of marriage with a heretic. In this latter case a dispensation is now (i.e. since the papal decrees ne temere of the 2nd of August 1907, which came into force at Easter 1908) only granted on condition that the parties are married by a Catholic bishop, or a priest accredited by him, that no religious ceremony shall take place except in a Catholic church, and that all the children shall be brought up in the Roman Catholic faith.[8]
In the absence of any impediment a marriage is according to the canon law completed between baptized persons by the facts of consent and consummation; the principle is still maintained that the parties to the marriage, not the priest, are the “ministers of the sacrament” (ministri sacramenti).[9] From the first, however, the Church, while recognizing the validity of private contracts, enjoined the addition of a public religious ceremony, so that they might be “sanctified by the word of God and prayer” (1 Tim. iv. 5).[10] Tertullian (de pudicitia, cap. iv.) says that clandestine marriages, not professed in the Church, were reckoned among Christians as all but fornication, and he speaks of the custom of seeking permission to marry from the bishop, priests and deacons (de monogamia, cap. xi.). This latter precaution became increasingly necessary as impediments were multiplied, and Charlemagne, in a capitulary of 802, forbade the celebration of a marriage until “the bishops, priests and elders of the people” had made diligent inquiry into the question of the consanguinity of the parties. This was the origin of the publication of banns which, long customary in France, was made obligatory on the whole Church by Pope Innocent III. In the Eastern Church the primitive practice survives in the ceremonial blessing by the priest of the betrothal, as distinguished from the marriage ceremony. The ecclesiastical recognition of clandestine marriages, however, survived until the crying evil was remedied by a decree of the council of Trent (Sess. xiv. de matrim.),[11] which laid it down that for a valid marriage it was at least necessary that consent should be declared before a priest and in the presence of three witnesses. According to the actual law of the Roman Catholic Church, then, a civil marriage is only valid when the Tridentine decree has not been published; where this has been published, or has been in practice without publication, such a marriage can only become valid if followed by a religious ceremony in the prescribed form. Where such form has not followed the ecclesiastical courts must treat the marriage as voidable through the impedimentum clandestinitatis.
Divorce, i.e. the annulment of marriage for any cause but an impediment which makes the marriage ipso facto void, is unknown to the Roman Catholic Church. Separation a vinculo matrimonii is only possible under the canon law by a judicial decree of nullity (annullatio matrimonii), which implies, not the severing of the ties of a real marriage, but the solemn declaration that such marriage has never existed. There may, however, be a “separation from bed and board” (a thoro et mensa), even perpetual, which does not however give either party the right to remarry during the lifetime of the other. But, marriage not being regarded as a sacrament until consummated, it may be dissolved, if non-consummation he proved, by one or both parties taking the religious vows, or by papal dispensation. The Church claims exclusive control over marriage, and the council of Trent anathematized the opinion held by Luther and other Reformers, that it was properly a subject for the civil courts (si quis dixerit causas matrimoniales non spectare ad judices ecclesiasticos anathema sit, Sess. xxiv. cap. 2). This attitude became of extreme political importance when even in Catholic countries the codes established civil marriage as the only legally binding form.