This reasoning was considered conclusive by the council, and the prisoner suffered as a common spy. The post at West Point, now vacated by the treachery of Arnold, was confided to Greene, and by the 8th of October he was already at his new station on the banks of the Hudson. He had hardly entered upon his duties, when General Washington appointed him to the command of the army in the South.
We now behold an entire change in the situation of General Greene, and follow him through a southern campaign, virtually invested with the supreme command of a large section of the United States. On his arrival at Charlotte, North Carolina, the head-quarters of General Gates, and on entering on the duties of his command, he found himself in a situation fearfully embarrassing.
He found but a handful of men, amounting to about two thousand, and these principally militia, with but three days’ provision, and a very short supply of ammunition. In front lay an enemy treble his number, proud in victory, and too strong to be encountered. Before him was a task which he considered hopeless—the recovery of two States already conquered, and the protection of a third. He saw the astounding difficulty he had to encounter—to raise and provide for a dispirited army in a devastated country, having to create resources where they did not exist; to operate with an incompetent force on an extended and broken line of frontier, and to contend with an enemy superior in numbers and discipline. To conduct a warfare like this required a genius of the highest order, combined with indefatigable skill and industry. In order to prepare for such a campaign, Greene’s first care was to provide for his troops subsistence and ammunition. His next was to draw close the reins of discipline, which had been shamefully relaxed, and make both officers and men feel that they had a commander who knew both his duty and theirs, and was resolved that both should be performed. He called no councils of war, studying every question himself, and communicating his intentions to only two or three of his officers whom he trusted most. In a letter to General Hamilton, he says, “If I cannot inspire the army with confidence and respect by an independent conduct, I foresee it will be impossible to instill discipline and order among the troops.”
His next care was to select a position where his troops could be properly trained to the use of their arms, and better and more easily supplied with food; while at the same time it was essential that every step on his part should be a connecting link in his general plan of operations. It must be conceded that much of the moral strength of an army consists in a confidence in its leader, an attachment to his person, and a spirit of subordination founded on principle. To such an extent was this true, that even the common soldiery, sensible of the superintendence of a superior officer, confidently predicted a change of fortune. They felt a solicitude to regain the reputation they lost at Camden under their late commander, and to signalize their prowess under the command of their present one. The main part of the British army was then lying at Winnsborough, between the Broad River and the Catawba, with powerful garrisons in their flank and rear, and Charleston to fall back upon in case of a defeat. Cornwallis, who was at Charleston, receiving continual supplies of both men and provisions from New York, was expected to connect with the part of the army at Winnsborough, and attack the Americans before they could be ready to leave the village of Charlotte. This called for a decided movement of the American army, and Greene resolved to divide his forces, sending one portion to act upon the west bank of the Catawba, to the north of the enemy’s position, and advancing with the other to the Cheraw hills on the frontiers of South Carolina. The first dispatch was about four hundred continentals, under General Morgan, with Colonel Washington’s corps of dragoons, and a few militia, amounting in all to six hundred men. This judicious arrangement, which formed a rallying point for the friends of independence, both in the East and West, also facilitated the procuring of provisions for the troops. General Greene soon began to feel the good effects of this movement; it enabled him to make the most of his little army by compelling his adversary to divide his forces, and leaving him at a loss which way to direct his efforts. By advancing against the American commander, he would expose his posts at Ninety-Six and Augusta, or Morgan, hovering upon his flanks or his rear, might seize the critical moment for aiming a blow in concert with the main army. Cornwallis, on discovering the movements of Greene, and finding that there was no time to be lost, dispatched Colonel Tarlton with a strong detachment, amounting in horse and foot to nearly a thousand men, for the protection of Ninety-Six, with orders to bring General Morgan, if possible, to battle. With numbers greatly superior to Morgan, he advanced with a menacing aspect, and compelled him at first to fall back rapidly. He accordingly continued for a few days to retire before his adversary, receiving at every step new accessions of strength from the inhabitants of the country through which he passed, alarmed by the presence, and irritated by the cruelty of the enemy. Relying with confidence on the firmness of his regulars, and glorying in action, Morgan halted at the Cowpens, and prepared to give his adversary battle. Tarlton seized the opportunity, and the conflict, which was severe and stoutly contested, ended in a complete victory obtained by the Americans. Tarlton fled, leaving one hundred and eighty-four men on the field, and more than five hundred as prisoners in the hands of the victor. Two field-pieces, eight hundred muskets, one hundred dragoon-horses, with a very large supply of tents and ammunition, which constituted, in the present state of the American army, one of the most welcome fruits of the victory. This battle of the Cowpens, although achieved under the immediate command of Morgan, was the first stroke of General Greene’s fortunate career at the South.
