Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.[04]
This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.
A Sudden Decision.
It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.
If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:
We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think necessary to take.—(British "White Paper" No. 151.)
One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders:
You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France.—(British "White Paper" No. 155.)
Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.
But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.