Devolution
Nor can I stop to dwell upon the very important subject of the delegation or devolution of powers by Parliament to subordinate bodies. I will only say that devolution may be, and I think ought to be, of two kinds, which we may define as regional and functional. To regional bodies for large areas (which might either be directly elected or constituted by indirect election from the local government authorities within each area) might be allotted much of the legislative power of Parliament in regard to private Bills, together with general control over those public functions, such as Education and Public Health, which are now mainly in the hands of local authorities. Of functional devolution the most important expression would be the establishment of a National Industrial Council and of a series of councils or boards for various industries endowed with quasi-legislative authority; by which I mean that they should be empowered by statute to draft proposals for legislation of a defined kind, which would ultimately receive their validity from Parliament, perhaps without necessarily passing through the whole of the elaborate process by which ordinary legislation is enacted. I believe there are many who share my conviction that a development in this direction represents the healthiest method of introducing a real element of industrial self-government. But for the moment we are concerned with it as a means of relieving Parliament from some very difficult functions which Parliament does not perform conspicuously well, without qualifying its supreme and final authority.
One final point. If it is true, as I have argued, that the decay of the prestige and efficiency of Parliament is due to the fact that it is already overloaded with functions and responsibilities, it must be obvious that to add to this burden the responsibility for controlling the conduct of great industries, such as the railways and the mines, would be to ensure the breakdown of our system of government, already on the verge of dislocation. In so far as it may be necessary to undertake on behalf of the community the ownership and conduct of any great industrial or commercial concern, I submit that it is essential that it should not be brought under the direct control of a ministerial department responsible to Parliament. Yet the ultimate responsibility for the right conduct of any such undertaking (e.g. the telephones, electric supply, or forests) must, when it is assumed by the State, rest upon Parliament. How is this ultimate responsibility to be met? Surely in the way in which it is already met in the case of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners or the Port of London Authority—by setting up, under an Act of Parliament, an appropriate body in each case, and by leaving to it a large degree of freedom of action, subject to the terms of the Act and to the inalienable power of Parliament to alter the Act. In such a case the Act could define how the authority should be constituted, on what principles its functions should be performed, and how its profits, if it made profits, should be distributed. And I suggest that there is no reason why the Post Office itself should not be dealt with in this way.
It is only a fleeting and superficial survey which I have been able to give of the vast and complex themes on which I have touched; and there is no single one of them with which I have been able to deal fully. My purpose has been to show that in the political sphere as well as in the social and economic spheres vast tasks lie before Liberalism, and, indeed, that our social and economic tasks are not likely to be efficiently performed unless we give very serious thought to the political problem. Among the heavy responsibilities which lie upon our country in the troubled time upon which we are entering, there is none more heavy than the responsibility which rests upon her as the pioneer of parliamentary government—the responsibility of finding the means whereby this system may be made a respected and a trustworthy instrument for the labours of reconstruction that lie before us.
THE STATE AND INDUSTRY
By W.T. Layton
M.A., C.H., C.B.E.; Editor of the Economist, 1922; formerly Member of Munitions Council, and Director of Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations; Director of Welwyn Garden City; Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, 1910.
Mr. Layton said:—The existing system of private enterprise has been seriously attacked on many grounds. For my present purpose I shall deal with four: (1) The critic points to the extreme differences of wealth and poverty which have emerged from this system of private enterprise; (2) it has produced and is producing to-day recurrent periods of depression which result in insecurity and unemployment for the worker; (3) the critics say the system is producing great aggregations of capital and monopolies, and that by throwing social power into the hands of those controlling the capital of the country, it leads to exploitation of the many by industrial and financial magnates; (4) it produces a chronic state of internal war which saps industrial activity and the economic life of the community.
I shall not attempt to minimise the force of these objections; but in order to get our ideas into correct perspective it should be observed that the first two of these features are not new phenomena arising out of our industrial system. You find extreme inequalities of distribution in practically all forms of society—in the slave state, the feudal state, in India and in China to-day. Nor is this the first period of history in which there has been insecurity. If you look at any primitive community, and note the effect of harvest fluctuations and the inevitable famine following upon them, you will recognise that the variations of fortune which affect such communities are more disastrous in their effect than the trade variations of the modern world.