From the Messaggero, April 1.
As Prince von Bülow's negotiations have apparently failed, Italy naturally addresses herself to England. There is, however, this difficulty: England has already made arrangements with France and Russia for the solution of the questions of the Dardanelles and Asia Minor, whereas Italy wishes to have her say in these questions before giving her assistance to the Triple Entente. Moreover, there are Greek aspirations in the Levant and Serbian in the Adriatic to be reconciled with those of Italy. Consequently the situation is not easy.
From the Stampa, April 11.
Not only must Italy have her natural frontiers on the east restored, not only must she have her legitimate supremacy in the Adriatic assured, not only must she safeguard her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the eventual partition of the Turkish Empire, but she must also see assured in the Western Mediterranean a greater guarantee for the safety of herself and her possessions and wider liberty of action than that of which she has recently had painful experience. These things must be guaranteed by an alliance with either Russia or with England....
Before having solved this difficulty any decision in favor of war would be a leap in the dark, an act of inconceivable political blindness. It would be, to adopt a rough, but inevitable, term, a veritable betrayal.
From the Giornale d'Italia of April 12, in criticising the foregoing.
We absolutely fail to understand the motive which induced the Piedmontese journal to print matter so calculated to confuse public opinion. Indeed, the care with which our contemporary seeks to embarrass Italian diplomatic action seems somewhat strange and cannot escape the blame of all those who think it necessary not to hamper the liberty of action conceded to the Government almost unanimously by Parliament and by the people....
It seems almost as though the Piedmontese journal had no thought but to put insoluble problems to the Government, in the face of public opinion, so as to try to prejudice its action in advance. The Stampa's program practically means that to the diplomatic rupture with the Central Empires would be added another diplomatic rupture with the Triple Entente, thus insuring the isolation which the Stampa professes to fear so much.
From the Corriere della Sera, April 12.
The article in the Stampa, which appears ultra-nationalist, is in reality purely neutralist. Italian aspirations must be kept within reasonable bounds. What would happen to Italy if demands were put forward which the Entente could not entertain? Quite apart from questions of direct interest and gain, other factors must be taken into account. There is the danger to Italy in case of the success of her late allies, which would mean the prostration of France, the annexation of Belgium to Germany, the arrival of Austria at Saloniki, British naval hegemony replaced by German, the revival of Turkey, and the consequent ambition to resume possession of lost territories.