Sir E. Grey (Northumberland, Berwick)—These were personal suggestions made by the Ambassador on Aug. 1, and without authority to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the German Chancellor in No. 85 in the "White Paper"—Miscellaneous, No. 6, [1914.]
The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next morning—that is, Sunday, Aug. 2—the conditions on which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion that respect for the neutrality of Belgium must be one of these conditions. ["Hear, hear!">[ The German Chancellor had already been told on July 30 that we could not bargain that way.
On Monday, Aug. 3, I made a statement in the House accordingly. I had seen the German Ambassador again at his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, though he said that he did not know the plans of the German military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the morning, and I had no time to record the conversation, and therefore it does not appear in the "White Paper"; but it was impossible to withdraw that condition [loud cheers] without becoming a consenting party to the violation of the treaty, and subsequently to a German attack on Belgium.
After I spoke in the House we made to the German Government the communication described in No. 153 in the "White Paper" about the neutrality of Belgium. Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that communication had not been received when the "White Paper" was printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete the "White Paper."
I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123 in the "White Paper" when I spoke in the House on Aug. 3. If I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality I must have referred to No. 85, the proposals made, not personally by the Ambassador, but officially by the German Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister subsequently, and this would have made the case against the German Government much stronger than I did make it in my speech. ["Hear, hear!">[ I deliberately refrained from doing that then.
Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made on behalf of his Government. He worked for peace; but real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace failed. [Loud cheers.]
Mr. Keir Hardie—May I ask whether any attempt was made to open up negotiations with Germany on the basis of suggestions here set forth by the German Ambassador?
Sir E. Grey—The German Ambassador did not make any basis of suggestions. It was the German Chancellor who made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, speaking on his own personal initiative and without authority, asked whether we would formulate conditions on which we would be neutral. We did go into that question, and those conditions were stated to the House and made known to the German Ambassador.
Mr. Keir Hardie [who was received with cries of "Oh!" from all parts of the House]—May I ask whether the German authorities at Berlin repudiated the suggestions of their Ambassador in London, and whether any effort at all [renewed cries of "Oh!" and "Order!">[ was made to find out how far the German Government would have agreed to the suggestions put before them by their own Ambassador?