On the 31st of October he crossed the St. Lawrence opposite Longueil, whence he determined, after mustering his forces to march against the besieging army. The movements of Sir Guy Carleton, though conducted with considerable secrecy, did not escape the vigilant eye of Montgomery, who had for some time expected such a proceeding. He had previously ordered certain officers to take a position with two regiments on the Longueil road, ordering them to patrol that route carefully and frequently, as far as the St. Lawrence; to report daily to the commanding general such information as he might be able to obtain, and to attack any part of the enemy indicating an intention of moving in the direction of the American camp.
These regiments, commanded by General Warner, arrived at Longueil on the morning of the same day that Carleton was preparing to cross, but did not display their force until the British had nearly reached the shore. He then suddenly opened upon them with both musketry and artillery, killing many of the soldiers, and scattering and disabling their boats. By a most fortunate coincidence, at the same time, and with similar orders, Easton, Brown, and Livingston approach McLean, who, losing all hope of support from Carleton, hastily withdrew to his boats and descended the St. Lawrence.
This gratifying intelligence was immediately communicated to General Montgomery, who presented them in a written form to the commandant of St. John’s, urging the impossibility of his deriving any relief from Carleton, and the useless effusion of blood, which must necessarily follow any attempt to prolong the defense. After proper consideration the garrison surrendered. The next step to be taken, was a rapid movement on Montreal, but which was much impeded by the disaffection of the troops; this was only overcome by a promise of discharge at Montreal. Under this arrangement, he was enabled to display a force in front of the town, which on the 12th of November secured to him a full and peaceable possession of it, and of eleven armed vessels left by the enemy. Though now master of a great part of Canada, Montgomery’s labors, far from becoming lighter or fewer, were much augmented in both number and character.
The pursuit of Carleton, (who had retreated to his fleet, with the hope of making his escape through that avenue; but finding this impossible, entered a small boat with muffled oars, and at midnight passed through the American fleet without being perceived and hurried on to Quebec,) and an experiment on the strength of Quebec, were objects sufficiently indicated by his own judgment, and the hopes of the nation. To prosecute so desperate an action required means of which he was greatly deficient.
His situation described in a letter to R. R. Livingston, then a member of Congress, is a faithful picture of the embarrassments under which he labored. He says:
“I need not tell you that until Quebec is taken, Canada is unconquered; and that to accomplish this we must resort to siege, investment, or storm. The first of these is out of the question, from the difficulty of making trenches in a Canadian winter, and the greater difficulty of living in them, if we could make them; secondly, from the nature of the soil, which, as I am at present instructed, renders mining impracticable, and, were this otherwise, from the want of an engineer having sufficient skill to direct the process; and thirdly, from the fewness and lightness of our artillery, which is quite unfit to break walls like those of Quebec. Investment has fewer objections, and might be sufficient, were we able to shut out entirely from the garrison and town the necessary supplies of food and fuel, during the winter, but to do this well (the enemy’s works being very extensive and offering many avenues to the neighboring settlements,) will require a large army, and from present appearances mine will not, when brought together, much if at all exceed eight hundred combatants. Of Canadians I might be able to get a considerable number, provided I had hard money, with which to clothe, feed, and pay their wages; but this is wanting. Unless, therefore, I am soon and amply reinforced, investment, like siege must be given up.
“To the storming plan there are fewer objections; and to this we must come at last. If my force be small, Carleton’s is not great. The extensiveness of his works, which, in case of investment, would favor him, will in the other case favor us. Masters of our secret, we may select a particular time and place for attack, and to repel this the garrison must be prepared at all times and places; a circumstance, which will impose upon it incessant watching and labor by day and by night; which, in its undisciplined state, must breed discontents that may compel Carleton to capitulate, or perhaps to make an attempt to drive us off. In this last idea, there is a glimmering of hope. Wolfe’s success was a lucky hit, or rather a series of such hits. All sober and scientific calculation was against him, until Montcalm, permitting his courage to get the better of his discretion, gave up the advantages of his fortress and came out to try his strength on the plain.
