There can be no greater contrast than that between the United States and Germany in one of the most important questions of existence with which a State is confronted. In its whole history the United States has never had a foreign hostile force of invaders upon its territory, foreign armies have never laid waste its fields. Until late in the last century, however, Germany was the battlefield for the then most powerful nations of Europe. The numerous German States and provinces, too, fought among themselves, often on behalf of foreign powers. The European great powers of that day were able, unhindered and unpunished, to take for themselves piece after piece of German territory. In the United States, on the other hand, it was years before the steadily increasing population attained to the boundaries set for it by nature.
Our Bismarck was finally able, in the years from 1864 to 1871, to create a great empire from the many small German States. As he himself often remarked, however, this was possible only because his policies and diplomacy rested upon and were supported by a well trained and powerful army. How the German Empire came into being at that time is well known. A war was necessary because of the fact that the then so powerful France did not desire that North and South Germany should unite. She was not able to prevent this union, was defeated and had to give back to us two old German provinces which she had stolen from the Germans. The old Field Marshal von Moltke said not long after the war of 1870-71 that the Germans would still have to defend Alsace-Lorraine for fifty years more. Perhaps he little realized how prophetic his words were, but he and those who followed him, the German Emperors and the German War Ministers, prepared themselves for this coming defensive struggle and unremittingly devoted their attention to the German Army.
From 1887 on there had been no doubt that in the event of war with France we should have to reckon also with Russia. This meant that the army must be strong enough to be equal to the coming fight on two borders—a tremendous demand upon the resources of a land when one considers that a peaceful folk, devoted to agriculture, industry, and trade, must live for decades in the constant expectation of being obliged, be it tomorrow, be it in ten years, to fight for its life against its two great military neighbors simultaneously. There are, moreover, the great money expenditures, and also the burden of universal military service, which, as is well known, requires every able-bodied male German to serve a number of years with the colors, and later to hold himself ready, first as a reservist, then as member of the Landwehr, and finally as member of the Landsturm, to spring to arms at the call of his supreme war lord, the German Emperor. A warlike, militant nation would not long have endured such conditions, but would have compelled a war and carried it through swiftly. As Bismarck said, however, the German Army, since it is an army of the folk itself, is not a weapon for frivolous aggression. Since the German Army, when it is summoned to war, represents the whole German people, and since the whole German people is peaceably disposed, it follows that the army can only be a defensive organization. If war comes, millions of Germans must go to the front, must leave their parents, their families, their children. They must. And this "must" means not only the command of their Emperor, but also the necessity to defend their own land. Did not this necessity exist, these sons, husbands, and fathers would assuredly not go gladly to the battlefield, and it is likewise certain that those who stayed at home would not rejoice so enthusiastically to see them go as we Germans have seen them rejoicing in these days. Again, then, let us repeat that the German Army is a weapon which can be and is used only for defense against foreign aggressions. When these aggressions come, the whole German folk stands with its army, as it does now.
The German Army is divided into 25 corps in times of peace. In war times reservists, members of the Landwehr, and occasionally also of the Landsturm, are called to the colors. The result is that the German Army on a war footing is a tremendously powerful organ.
Our opponents in foreign countries have for years consistently endeavored to awaken the belief that the German soldier does his obligatory service very unwillingly, that he does not get enough to eat and is badly treated. These assertions are false, and anybody who has seen in these weeks of mobilization how our soldiers, reservists, and Landwehr men departed for the field or reported at the garrisons, anybody who has seen their happy, enthusiastic and fresh faces knows that mishandled men, men who have been drilled as machines, cannot present such an appearance.
On the day the German mobilization was ordered we traveled with some Americans from the western border to Berlin. These Americans said: "We do not know much about your army, but judging by what we have seen in these days there prevails in it and all its arrangements such system that it must win. System must win every time." In this saying there is, indeed, much of truth—order and system are the basis upon which the mighty organization of our army is built.
Now a word concerning the German officer. He, too, has been much maligned, he is often misunderstood by foreigners, and yet we believe that the people of the United States in particular must be able to understand the German officer. One of the greatest sons of free America, George Washington, gave his countrymen the advice to select only gentlemen as officers, and it is according to this principle that the officers of the German Army and Navy are chosen. Their selection is made, moreover, upon a democratic basis, in that the officers' corps of the various regiments decide for themselves whether they will or will not accept as a comrade the person whose name is proposed to them.
One sees that the German Army is not, as many say, a tremendous machine, but rather a great, living organism, which draws its strength and lifeblood from all classes of the whole German folk. The German Army can develop its entire strength only in a war which the folk approve, that is, when a defensive war has been forced upon them. That this is true will have been realized by our friends in the United States before this comes into their hands.
The German fleet is in like manner a weapon of defense. It was very small up to the end of the last century, but has since then been consistently built up according to the ground principles which Mr. Roosevelt has so often in his powerful manner laid down for the American fleet. The question has often been asked, what is there for the German fleet to defend, since the German coastline is so short? The answer is that the strength of a fleet must not be made to depend upon the length of coastlines, but upon how many ships and how much merchandise go out from and enter the harbors, how great oversea interests there are, how large the colonies are and how they are situated, and, finally, how strong the sea powers are with which Germany may have to carry on a war and how they are situated. To meet all these requirements there is but one remedy, namely, either that our fleet shall be strong enough to prevent the strongest sea power from conducting war against us, or that, if war does come, it shall be able so to battle against the mightiest opponent that the latter shall be seriously weakened.
Germany, as especially the Americans know, has become a great merchant marine nation, whose colonies are flourishing. Furthermore, since the land's growing population has greatly increased its strength in the course of the last years, the mistrust and jealousy of Great Britain have in particular been directed steadily against the development of our ocean commerce, and later of our navy. To the upbuilding of the German Navy were ascribed all manner of plans—to attack Great Britain, to make war on Japan, &c. It was even declared by the English press that Germany intended to attack the United States as soon as its fleet was strong enough. Today, when Great Britain has needlessly declared war upon us, the Americans will perhaps believe that our fleet was never planned or built for an attack on any one. Germany desired simply to protect its coasts and its marine interests in the same manner in which it protects its land boundaries. It is realized in the United States as well as here that a fleet can be powerful only when it has a sufficient number of vessels of all classes, and when it is thoroughly and unremittingly schooled in times of peace. We have tried to attain this ideal in Germany, and it may be remarked that the training of the personnel requires greater efforts here, since the principle of universal service is also applied to the fleet, with a resulting short term of service, whereas all foreign fleets have a long term of enlistment.