The days of the Turk in Europe are numbered, but no one will deny that he is dying hard and game. It came as a disagreeable shock to many to read on the morning of March 19 that two British battleships and one French had been sunk in the Dardanelles, while several others had been hit and damaged.
We were told that the outer forts had been completely destroyed and that the work of mine sweeping had made excellent progress. This news was given in perfect good faith and was also quite true, but we built up on it too great a structure of hope, but few realizing the immense difficulties the fleet has had to face—obstacles which do not really commence until the Narrows are approached. The combined advance of the allied fleet up the Dardanelles on March 18 was not an attempt to pass the Narrows. It was merely intended as a great demonstration against the forts, in order that the destroyers and sweepers might clear the minefield under cover of the guns of the ships.
This work was carried out in the most gallant manner and was perfectly successful, but unfortunately the further advance had to be abandoned, owing to the sudden and unexpected disasters to three vessels inflicted by drifting mines. But the price paid cannot be considered too high when one remembers the issues at stake and the vast bearing they may have on the future of the war. The Turks have always believed the Dardanelles to be impregnable, and this belief has been accepted as the truth by most lay minds until the navy started to put the issue to the test. Then, for some unknown reason, here came a quite unjustifiable wave of optimism, which swept over the country until the eyes of the public were opened by the events of March 18.
In the old days of sailing ships the Dardanelles were a most formidable obstacle which no Admiral would have faced with confidence.
It was almost impossible to overcome the obstacles in the early days of the nineteenth century. The difficulties and dangers of the passage have been increased tenfold now by long-range weapons, torpedoes, and mines. Nevertheless, the navy is of opinion that the Narrows can be forced, in spite of these obstacles, and this opinion has been strengthened and confirmed by the great trial of March 18. It might mean the loss of ships, but if the occasion justified the sacrifice the fleet would not hesitate to make the attempt.
But, unless there is a powerful army ready to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula the moment the fleet passed into the Sea of Marmora or made its way to Constantinople, the strait would immediately be closed behind it, and, supposing the Turks, backed up by German officers and German intrigues, decided to continue the war, it would have to fight its way out and again clear the minefield. It has long been an accepted axiom of naval warfare that ships are of no use against forts, or that they fight at such a disadvantage that it is not worth while employing them for such a purpose.
This axiom must now be modified, after the experience which the fleet has gained in the present operations against the Dardanelles. Any fort built of stone or concrete, however strong, can be put out of action by direct fire from guns, if only a clear view of it can be obtained, or provided aeroplanes are available to "spot" for the gunners, to signal back results, and correct the fire.