We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner subscribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned:
He [Sazonof] would like to see the question placed on international footing.... If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.—(British "White Paper" No. 17.)
Hence, not if England, but only if Servia would propose arbitration by the powers, Mr. Sazonof was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Servia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from Servia. In expressing such an idea. Mr. Sazonof proved that it was his intention to bring war about.
[04] The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned previously states on Page 27 (retranslation):
That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had been taken into consideration by the Germans has been known in England generally for several years; and it has also been generally accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about the active resistance of the British armed forces: one assumed that these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian territory.