On the western front the principal scenes of action have been the front from Nieuport to Arras, the Champagne district, and the southern side of the German wedge from its apex at St. Mihiel to Pont-à-Mousson. On the northern part of the Allies' line from Ypres to Nieuport the Germans have been the aggressors. They have selected as the principal points of attack the Belgian line back of the Yser just south of Nieuport and the point of juncture of the British with the Belgian lines.
Both attacks have the same general object—the bending back of the line between these two points with a vision, for the future, of Dunkirk and Calais. The attack along the Yser has not been pushed to any extent, and what advantage there is rests with the Belgians. In fact, the Belgians have advanced somewhat and have been able to throw a bridge across the Yser near St. George, just east of Nieuport, on the Nieuport-Bruges road.
Around Ypres the fighting has been more than usually fierce and desperate. Blow after blow has been struck, first by one side, then by the other. Both German and British have admittedly suffered enormous losses, but the positions of their respective lines are almost unchanged from those occupied a week ago. The German gains of last week in the vicinity of Steenstraate produced in the British lines around Ypres a sharp salient, and it is against the sides of this salient that the Germans have been hurling their forces.
The town of Ypres is now in complete ruins, and, although it would normally be of importance because of the fact that it is the point of crossing of a number of roads, this importance is destroyed by the fact that it is entirely dominated by the German artillery. As long as this state of affairs exists the town has practically no strategic value. All that the Germans can accomplish if they take Ypres will have been a flattening out of the British salient.
Germany cannot be content with occasional bending of the Allies' line. The process is too slow and too costly. Germany has almost, if not quite, reached her maximum strength, and the losses she now suffers will be difficult to replace. Viewing the situation entirely from the German standpoint, success can only mean breaking through and attacking the two exposed flanks at the point pierced. This would force a retreat as in the case of the Russian lines along the Dunajec, which will be taken up later on. No other form of action can be decisive, though it might permit a little more of Belgian or French territory to change hands. This would, of course, in case the war were declared a draw, give Germany an additional advantage in the discussion of terms of peace, especially if the rule of uti posseditis were applied as a basis from which to begin negotiations. But this contingency is too remote for present consideration.
As to the probability of German success around Ypres, it seems to grow less as time passes. After the first rush was over and the British lines had time to re-form Germany has accomplished nothing. Moreover, it is certain that in back of the short twenty-five miles of line held by the British troops there is a reserve of almost a half million men. No other portion of the battle line in either theatre has such great latent strength ready to be thrown in when the critical moment comes. Just why it has not been used so far is a mystery, the solution of which can be found only in the brain of Sir John French. But it is known to be in France and is there for a purpose.
From Loos to Arras the French have undertaken the most ambitious and the most successful offensive movement made in the west since Winter set in. The entire French line along this front of twenty-five miles, taking the Germans by surprise, has gone forward a distance varying from one-half to two and a half miles. The attack was launched at an extremely opportune moment. The Germans were, in the first place, extremely busy in the north at Ypres, and were making every effort to drive that attack home. The probabilities were, therefore, that the line in front of the Arras-Loos position was none too strong, and that such reserves as could be spared had been sent north. Then, again, it would tend to divert attention from the Ypres line, and so relieve somewhat the pressure on the British lines at that point.
The objective of the French attack seems to have been the town of Lens, which is the centre of the coal district of France. Loos, which is about three miles north of Lens, has been one of the centres of fighting. This indicates how close the French are to their objective. Lens is an important railroad centre, and is the point of junction of many roads which radiate in all directions. As yet the French advance is not sufficient to denote anything, but another step in the "nibbling" process by means of which the French have kept the Germans occupied for some months.
In the German angle, from Etain to St. Mihiel to Pont-à-Mousson, the French achieved what will probably prove to be the greatest local success of the past week. That is, the complete occupation of the Le Prêtre woods. Sooner or later the continual French encroachments on the German area of occupation must cause the straightening out of this line and the retirement of the Germans to the supporting forts of Metz. The object of all the French moves against this angle has been the town of Thiancourt, on the German supply line from Metz. The capture of the last German line of trenches in the Prêtre Forest brings the French within six miles of this town. When the French reach the northern edge of this forest, and they must be very close to it now, it will be a simple matter to drop shells into Thiancourt and seriously endanger every train that comes in.
On the rest of the western front there have been a number of isolated actions, notably in the Champagne district, in the Argonne Forest and north of Flirey, between St. Mihiel and Pont-à-Mousson. They have been of no particular advantage however, and seem to have had no definite purpose beyond making additions to the casualty lists.