“Carleton, who was Wolfe’s quartermaster-general, understands this well; and, it is to be feared, will not follow the Frenchman’s example. In all these views, you will discover much uncertainty; but of one thing you may be sure, that, unless we do something before the middle of April, the game will be up; because by that time the river may be open and let in supplies and reinforcements to the garrison in spite of any thing we can do to prevent it; and again, because my troops are not engaged beyond that term, and will not be prevailed upon to stay a day longer. In reviewing what I have said, you will find that my list of wants is a long one, men, money, artillery, and clothing accommodated to the climate. Of ammunition Carleton took care to leave little behind him at this place. What I wish and expect is, that all this be made known to Congress, with a full assurance, that, if I fail to execute their wishes or commands, it shall not be from any negligence of duty, or infirmity of purpose on my part. Vale, cave ne mandata frangas.”
On the 19th of November, General Arnold having crossed the St. Lawrence in safety, was joined by Montgomery, and on the 4th of December, took a position before Quebec. The first thing was to obtain a knowledge of the extent and structure of the enemy’s works; the force and strength of his garrison, and the means possessed by the inhabitants to supply the wants of the troops.
Montgomery having satisfied himself on these points, next presented a summons to surrender in the customary form, a cannonade of the fort from a battery of five guns and one howitzer; a display of the American force in full view of the British garrison, in the hope that the enemy would forego a contest; but this was done without producing any effect. At this moment a circumstance took place which threatened the whole project with defeat. Three companies of Arnold’s detachment (whose term of service was on the point of expiring) having taken offence at the conduct of their commanding officer, the cause of which offence was never properly explained; seized the present occasion to make known their intention of quitting the army, unless, in the approaching movement they were permitted to attach themselves to some other corps. Upon investigating the affair, General Montgomery found the complaints so absurd, that he promptly determined, in justice to Arnold, to reject the proposal. But before officially announcing his decision, he thought it most prudent to try what could be effected by expostulation; in this attempt he finally succeeded, and brought them back to a sense of good order and obedience, without coercive means. The mind of Montgomery was not yet at ease, and suspecting that the flame of the late controversy might not be extinguished, he resolved to call a council of war, in which he submitted two questions,—“Shall we attempt the reduction of Quebec by a night attack? And if so, shall the lower town be the place attacked?” This seemed to infuse new life into the officers, and both questions were affirmatively decided, the troops were ordered to parade in three divisions at two o’clock in the morning of the 31st of December; the New York regiments and part of Easton’s Massachusetts militia, at Holland House; the Cambridge detachment and Lamb’s company of artillerists, with one field-piece at Captain Morgan’s quarters; and the two small corps of Livingston and Brown at their respective grounds of parade. To the first and second of these divisions were assigned the two assaults on the opposite sides of the lower town; and to the third, a series of demonstrations or feigned attacks on different parts of the upper. This arrangement was made to meet the expectations of colonies, who looked to Montgomery for the capture of the capital, and speedy reduction of the province. But they understood little of Montgomery’s difficulties; the steep heights which fortified the upper town rendered the passage from one to the other almost impassable. The number of soldiers in the garrison consisted of about two hundred and seventy marines and regulars, eight hundred militia, and four hundred and fifty seamen. The movement began between three and four o’clock in the morning, from the Heights of Abraham; Montgomery advancing at the head of the first division by the river road, round the foot of Cape Diamond to Aunce au Mere; and Arnold at the head of the second, through the suburbs of St. Roque, to the Saut de Matelots. Both roads were so obstructed by snow and thick masses of ice, as to render their progress very difficult. These obstacles being at last surmounted, the first barrier was approached, vigorously attacked, and rapidly carried, and the troops after a moment’s pause pushed on to the second.