BY RICHARD BARRY.
COOKE'S CAVALRY AT GAINES'S MILL.
It was a strange fact that those in authority at Washington and those in charge of the immediate conduct of the Union armies in the field did not early in the war recognize the immense importance of a well-organized cavalry.
The idea that cavalry should be used merely as an auxiliary arm of the service was held by General Scott, and those who immediately followed him in command seem to have held the same opinion.
The small bodies of troopers of both the regular and volunteer branches of the mounted service were attached to various isolated army corps. Their duties consisted mainly in taking the places of orderly messengers, doing patrol duty, and acting as advance outposts. Their duties were onerous, and were not calculated to bring them much chance for glory or advancement. The cavalry Captains and leaders demurred greatly against this false position, and it may be said that the lesson that the Union Generals learned in regard to the uses of mounted troops was gained from the experience of battle, when they had arrayed against them the quickly moving, impetuous horsemen of Stuart and the younger Lees.
But even before the North had developed the magnificent and well-ordered brigades that figured so conspicuously in the latter years of the war, there occurred not a few instances where the trooper with his pistol and sabre distinguished himself before the enemy and under the eyes of his countrymen. The first charge of any importance that took place before the reform was inaugurated that gave the men in the saddles a worthy position was at the battle of Gaines's Mill, on the 27th of June, 1862.
About the part that the cavalry played in this affair much bitter controversy has arisen. Men whose names are well known, whose intrepid bravery and worth have long been recognized, have taken stands upon this question. It is not the place of an article so short as this to go into this in detail. We have but to tell of the brave actions which occurred that day, and to relate the facts and important happenings on the left of the line of battle, where the small detachments of cavalry that made the charge were placed.
All day long the Union batteries and the Confederate batteries had been replying to one another. General Fitz John Porter had estimated that the forces under his command were greatly overmatched. Early in the day he had determined upon a battle of resistance, and made up his mind to hold the enemy in check if possible. A long line of infantry that stretched along the swampy bottom-lands and woody ravines were hardly enough to guard and support the artillery which had been placed in positions more or less exposed on the crests of the hills and the vantage spots south of the Chickahominy. This river divided the Union army, making it almost impossible to send re-enforcements to the right wing or to gather it together on the right bank.
On June 14 the Confederate General Stuart had made a dashing raid around McClellan's army. The slow-moving infantry had not had time to cut them off.
General Porter had posted his batteries of artillery, and had been employed all the morning in forming his lines to await the enemy's attack. General P. St. George Cooke had been instructed to take his position with the small body of cavalry at his disposal under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy. It was expected of him to support the artillery stationed there and to guard the left flank of the long line. The whole attitude of the Union forces, as we have said, was one of defence. The battle opened on the left in the morning, and by two o'clock in the afternoon had spread along the entire front. It was a strange fact that all of the severe battles of the seven days' fight before Richmond began after noonday.