The disappointment of Cornwallis was severe, for he had looked with confidence for victory under the accomplished Tarlton. Still he received the tidings with serenity, and immediately gave orders for pursuing the victorious army, whose retreat he yet hoped to cut off; and in order to prepare for the effort, and free himself from every thing that could encumber or retard his march, he ordered that all the baggage at head-quarters should be committed to the flames.
This was done, and the example was followed by his faithful soldiers with cheerfulness, reserving but a small supply of clothing for each man, and a few wagons for the conveyance of hospital stores, ammunition, and of the sick and wounded. Every thing else was burned. While these desperate measures were going on in the British camp, Greene reached Morgan’s head-quarters on the banks of the Catawba.
To his great mortification, Lord Cornwallis now perceived that in two of his objects, the destruction of Morgan’s detachment, and the prevention of its union with the main division, he was completely frustrated by the activity of Greene. But he still hoped to cut off the retreat of the Americans into Virginia, after their union, and to compel them to action, was still perhaps practicable; and to the achievement of this he now directed his undivided energies.
Notwithstanding the vigilance and activity of the British commander, Greene brought his men in safety into Virginia, without any loss of either men or ammunition. Soon after his arrival in Virginia he received reinforcements, and also effected a junction with a continental regiment. Upon these accessions, he was determined on attacking the British commander without loss of time, and accordingly commenced his march toward Guildford Court-House, the British then lying at twelve miles distance. His army had now increased to four thousand five hundred men, that of the British about two thousand four hundred. General Greene arrived at Guildford Court-House on the 14th of March, and on the morning of the 15th Cornwallis marched to meet him. He disposed his army in three lines—the militia of North Carolina were in front; the second line was composed of those of Virginia; and the third, which was the flower of the army, was formed of continental troops, near fifteen hundred in number. They were posted on a rising ground, a mile and a half from Guildford Court-House.
The engagement commenced by a brisk cannonade, after which the British advanced in three columns and attacked the first line composed of North Carolina militia. Many of the latter had never been in action before, and panic-struck, ran away without firing a gun, or being fired upon, and even before the British had come near them. The conflict lasted an hour and a half, and was terminated by General Greene’s ordering a retreat, when he found the enemy about encircling his troops.
This was a hard fought battle, and the exertions of the two rival generals, both in preparing for this action and during the course of it, were never surpassed. Forgetful of every thing but the fortune of the day, they on several occasions, mingled in the danger like common soldiers. The Americans lost in this battle about 400; several of the number were officers of distinction. The result of this conflict, though literally a defeat, was eventually a victory; for on the part of General Greene it will be seen that it placed him on higher ground toward his adversary than he had previously occupied. Believing that Lord Cornwallis would follow him, he kept retreating slowly until he had gained an advantageous position, where he could renew the contest whenever his adversary came in view. But Cornwallis, not being in a condition to pursue, commenced his retreat, leaving behind him about seventy of his wounded, whom he recommended, in a handsome letter, written by himself, to the humanity and attention of the American commander. Had General Greene been in a situation to have pursued his lordship, the destruction of that officer and his army would have been inevitable; and Carolina would have witnessed that momentous event which was reserved for Virginia. But the exhaustion of General Greene’s military stores, suspended his movements till he had received a supply.