One set of reports intimates that the German counter-proposals have been found to harmonize with Mr. Bryan's plan of providing for a period of investigation in cases of international conflict, while other advices reproduce various American editorials, declaring that the German note is utterly unacceptable, and demanding that steps of varying degrees of aggressiveness be taken.
While waiting, the time is being utilized by some of the more aggressive German newspapers and writers of the type of Reventlow to launch abusive articles against the United States and President Wilson's policy, but the press and public generally seem desirous of avoiding anything which might increase the tension between the two Governments while the German note is under consideration. In this they are acting in complete accord with the Foreign Office, which apparently is sincerely anxious to preserve friendly relations with the United States and deprecates any publication which would tend to inflame the feelings either in Germany or America.
There seems to be no doubt that the Foreign Office would rejoice at a solution consistent with German interests, and it is considered here that one of the unfortunate features of the situation is the inability of the Foreign Office to cope with the chronic firebrands of the press.
This complaint was followed by the news, published by The Chicago Herald on June 4, that a special arrangement had been effected by Ambassador Bernstorff in his conference with President Wilson on June 2, as follows:
With the approval of the President of the United States, Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in Washington, has sent a special agent to Berlin to discuss the American view of the Lusitania tragedy with the German Government.
The agent is Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhard. He sailed today for Denmark. It is not believed that his voyage will be interfered with. Mr. Gerhard's connection with the great question between the United States and Germany has been guarded with the utmost secrecy. It leaked out only when inquiries were made regarding his departure in such a hurry. Mr. Gerhard himself could not be seen.
The suggestion that Mr. Gerhard go to Berlin was made by Count von Bernstorff to the President at the White House conference on Wednesday. The Ambassador described to the President the difficulties he experienced in transmitting information to his Government. He cannot use the cables, which are in the possession of the Allies. So far as wireless is concerned, conditions make it almost impossible to send anything but the briefest dispatches. As a result, Germany is not well informed in regard to the reasons controlling the policy of the Administration or the state of public sentiment. If his Government were adequately informed the Ambassador is confident that it would look at the demands of the United States in a different fashion.
The President apparently appreciated the view presented by the Ambassador. In any event, he authorized him to send an agent to Berlin, and it is presumed that thereupon he was apprised of the identity of the man selected. Count von Bernstorff vouched for Mr. Gerhard as thoroughly informed on the entire diplomatic situation as well as upon the condition of public sentiment. In addition, he is carrying full explanatory reports from the Ambassador himself.
[Dr. Meyer-Gerhard arrived in Berlin via Copenhagen on June 16 and reported at the German Colonial Office. While en route The Providence Journal and The New York Tribune published stories, varying in detail, to the effect that the United States Government had been hoaxed into obtaining safe conduct into Germany for a Dr. Alfred Meyer, reported to be a German buyer of munitions of war in this country, either under the name of Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhard, falsely given, or under Meyer-Gerhard's protection. On receiving assurances to the contrary from Count von Bernstorff, Secretary Lansing announced on June 18 that the charge was false.]